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Thesis Summary  
  
The title, per aspera ad astra, the ‘struggle to the stars’, speaks to this thesis in 
two ways. Firstly, the theoretical focus of this research project rests upon 
understanding the joint pursuit of exploitation (efficiency) and exploration 
(innovation), a concept otherwise known as organizational ambidexterity. To date, 
studies have demonstrated that organizations with the ability to achieve ambidexterity 
are apt to become leading star performers in their industries. Yet the pursuit of 
ambidexterity is difficult and fraught with tension; for exploration and exploitation are 
considered incompatible and demand fundamentally different skill requirements and 
capabilities. The research herein contributes knowledge to the field of strategy and 
change management by addressing an important but underdeveloped area of inquiry in 
examining how, in practice, an organization transitions towards an ambidextrous 
strategy and manages the exploration-exploitation duality (Birkinshaw, Crilly, Bouquet 
and Lee, 2016). Herein, the study focuses on the exploration-exploitation duality and 
addresses the research questions ‘how does an established organization transition in 
strategic pursuit of organizational ambidexterity, and what underlying mechanisms 
support or impeded its transition?’ 
Secondarily, to address this question an empirical qualitative case study 
analysis was conducted of an organization undergoing strategic change towards 
achieving ambidexterity, namely the NASA Johnson Space Center who strive to 
advance science and technology through the difficult endeavor of human space 
exploration. Utilizing a multimethod approach, rich qualitative data was gathered and 
through inductive reasoning and a grounded theory approach, theoretical insights were 
generated to develop theory. Broadly speaking, the study finds that: (1) an 
organization’s approach to ambidexterity is not static but evolves progressively with 
antecedents arranged in a layered pattern over time due to a dynamic relationship 
between exploration-exploitation. Consequentially, structural and contextual 
antecedents to ambidexterity are employed in a hybrid manner, and this is enabled by 
various distinct skills, processes and structures resembling the micro foundations of 
dynamic capabilities; (2) the formal and informal organization are important 
organizational features whose interaction creates a practice-based mechanism which, 
under certain conditions, engenders the informal organization to promote long-term 
change supporting the effective pursuit of ambidexterity; and (3) an organization’s 
history, when punctuated with crisis events, can have a paradoxical influence that 
simultaneously supports and impedes its approach to exploration and exploitation. 
The study contributes to a richer understanding of organizational ambidexterity and 
how an organization pursues and implements this strategy in practice. It also 
contributes to expanding our understanding of the processes, structures and micro-
features engaged in the development of ambidexterity at different levels of the 
organization.  
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Chapter One  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones” 
 – John Maynard Keynes 
 
Over the last decade, we have witnessed an explosion of literature and 
research from the fields of organizational management and strategy exploring the 
concept of organizational ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). With the 
organizational environment becoming ever more dynamic and complex, together with 
the constraints of finite resources, managers in both the public and private sector must 
increasingly grapple with complex decisions and master the skill of managing 
competing internal tensions and demands. The ability to perform and balance 
different and often opposing activities at the same time lies at the heart of the 
ambidexterity hypothesis. Organizational ambidexterity scholars argue that an 
ambidextrous organization develops key competencies that engender superior firm 
performance (Simsek, Heavey, Veiga and Souder, 2009). Interest in organizational 
ambidexterity is warranted having been associated with several positive outcomes 
including optimal performance (Uotila, Maula, Keil and Zahra, 2009), sales growth 
(He and Wong, 2004), and knowledge sharing (Kauppila, 2010). A number of 
empirical studies have also given support to the ambidexterity hypothesis (Simsek et 
al, 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling and Veiga, 2006). He and Wong 
(2004) and Lubatkin et al’s (2006) statistical analysis found a positive relationship 
between firm growth performance and the joint pursuit of exploration and 
exploitation. And Uotila, Maula, Keil and Zahra’s (2009) longitudinal content analysis 
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of firm-level operationalization of exploration and exploitation activities found an 
inverted-U shaped relationship between long-term financial performance and the 
relative emphasis of ambidexterity. Thus, the ability to balance exploration and 
exploitation activities leads to optimal performance levels (Uotila et al, 2009). 
Similarly, case studies of exemplar companies such as Apple Inc. (Heracleous, 2013), 
USA Today (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004), Toyota (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 
1999) and Singapore International Airlines (Heracleous and Wirtz, 2014) provide real-
world evidence of organizations who demonstrate ambidextrous capabilities and 
consequently outperform in their industries; thus, demonstrating the important value 
and contribution of ambidexterity research to academia and organizational practice. 
Yet, despite growing interest in ambidexterity research, scholars acknowledge that the 
ability to balance competing tensions effectively remains a difficult endeavor, which 
begs an interesting point for investigation for academics and practitioners alike. If 
organizational ambidexterity has the potential to engender highly-effective star 
performing organizations, then how in actuality does an organization go about 
transitioning to become ambidextrous and under what conditions? Additionally, which 
underpinning mechanisms support this transition or pose obstacles during this change 
process and why? Such questions persist and provide a launch pad from which to 
probe and go deeper, as to bridge the theoretic and pragmatic, in exploring the 
concept of organizational ambidexterity and how an organization pursues such an 
agenda.  
 
Organizational Ambidexterity 
Defining organizational ambidexterity 
Ambidexterity research has grown rapidly since the turn of the millennium 
(Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013) with contributions stemming from multiple streams of 
literature including, strategic management, organizational learning, organizational 
design and organizational adaptation (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Due to its various 
conceptualizations, there remains a lack of consensus omnium over the definition of 
organizational ambidexterity (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013; Papachroni, Heracleous and Paroutis, 2014; 
Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Simsek, 2009; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996).  
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This thesis adopts a view of ambidexterity as an organization’s capacity to 
simultaneously pursue and operate dualities or internal tensions in response to changes 
in its environment. This broad view draws from elements common across the varying 
interpretations posited by researchers (Simsek, 2009; Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013) 
and does not adhere to a particular theoretical assumption as to the nature of 
organizational tensions (i.e. continuum, orthogonal or paradoxical) (see Gupta et al, 
2006; Papachroni et al, 2014).  In so doing, this allows the researcher to examine the 
nature and management of organizational tensions as they are perceived and 
operationalized through the perspective of actors involved in the organization’s 
pursuit of ambidexterity.  
 
The exploration-exploitation tension 
Scholars acknowledge that a multiplicity of tensions are present within 
organizations1. The most frequently examined and conspicuous tension within 
research has been the exploitation-exploration tension (March 1991), with theoretical 
and empirical studies analyzing how an organization may simultaneously achieve these 
two activities adjudged to be incompatible.  However, as with the concept of 
ambidexterity, ambiguity surrounds the meaning of the terms exploration and 
exploitation (Lavie et al, 2010). This thesis assumes a general view of exploration as 
comprising the discovery of new knowledge and search for novel opportunities, 
flexibility, risk taking, experimentation, innovation, variation and embraces autonomy 
(March, 1991; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). Conversely, exploitation involves the 
refinement of existing competencies through variance reduction, maintaining stability 
in operations, efficiency (March, 1991), and “effective implementation, execution, 
certainty and control” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008: 189). Adopting this broad scope 
                                                          
1 Scholars have identified and analyzed a multiplicity of organizational tensions which include 
adapting to environmental changes-alignment in present operations (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004), flexibility-stability (Bahrami, 1992), low cost strategic position-differentiation strategic 
position (Porter, 1980); change-stability (Leana and Barry, 2000), flexibility-efficiency (Adler et 
al, 1999), revolutionary-evolutionary change (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996); retrenchment-
investment (Paroutis, Bennett and Heracleous, 2014); centralization-decentralization (Lewis, 
2000), short term performance-long term performance (Smith and Lewis, 2011); social 
orientation-profit orientation (Smith, Besharov, Wessels, and Chertok, 2012); local 
responsiveness-global integration (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989); intuitive-rational strategic 
decision making (Calabretta, Gemser and Wijnberg, 2017); similarity-distinctiveness employee 
identity (Cuganesan, 2017).  
 
4 
 
captures the various nuances, processes and practices that define the dimensions of 
exploration and exploitation. 
   
Facets of the antecedents to organizational ambidexterity  
In observing the prevailing conceptualizations that address how exploration 
and exploitation may be pursued ambidextrously, one can conclude that they orientate 
around four main facets: (1) configuration of time, (2) mechanism of resolve the 
tension, (3) organizational feature, and (4) unit of implementation (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Summary of the key facets of organizational ambidexterity 
Key dimensions Means to ambidexterity
1. Configuration of 
time
Static (simultaneous)
Dynamic (sequential)
2.
3. Structural / archetectural design
Contextual /behavioural
4. Organization
 Inter-organizational
 Intra-organizational
Team
Individual unit
Business unit
Executive Leadership
Employees on the ground
Authors
Adler et al (1999); Gibson & 
Birkinshaw (2004)
Unit of 
implementation 
Organizational 
features
Mechanism to 
manage tension
Lavie & Rosenkopf (2006)
Separation  of processes, systems, 
structures 
Integration  of processes, systems, 
structures
Katila & Ahuja (2002); Farjoun 
(2010); Jansen, Tempelaar, Bosch & 
Volberda (2009)
O'Connor & DeMartino (2006)
Smith, Lewis & Tushman (2016)
Rogan and Mors (2014); 
Zimmerman, Raisch & Birkinshaw 
(2015)
Tushman & O'Reilly (1996); 
Birkinshaw & Gibson (2004)
Brown & Eisenhardt (1997); 
Boumgarden, Nickerson & Zenger 
(2012); Romanelli & Tushman 
(1994); Kang, Kang and Kim (2017)
Duncan (1976); Tushman & O'Reilly 
(1997)
Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004)
Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling & Veiga 
(2006); Liu & Leitner (2012); 
Heavey & Simsek (2017)
Duncan (1976); Tushman & O'Reilly 
(1996)
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The first facet, configuration of time, captures how organizational ambidexterity 
operates temporally, noting that organizational tensions may be balanced or managed 
either within or across time (Boumgarden, Nickerson and Zenger, 2012). In balancing 
the exploration-exploitation tension ambidexterity literature treats and configures time 
in two different compositions. First, time and ambidexterity are perceived to occur 
dynamically in that ambidexterity emerges through a sequential cyclical movement 
where the two elements of the tension (i.e. exploration and exploitation) alternate 
cyclically through time. The other perception assumes a static presence of time, where 
the balance of the tension happens in the same instance and both activities are 
managed in unison, simultaneously.  
The second dimension, the mechanism to manage tension, pertains to the approach 
taken in order to manage and generate either balance or reconciliation between the 
two aspects of the tension. To date, ambidexterity literature outlines two mechanisms 
of balance, both of which are fundamentally different in how the nature of the 
exploration-exploitation tension is perceived. One mechanism to manage the tension 
contends that balance should be achieved through an approach that separates 
exploration from exploitation activities and both are managed independently, for the 
two are deemed to be irreconcilable (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). The second 
mechanism views explore-exploit activities to be congruent and therefore advocates an 
approach in which both activities are integrated (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2014).  
The third facet, organizational feature, refers to the attributes inherent in 
organizations through which the balance or management of exploration-exploitation 
may be achieved. Ambidexterity literature to date has focused primarily on two 
organizational features, (a) the organization’s business model and structural form (i.e. 
organizational design) (Jansen, Simsek and Cao, 2012; Markides and Oyon, 2010); and 
(b) its internal context and behavior (i.e. culture and values) (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004). However, little attention has been given to the role of other organizational 
features such as the informal organization and the role it plays in the process of 
becoming ambidextrous.  
Lastly, the unit of implementation. For ambidexterity to be realized within an 
organization, research suggests that the unit level at which this competency is enacted 
may be critical to its effectiveness (Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst and Tushman, 2009). 
Furthermore, existing studies have for the most part centered on three distinct levels 
of implementation – the organization, the group [team] and the individual unit. At the 
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organizational level, studies have suggested that ambidexterity may occur as an inter-
organizational endeavor (i.e. collaborative partnerships and alliances) (Kauppila, 2010), 
whilst other researchers have examined how ambidexterity is achieved intra-
organizationally, within the organization (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Although the 
writer of this thesis appreciates the inter-organizational argument for ambidexterity, 
the research focus of the thesis hereinafter concentrates on ambidexterity as an intra-
organizational undertaking. In giving greater attention to the intra-organizational 
setting, the study contributes to understanding the internal construction and 
manifestation of organization ambidexterity, and what this transition looks like by 
considering its macro and micro dimensions, which is something that has been 
relatively underexplored (Stokes, Moore, Moss, Mathews, Smith and Liu, 2015).  
Furthermore, the two other levels of implementation – group and individual – 
have within literature, tended to pertain to units internal to an organization.  At the 
group level, scholars (Lubatkin et al, 2006; Smith and Tushman, 2005) have 
highlighted the role of executive management teams as being critical enabling levers of 
ambidexterity; with some studies indicating them to be its source in that they are the 
ones capable of balancing and managing the exploration and exploitation tension via 
managerial leadership capabilities and learning behaviors (Smith et al, 2010). In 
addition, senior management are considered to have the potential to drive and 
determine an organization’s propensity to pursue exploration and/or exploitation by 
virtue of the biases and capabilities they may possess (Lavie et al, 2010). Other 
ambidexterity researchers have examined the phenomenon at the individual unit level, 
surmising its manifestation within a particular organization, work unit or amongst 
single individuals – namely executive leadership (Smith, Lewis and Tushman, 2016) 
and employees/individuals on the ground (Rogan and Mors, 2014).  
Moreover, environmental factors and their influence on an organization’s 
propensity to pursue exploration and exploitation has also received some research 
attention. Features such as an industry’s competitive intensity and technological 
dynamism (Uotila, et al, 2009), environmental shocks/dynamism (Jansen, Van Den 
Bosch, and Volberda, 2005; Jansen, Vera, and Crossan, 2009a), and organizational 
history, as represented by a firm’s size and age (Lavie et al, 2010), have received some 
empirical attention. However, as Lavie and colleagues (2010) note these studies have 
produced limited or mixed empirical results, thus highlighting a gap in our 
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understanding of the role and influence of factors such as history and environmental 
dynamism upon an organization and how it pursues ambidexterity.  
 
Knowledge Gaps 
The four key dimensions, as represented in table 1, outline important facets 
central to understanding how organizational ambidexterity emerges and are features 
encompassed in prevailing theories on the antecedents to ambidexterity. Current 
research on the antecedents of ambidexterity is dominated by three main frameworks 
offering solutions to the exploration-exploitation conflict. These three frameworks are 
referred to as structural ambidexterity, contextual ambidexterity and 
dynamic/temporal ambidexterity. Studies on organizational ambidexterity and its 
antecedents thus far provide valuable conceptual and empirical insights on persistent 
internal competing tensions and the conditions that make it possible for organizations 
to achieve alignment or fit between their internal elements. However, gaps remain in 
our understanding of how the tension between exploration-exploitation is balanced or 
managed. Gupta, Smith and Shalley (2006) note that “although near consensus exists 
on the need for balance [of exploration and exploitation], there is considerably less 
clarity on how this balance can be achieved” (p. 697).  
Existing studies on the antecedents of ambidexterity tend to focus their 
analysis on a particular approach or mode and, whilst this has helped in 
deconstructing ambidexterity as a concept, it offers a restricted perspective and 
understanding of how organizational tensions may be managed, performed or 
balanced. By conceptualizing the antecedents from a particular lens literature does not 
fully account for the complexity inherent within the process, and in the words of 
Turner, Swart and Maylor (2013) “the theorization of ambidexterity is inadequate for 
complex, practical realities and, in turn, this hinders the way in which it can aid the 
management of ambidexterity in practice” (p. 317). Ambidexterity writers contend that 
the prevailing antecedents should be viewed as complementary, and therefore balance 
is supposedly achieved through the engagement of multiple approaches rather than 
singularly (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2013; Kauppila, 2010; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 
2008). However, whilst this is conceptually acknowledged amongst researchers this 
line of discussion has received scant empirical attention within literature, nor has it 
been probed in ambidexterity article publications, which themselves have presented 
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mostly a single mode or approach to ambidexterity. If we are to deepen our 
understanding of how organizations become ambidextrous and the process by which 
it may be attained, then an examination of the complementarity and interrelations 
between antecedents could engender additional insights and open new avenues of 
investigation.  
Academic exploration of organizational ambidexterity has also looked at 
several organizational mechanisms (instruments and devices) underpinning an 
organization’s pathway to becoming ambidextrous. Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) 
conceptualize two meta-constructs, performance management and social support, 
whose interaction they contend produces ambidexterity by creating a high performing 
organizational context. Other researchers have looked at network ties within and 
across organizations as being mechanisms that facilitate the connection between 
exploration and exploitation and underpin antecedent solutions to ambidexterity 
(Stadler, Rajwani and Karaba, 2014; Simsek, 2009; Mom, van den Bosch and 
Volberda, 2009; Rogan and Mors, 2014). For example, Beckman (2006) identifies 
managerial capabilities as an underlying determinant of ambidexterity. Interestingly, 
one of the main solutions to the ambidexterity dilemma, contextual ambidexterity, 
implies that the informal organization and its operations play a role in enabling 
ambidexterity, nonetheless this has not been extensively explored within literature. 
Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) note “the many formal and informal structures, systems 
and processes that make up an organization’s design affect one another” (p. 290). This 
suggests that if we are to fully understand how organizational ambidexterity is enacted 
research should strive beyond formal structures, processes, and systems to examine 
the informal organization and its interaction with the formal organization more 
explicitly.  
Lastly, organizational scholars have acknowledged that time - its structure and 
subjective experience - is important in understanding organizational processes (Lord, 
Dinh and Hoffman, 2015).  Dynamic/temporal ambidexterity depicts the significance 
of time in balancing the exploration-exploitation dilemma, however, deliberations of 
this solution have not elaborated on the role of organizational history or its potential 
influence on how ambidexterity may be achieved.  History is crucial for it shapes an 
organization’s present and emerging context (Pettigrew, 1979; Clark and Rowlinson, 
2004). Lavie et al (2010) maintain that organizational attributes including age, size, 
capabilities, structure and resources are grounded within, and are also a product of, an 
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organization’s history, thus suggesting that analysis of such features may be looked 
upon as proxies for organizational history. Studies have looked at whether an 
organization’s age, size and prior experience influences its tendency to pursue 
exploration versus exploitation (Beckman, Haunschild and Phillips, 2004; Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2004; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000), and have engaged concepts such as 
inertia, liabilities of newness, path dependency and access to resources as explanations 
for why an organization may have a predilection for either exploration or exploitation. 
In analyzing these organizational features such studies highlight the significance of an 
organization’s history, however they shed little light on the effects organizational 
history has specifically in relation to an organization as it transitions in an effort to 
pursue exploration and exploitation ambidextrously. Current evidence would suggest 
that as organizations age they become increasingly inert structurally (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Le Mens, Hannan and Pólos, 2011) and that history may be a core 
rigidity, particularly in the context of organizational change (Teece and Pisano, 1994; 
Barnett and Carroll, 1995). In relation to organizational ambidexterity, this would 
imply that established organizations may encounter additional obstacles when shifting 
to become ambidextrous.  
However, existing conceptualizations of ambidexterity and its antecedents do 
not fully account for or expound on what historical precedents beyond age and size 
may influence an organization’s transition to ambidexterity, or how organizational 
history may enable or impede an organization from attaining ambidexterity.  
Therefore, if we are to gain a better understanding of how ambidexterity may be 
attained, research may benefit from giving more explicit attention to the role and 
impact of organizational history, whether it constitutes an inhibiting or enabling force 
of ambidexterity and under what conditions. Furthermore, there have been growing 
calls from academia for greater consideration of history and an historical research 
approach to the study of organizational management and strategy (Suddaby and 
Foster, 2017; Godfrey, Hassard, O’Connor, Rowlinson and Ruef, 2016; Argyres, De 
Massis, Foss, Frattini, Jones and Silverman, 2017), and within the field of 
ambidexterity the role and impact of an organization’s history in producing 
ambidextrous performance has received little explicit attention.  
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Research Agenda  
Despite mounting research interest lacunas remain in our current 
conceptualizations of organizational ambidexterity and the underlying mechanisms 
that engender the phenomenon. In referring to underlying mechanisms, this study 
draws upon the strategy-as-practice perspective (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl and Vaara, 
2010; Rouleau, 2005) and Felin, Foss and Ployhart (2015) academic treatise on 
‘microfoundations’ as a thinking approach which “call[s] attention to lower and inter-
level mechanisms” (p. 578). The strategy-as-practice perspective focuses on the 
everyday activity of what people do and spurs an interest in the micro-activities, 
processes and practices of practitioners involved in the making and doing of strategy 
(Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 2003). In invoking micro and inter-level explanatory 
mechanisms (e.g. organizational activities, tasks, process characteristics and contextual 
features), this research study recognizes that heterogeneous lower-level organizational 
factors contribute to explaining organizational ambidexterity and its development, and 
hopes to gain insights into the features that underpin and contribute towards, or 
hinder the pursuit of ambidexterity. Felin et al (2015) note that “microfoundations are 
concerned with understanding how actors, their interactions, and the mechanisms and 
context that influence such interactions, produce firm-level and collective 
heterogeneity… [and] crosses several intervening levels between macro and micro” (p. 
605-606). Hence, this approach entails multilevel considerations of a phenomenon and 
gaining an understanding of the interaction between the lower or individual level and 
the higher or macro level. Thus, this study assumes what Felin et al (2015) refer to as a 
multilevel approach in that it “does not privilege any particular analytical level” (p. 
588), but engages with the organizational level, division/unit level and actor level.  
Consequently, this thesis seeks to address two overarching research questions 
through empirical study:  
1) How does an established organization transition to become ambidextrous 
in actuality? 
2) What underlying mechanisms manifest during this process to support 
and/or impede the organization’s pursuit of ambidexterity?  
 
The subsequent research investigation is motivated by two research objectives:  
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(i) Develop a theoretical and empirical understanding of the pathways to 
organizational ambidexterity. 
(ii) Examine the change process an organization undertakes in a strategic 
effort to become ambidextrous and the key constructs that influence 
its pursuit.  
 
The first objective concedes that the pursuit of ambidexterity is a process and 
may be sought by way of several approaches engaging with different mechanisms, 
some of which may have been overlooked in existing literature. The second objective 
gives emphasis to the pursuit of organizational ambidexterity as being a dynamic 
change process involving different constructs. I also note that these constructs do not 
function in isolation, for the way in which they connect and relate to one another may 
be pertinent to ambidexterity. 
In addressing these two overarching research questions and objectives, the 
research program presented in this thesis pays attention to three areas which have 
received limited research attention, and in so doing hopes to make some headway in 
addressing these gaps. Firstly, this research project examines the issue of 
complementarity between the approaches (antecedents) to ambidexterity and how it is 
they may be engaged with interactively and the organizational instruments implicated. 
Secondly, the study consciously addresses the informal organization and its interaction 
with the formal organization as an influencing factor during the development of 
ambidexterity and focuses on practices embedded within the informal organization, 
and probes how and why the informal organization constitutes an enabling or 
inhibiting feature of ambidexterity. Lastly, the research focuses on organizational 
history and its impact on the transition to organizational ambidexterity, looking at how 
certain historical episodes may condition the organization’s contemporary approach to 
ambidexterity and how it is perceived by organizational actors.  
In attempting to address these research objectives this thesis engages with 
various organizational constructs, nonetheless, the overarching research program is 
bound together by two core tenets – (1) organizational change and the process of 
becoming, and (2) its philosophical commitment to an interpretative paradigm. 
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Change – the process of becoming  
It is important to emphasize that the focus of this thesis is the process by 
which an organization becomes ambidextrous, rather than ambidexterity as an outcome 
or its sustainability.   The concept of becoming, in relation to organization literature, 
deals with the issue of “changing” (Weick and Quinn, 1999: 382) at the most basic 
level, for it captures the process or event whereby an entity transitions from one state 
in an attempt to assume another (Ford and Ford, 1994). Change is one of the core 
tenets of management literature and the social sciences (Pettigrew, Woodman and 
Cameron, 2001). Explorations of organizational change include ontological debates as 
to the nature of change and its treatment in organizational research (Tsoukas and 
Chia, 2002), studies on the pace and typology of change (By, 2005; Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995) – be it synoptic models of change as a planned episodic endeavor 
(Lewin, 1951; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), or a continuous evolving process 
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Weick and Quinn, 1999), and level of implementation 
at which change occurs in relation to structures, strategy, systems, resources, processes 
and micro-processes (Hall and Ford, 2006). Weick and Quinn’s (1999) analysis of 
organizational change outlines various theoretical depictions, and their elaborate 
juxtaposition of episodic and continuous change provides a valuable framework in 
which to orientate this research program. In seeking to explore how an organization 
may transition to become ambidextrous, this research thesis can be seen to reside 
within Weick and Quinn’s (1999) notion of episodic change. Episodic change, the 
authors contend, connotes an intentional, radical and infrequent change which “tends 
to occur in distinct periods during which shifts are precipitated by external events such 
as technology change or internal events” (Weick and Quinn, 1999: 365).  
Hence, in relation to ambidexterity, conventional wisdom in management 
strategy advocates that organizations pursue a focused strategy (Christensen, 1997; 
Porter, 1980, 1996) aligning behind either exploration or exploitation. For an 
established organization for whom ambidexterity constitutes a change in its strategic 
direction (i.e. it has traditionally pursued and operated within the confines of a 
focused strategy), the transition to ambidexterity would constitute an episode of 
planned strategic formal change, a decision assumedly initiated by senior management. 
It marks a radical divergence from the organization’s status quo for it requires they 
adjust to accommodate an unfamiliar competency and become adept in balancing 
these supposedly contentious activities. Radical strategic change is defined as being a 
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conscious process initiated by senior management intended to produce fundamental 
change in the very nature of the organization’s core structures and activities (Mantere, 
Schildt and Sillince, 2012). Thus, the shift from a mono-dexterous position towards an 
ambidextrous one can represent a radical strategic change context for it may require 
that the organization’s structure and/or core activities are reconstructed to enable 
both elements of a tension to be engaged with simultaneously, thereby disrupting its 
status quo. This episode of change can be seen to represent a distinct period of time, 
although, one could argue that the preservation of ambidexterity is itself a continuous 
process during which incremental modifications may occur within an organization’s 
structure and/or behavioral operations. Nevertheless, further exploration of the 
sustainability line of argument for ambidexterity is beyond the scope of this current 
research project.  
Although the proceeding research centers on a planned episodic change 
process, the study acknowledges the contention of Tsoukas and Chia (2002). Drawing 
on the work of Greenwood and Hinings (1996), Tsoukas and Chia (2002) contend 
that “to properly understand organizational change one must allow for emergence and 
surprise, meaning that one must take into account the possibility of organizational 
change having ramifications and implications beyond those initially imaged or 
planned” (p. 568).  Consequently, in studying how ambidexterity may be pursued and 
attained the following research is not completely restricted by the boundaries of a 
planned change event but maintains a degree of openness in order to discover and 
gain an understanding of unexpected emerging mechanisms and instruments active in 
supporting or inhibiting this process towards ambidexterity. Furthermore, 
organizational change constitutes a shift not only in the formal structures and hard 
elements of an organization but also in the embodied actions and cognitive 
perceptions of organization’s actors. In reference to organizational change, Jones and 
Van de Ven (2016) note that “it [change] also has important and often underestimated 
behavioral and psychological implications for individual employees” for 
“organizations only change and act through their members” (p. 32). Therefore, in 
order to understand an organization’s transition to ambidexterity it is important to 
take account of how it is enacted and perceived by the organizational actors engaged 
in the process itself, in addition to movements in the organization’s formal and 
structural features.  
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Philosophical Commitment 
Interpretive paradigm 
 The research program herein is guided by an interpretive ontological and 
epistemological paradigm. Ontologically, the interpretive paradigm maintains that the 
social world is a constructed reality formed through the intersubjective experiences of 
the individuals who inhabit it and as such it is not a hard-objective entity capable of 
being reduced and evaluated through positivist means and logic (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). For the researcher seeking to understand 
a real-world phenomenon, the interpretive paradigm provides a conducive lens for it is 
informed and motivated “by a concern to understand the world as it is, to understand 
the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience” 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979: 28). Epistemologically, therefore, knowledge of this 
constructed reality may be obtained through the exploration and inductive 
interpretation of the lived experience of individuals as seen from their perspective, and 
the way in which they interpret, modify and create their experience (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). Put another way, “social realities are constructed by the actors in the 
context, acting together, and these acts can only be understood through 
interpretation” (Hatch and Yanow, 2005: 69).  Heracleous (2001) emphasizes the 
importance of the researcher assuming the actors frame of reference explaining that 
“the conviction that accounts of social life must consider the actors’ frame of 
reference and be adequate at this level of first-order meaning” (p. 429). Intrinsically, 
this paradigm holds that there is no single objective reality to any research 
phenomenon, but rather multiple relative realities of those involved in the 
phenomenon (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). The existence of multiple realities 
“emphasizes the relativistic nature of the social world” (Burrell and Morgan, 1973: 3) 
and confers the presence of different meanings which are difficult to interpret in 
terms of fixed realities (Neuman, 2000).   
Organizations constitute a social world imbued with different meanings and 
interpretations and in order to understand them, it requires understanding how the 
organizational actors within them “develop, express and communicate meaning” 
(Hatch and Yanow, 2005: 66). Although an organization and its constituent parts may 
be united through shared values, norms and meanings, the lived experiences of 
individual employees are diverse and pluralist in form. So whilst there are points of 
similarities there will also be differences in the experiences and interactions employees 
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have with a phenomenon common across the organization. In application to this 
research study and its intention to understand how an organization may transition and 
pursue ambidexterity, one must look into and understand the phenomenon from the 
perspective of organizational actors, see it through their eyes and understand how they 
interpret the context, the strategy, the meanings they envisage and the rationale for 
their actions. 
 
Methodological Overview  
Qualitative approach  
Guided by an interpretive paradigm the contained research study employs a 
qualitative methodology as it intends to empirically explore how an organization 
transitions from a mono-dexterous strategic position to an ambidextrous one. In so 
doing, the research seeks to generate new insights and build theory based on 
qualitative data through the inductive detection of patterns emerging from the 
empirical data (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
A qualitative approach is appropriate for exploratory studies for it locates the 
researcher within the world of the subject, corresponding with the philosophical 
paradigm guiding this research study, and enables an examination of the phenomenon 
within its natural setting (Creswell, 2013; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Thus, in the case 
of organizational ambidexterity a qualitative methodology allows the researcher to 
observe the transition process within a real-world setting, and gain an understanding 
from the perspective of actors engaged in the phenomenon. Creswell (2013) 
comments that qualitative research can be emergent in design which gives rise to the 
need for flexibility within the study, should changes occur during the research process. 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) also note that qualitative research is an effective way 
to capture rich empirical data to study infrequent phenomenon, such as is the case of 
this research program which focuses on a strategic episodic transition towards 
organizational ambidexterity.  
Graebner, Martin and Roundy’s (2012: 278) alternative framework on working 
with qualitative data outlines three fundamental, advantageous characteristics of 
qualitative research approach. Firstly, the authors note the ‘open-ended’ nature of 
qualitative data allows for flexibility in exploring a phenomena without having to 
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anticipate and establish definite constructs and mechanisms worthy of appraisal prior 
to data collection; and contend that this feature of open-endedness benefits theory 
generation. This characteristic has an affinity with this study for in addressing the 
primary research question of how an organization transitions to become ambidextrous 
the study is not constrained to focusing on a particular predetermined antecedent or 
mode of operating but is open which provides for a more holistic approach to 
capturing and theorizing the reality of an organization becoming ambidextrous. 
Secondly, Graebner et al (2012: 278) refer to the ‘concrete and vivid’ nature of qualitative 
data, for utilizing this form of data allows for depth in theory development and the 
generation of abstract models rooted in real-life phenomena. This complements the 
intentions of this study to develop theoretical abstractions of organizational 
ambidexterity and the process by which an organization seeks to achieve this. Thirdly, 
the ‘rich and nuanced’ nature of qualitative data captures the lived and subjective 
experiences of those it seeks to study (e.g. individuals) (Graebner et al, 2012: 278). 
Hence, in the case of this research study, a qualitative approach allows for the 
detection of details and mechanisms possibly overlooked by extant literature or 
quantitative studies (e.g. He and Wong, 2009; Uotila, Maula, Keil and Zahra, 2009).  
Furthermore, the qualitative approach also serves to meet a methodological 
gap in current ambidexterity literature where scholars (Raisch et al, 2009; O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2013) have called for more in-depth qualitative studies examining 
ambidexterity. 
 
Embedded, single case study design and multimethod approach 
Case study research strategy “emphasize the rich, real-world context in which 
the phenomena occur” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 25) and enables the 
researcher to study the dynamics of the event within its natural setting (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Yin (2014) proposes three conditions in which a case study methodology is 
deemed preferable: (1) exploratory questions are presented asking ‘why’ or ‘how’ of 
underexplored phenomena; (2) the phenomena is beyond the researcher’s control or 
manipulation, and (3) the study centers on a current phenomenon occurring in reality. 
The planned research can be seen to comply with all three conditions thereby 
indicating a methodological fit with this project.  
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To study the pursuit of organizational ambidexterity in action this research 
employs an embedded, single case study design (Yin, 2009)2. This single case design 
follows in the footsteps of other in-depth case studies in the field of strategy and 
management which examined a single organization (i.e. Burgelman, 1983; Corley and 
Gioia, 2004; Danneels, 2010; Harreld, O’Reilly and Tushman, 2007; Siggelkow, 2001), 
and industrial sociologists (e.g. Lockwood, 1966). This approach was selected for its 
suitability as it allows for the in-depth study of real-world complex phenomena in an 
everyday context and importantly, it gives consideration to the contextual conditions 
that influence the character and form of the phenomenon; thus prevents the divorce 
of context from phenomenon (Pettigrew, 1987). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) note 
that for phenomenon-driven research questions, such as the ones posed in this 
project, inductive case research, including a single-case study, is appropriate for it 
provides rich empirical data upon which to develop and build theory. Furthermore, 
Siggelkow (2007) contends that “a single case can be a very powerful example” (p. 20), 
and recognizes that case data can provide salient insights directly garnered from the 
world and contribute to the development of persuasive conceptual arguments on 
causal forces related to a phenomenon.  
Although the study herein focuses on one organization’s pursuit for 
ambidexterity, its embedded design means that it engages multiple levels of analysis 
(Yin, 2009) – the organizational level, the division/unit level, and the individual level – 
and is reflective of Simsek’s (2009) idea of cross fertilization for it takes a cross-
sectional view of the organization across all levels of the hierarchy. This embedded 
unit design is conducive to exploring the complexities in an organization’s pathway to 
ambidexterity in action and its inner context - processes, structures, culture and social 
interactions – in greater detail. A few existing studies in ambidexterity literature 
assume a multi-level unit of analysis (Mom et al, 2009) and this project follows suit by 
adding to this body of research.  
To operationalize the study a multimethod approach was employed as part of 
the ethnographic approach in which different types of qualitative data was collected 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). The study relied upon multiple sources and methods 
of data collection for triangulation and validity (Yin, 2014). This involved interviews 
with actors from different levels of the organization; direct observations of internal 
                                                          
2 Example of an embedded single case design is Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) study on 
the internal politics of the International Typographical Union as cited in Yin (2009).  
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communication events, interest group meetings, team meetings and cultural 
workshops; photographs of the organization’s physical environment; documentary 
analysis of the organization’s internal documents and presentations; published 
resources and historical archives. (See table 2 for a summary of the types of data 
collected for this research project).  
Pettigrew (1990) explains that the study of organizational change requires a 
detailed longitudinal approach. Therefore, to investigate an organization’s transition in 
pursuit of ambidexterity this project employed a longitudinal case design (Eisenhardt, 
1989) and ethnographic research methods as part of fieldwork data gathering. 
Ethnography requires the researcher spend extensive periods of time embedded 
within the research context immersing oneself into the organization’s culture, 
observing its actors and its operations to gain an enriched level of understanding and 
sensitivity to tacit elements of the data (Suddaby, 2006; Langley, 1999; Geertz, 1973), 
and detect new and unexpected constructs and organizational mechanisms which 
befits the intention of this research project. 
 
 
Ethnographic Phases 
Onsite empirical field data was collected in four phases between August 2014 
and September 2015 (see table 3). Each onsite field trip occurred over a four to six 
week period taking place roughly in quarterly intervals.  As the researcher, I spent 
three weeks in the field for phase one during which time in-depth interviews, non-
participant observations, photographs and internal documents were gathered.  For 
phases two, three and four the researcher spent almost four weeks in the field on each 
occasion and continued to conduct interviews, observations, and take photographs, as 
well as archival data gathering. Interview questions became progressively tailored to 
informants as each phase of the study developed, conditional on the informants’ job 
role and tenure in the case study organization. (Appendix A includes a sample of the 
research questions asked during the study).  
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Table 2: Outline of research data sources 
 
This multiphase approach to data collection allowed me as the researcher to 
track and identify changes in organizational features during the organization’s 
transition process. Each phase acted like a benchmark for the succeeding phase(s), 
against which I could detect and trace the organizational changes and developments 
occurring over time. Furthermore, the intervals between fieldwork data collection 
phases provided me with analytical distance to be reflexive (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007; Schwandt, 2004). Throughout each phase I built my informal network 
using the organizational infrastructure (such as participating in employee resource 
groups and attending community events), and through informal social interactions (i.e. 
lunch invitations and participating in offsite social activities outside office hours and 
Interview transcripts 82
Field notes (pages) 419
Photographs 74
Published books 7
Organization reports (budget, activity reviews) 12
Online communications and articles 17
Industry reports 6
Press releases and news articles 22
Documentary videos/audios (mass media) 7
Archival items
Former employee interview transcripts 37
Strategy reports 8
Third party contracts and communications 23
Internal communication memos/news 19
Management system, rules and procedures 13
Organization charts 7
Independent management reports 4
Articles and thought pieces 11
Newspaper articles 9
Internal documents (confidential)
Internal briefings 24
Internal communications/memos 17
Meeting minutes 2
Organization, division and program charts 10
Policy, and process & procedure documents 11
Strategy frameworks and action plans 20
Number 
of items
Sources of data
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weekends with members of the organization). This provided further opportunities for 
informal data gathering.  
 
Phase one occurred during August 2014 and September 2014. Phase one 
marked my first encounter with the organization under study and introduced me to 
the setting, a subset of employees and aspects of its culture as experienced by 
organizational members. The case organization was two years into its strategic change 
program at that point and the implementation process was underway. Being my first 
field visit, phase one involved early discussions of actor perceptions and 
understandings of the organization’s new ambidextrous strategic vision, what 
activities, processes, systems or organizational features had been introduced as part of 
implementing the ambidextrous strategy. Data collection involved facilitating two 
workshops over a two day period on the topic of the organization’s looking at its 
‘past, present and future’. Workshops were open to all employees across the 
organization and attendance was voluntary. In total 70 individuals, a mix of 
contractors and permanent employees from different divisions and levels of seniority, 
participated in the two workshops. The workshops consisted of group discussions on 
its culture, structured by the cultural web framework (Heracleous and Langham, 1996; 
Johnson, 1988) and provided useful insights into actors’ views. The majority of 
workshop discussions focused on the organization’s current culture. Participants with 
longer employment tenures provided reflections on what aspects of the organization’s 
culture they thought had changed and what aspects they perceived were inhibiting 
change. Whilst these reflections may be open to nostalgia and other biases they aid in 
understanding how actor experience of organizational culture has changed, and 
informs longitudinal analysis. Participants discussed what they believed needed to 
change for the organization to be successful in the future. Extensive field notes were 
taken during the workshops of participant discussions, interactions and social 
behaviors. Semi-structured interviews were then conducted with nine individuals who 
had attended the workshops and who voiced an interest in participating in the study. 
Interviews focused on participants’ past and present experiences at the organization, 
and perceptions of its strategic and cultural evolution, the organization’s current 
operational and cultural climate and their perceptions of the new strategy towards 
organizational ambidexterity and its implementation. During this phase I received 
limited access to the organization’s intranet which provided me the opportunity to 
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become familiar with the organization’s internal systems and processes and I began to 
examine internal documents relating to the new strategic ambidextrous vision. It was 
during this phase I first began to observe and identify the role of informal practices, 
how actors engaged these practices in relation to implementing the new ambidextrous 
strategy and its interaction with formal organizational elements. 
Phase two took place between November and December 2014 with an added 
focus on how the strategy was being implemented and recent developments that had 
occurred. This phase built upon discussions held during phase one but occurred 
during an organizational restructure aimed to streamline reporting channels to 
executive management, combine capabilities by merging together two divisions (i.e. 
directorates) and further encourage collaborative innovation. Interview questions 
orientated around the restructure, the changes experienced and witnessed as a result, 
the effect of the change on operations and the way things are done, what actors 
comprehended as the intention of the restructure and new strategy; what they 
expected and or understood to be the outcome of the restructure; and what was the 
nature of innovation and collaboration. Furthermore, I continued to examine and 
observe the significance of informal organizational practices, which I had first 
identified during phase one, by questioning informants on the standard social 
behaviors in the organization, whether they differed from the past, the means by 
which individual actors and/or a division unit implemented the ambidextrous strategy 
and the challenges or obstacles they experienced. These questions helped provide 
insights into micro-level practitioner activities, their perceptions of the ambidextrous 
strategy and assessment of success. I continued with field observations across the 
organization and conducted 34 interviews. The majority of informants were previously 
unknown (i.e. they did not participate in the workshops in phase one) and were 
approached using snowball sampling. Four of the interviewees were former employees 
who had left the organization within the last seven years. The employment distance 
allowed for very candid conversations. External space industry experts were also 
interviewed to help provide a deeper understanding of the industry environment from 
a practitioner’s perspective. During phase two, the significance of organizational 
history and its influence on the strategic transition process towards ambidexterity 
became apparent through discussions and interactions with informants and inspection 
of internal documentation. Consequently, this spurred initial exploration of archival 
items and records specific to the case organization located at the local archival library. 
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Early examination of archival documents focused on previous organizational/division 
structures, strategic plans and organizational changes (i.e. processes and systems) 
which helped provide an understanding of how the organization had developed and 
evolved structurally over time.   
Phase three occurred from March to April 2015 and extended data gathering 
in terms of scope and activity. During this phase a further 11 interviews were 
conducted with informants both known and unknown to the researcher. Interviews 
and interactions with actors enabled me as the researcher to track developments and 
changes post the organizational restructure, which was underway during phase two of 
data collection, and had been captured during previous data collection phases. 
Discussions also addressed the nature of processes, procedures and the mechanics of 
day-to-day activities of individuals and teams in select divisions (such as knowledge 
management, finance and engineering). This focus provided a deeper understanding of 
practitioner day-to-day activities at the micro-level and how practitioners connect 
these activities with implementing exploration and exploitation. In addition, phase 
three involved gathering additional data pertaining to the organization’s history (i.e. 
archives and published material referencing to the organization’s history since its 
founding in the early 1960s). Particular focus was given to data relating to historical 
critical negative events and achievements as references to these repeatedly came up 
during interviews and in observations of organization wide events, and informal 
encounters with organizational actors.  
Phase four took place from August to September 2015 and extended activities 
conducted in phase three. A further 26 interviews were conducted and questions were 
more focused and probed key topics and areas of research interest that had arisen 
from earlier research phases. During this phase, greater focus was also given to the 
organization’s largest division (in terms of budget allocation and number of 
employees). Through informal social interactions outside office hours, the researcher 
learnt of a change initiative underway within this division intentionally designed to 
enable the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation activities. Interviews 
were conducted with individuals operating within the division and those who held key 
roles within the change initiative. Focusing on this particular division/unit provided 
me as the researcher with a narrowed detailed understanding of the modes and 
antecedents to ambidexterity at a discernable unit level, how this change process had 
evolved over time and the micro features and mechanisms hindering and/or enabling 
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this transition across different levels of the division (i.e. ground level individuals, 
middle managers, senior management and the unit as a whole). The data gathered 
during this phase is of particular significance to chapter two (paper one) in this thesis. 
Data collection continued until theoretical saturation (Dey, 1999) was 
achieved.  In between each of the four phases the data collected was analyzed and 
core findings were intermittently reported back to selected managers. This served as a 
way of confirming and validating the accuracy of my findings and the researcher’s 
interpretation of comments and discussions held with informants. It also helped to 
inform the findings and emerging theoretical themes during the data analysis process 
and received feedback that the summary reports of findings provided valuable insights 
into employee perceptions and the organization’s cultural climate and confirmed the 
findings were representative of the organization. In June 2017, following completion 
of data collection, analysis and early write up drafts, the researcher presented the full 
research findings to various members of the case study organization. Attendees to the 
presentation included those who had participated in the research and contributed to 
the interview data, members of the largest division/unit, and employees and 
contractors from different levels of the organization with an interest in hearing the 
results.  
 
Inductive reasoning and grounded theory approach 
Whilst examining organizational ambidexterity and the experiences of 
organizational actors within a real-life setting, the study exercised inductive reasoning 
in order to build theory from the qualitative data (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). In 
relying on qualitative data the study follows in the character of inductive case studies 
in which the outcome is to systematically generate explanatory models or theoretical 
propositions (Mantere and Ketokivi, 2013). Furthermore, building theory from case 
research also has the advantage of providing creative insights and generating novel 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Adopting Eisenhardt’s (1989) formulation of inductive case 
research, as the researcher, I sought to gain theoretical insights and derive 
generalizations developed in a manner driven and grounded in the raw data (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967).
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Table 3: Summary of research data collection process 
 
84
18 days
38 items
13 items
(electronic)
Total
82
74
64
131
August - September 2015
Phase 4
--
26 interviews
24 photos
9 items 
(hardcopy & electronic)
58 items
(electronic)
August - September 2014 November-December 2014 March - April 2015
26 items 67 items
-- 13 photos
16 days 16 days
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
-- --
Archival data
Internal documents 
(confidential)
2 cultural workshops
70 participants 
11 interviews
37 photos
14 days
-- 
4 items 
(hardcopy)
Workshops
Interviews
Photographs of 
physical environment
Field observations
34 interviews 11 interviews
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that the development of valid theory can 
result from study that is grounded and intimately connected to empirical data. This 
grounded approach allows me, as the researcher, to engage with a phenomenon for 
which there are still gaps in our understanding and extant literature, and provides the 
opportunity to generate novel insights into the organizational ambidexterity 
phenomenon.  
Although a number of data sources were gathered during the course of this 
research project, this study does not make direct or explicit reference to certain data 
sources, namely photographs taken onsite at the selected organization of its physical 
environment, and internal meeting minutes, however, these served to provide me with 
contextual understanding and contributed to the development of analytical themes. 
For example the photographs provided visual representations of tangible cultural 
features of the organization which helped establish context and aided me as the 
researcher to situate organizational actors.   
 
Overview of selected case organization  
Using theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989) the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
in Houston, Texas (USA) was selected as the research site for it provides a revelatory 
and illuminating case (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007) in which to 
explore and gain insights on the real-world actions of an organization in pursuit of 
ambidexterity, and how its systems, structures and organizational actors transition 
from a focused strategy to an ambidextrous one. (See appendix B for details of JSC’s 
strategy and its background).  
In 2013, amidst an environmental context characterized by disruptive change 
and the emergence of new industry players, JSC Center Director introduced a new 
strategy that focused on the simultaneous pursuit of innovation and efficiency. This 
new strategic aspiration reflects JSC’s drive to develop and manage exploration and 
exploitation capabilities simultaneously indicating an ambidextrous pursuit, making it 
an ideal case for investigation. In addition, during the course of the onsite field work 
for this research project (from August 2014 to September 2015), JSC underwent an 
organizational restructure designed to support the exploitation element of its 
ambidextrous strategy, JSC 2.0, by streamlining the number of direct reports to 
executive management. Witnessing this change event first-hand provided me, as the 
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researcher, a valuable opportunity to observe the adaptation process from the ground 
up and its impact on the organization’s broader pursuit of ambidexterity as perceived 
and interpreted by organizational actors who were themselves living through the 
change.   
Structurally, JSC is a large complex hierarchical organization characterized by a 
technocratic culture and bureaucratic administrative systems. The organization 
consists of several departmental units (directorates) each of which contain a number 
of offices. At a fundamental level these departmental units are categorized by 
organizational insiders as being either ‘program-side’ or ‘institutional’, where the 
former relates to the specific space programs funded directly by Congress, whereas the 
latter pertains to divisions/units responsible for the Center’s operational infrastructure 
and maintenance and also provide support to the space program as and when 
required. The largest division at JSC (in terms of budget allocation and number of 
staff) is the International Space Station (ISS) space program. This multi-level structural 
makeup provides an interesting opportunity to gain a holistic cross-sectional view of 
the organization and ambidexterity at all different levels. Having been permitted access 
to organizational members from various departmental units and offices across JSC, 
the researcher has the opportunity to intentionally engage multiple levels of the 
organization in exploring the ambidexterity phenomenon, thus adding depth to the 
research and its analysis. 
 
Thesis Structure 
This research program aims to address research lacunas within current 
organizational ambidexterity literature by examining key factors pertinent to the 
concept of ambidexterity and the way in which an organization transitions in an 
attempt to become ambidextrous. The thesis is comprised of three papers, and each 
paper constitutes a core chapter and offers constructive engagement with the concept 
of ambidexterity, and seeks to contribute to extending current thinking by generating 
some original theoretical insights.  
The first paper, “The evolving hybrid: an alternative perspective on organizational 
ambidexterity and its antecedents”, probes the notion of complementarity between the 
antecedents to ambidexterity, and the nature of the exploration and exploitation 
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tension and its accommodation. In empirically examining an organization’s approach 
as it endeavors to operate exploratory and exploitative activities simultaneously, this 
paper explores how an organization may engage with different antecedents 
interrelatedly.  Whilst ambidexterity scholars posit that ambidexterity is achieved 
through the combined employment of structural and contextual solutions (Kauppila, 
2010; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013), empirically studies have tended to examine the 
phenomena by looking at one approach, thus limiting our understanding of how 
ambidexterity is achieved in practice (Agostini et al, 2016). Through a longitudinal in-
depth case analysis of the largest space program in operation at the Johnson Space 
Centre, the International Space Station (ISS), this paper looks at how the unit evolved 
to simultaneously pursue exploration (science) and exploitation (engineering). The 
findings highlight the fluctuating nature in the exploration-exploitation tension and 
the context/situations that give rise to this. The study contributes to our 
understanding of how the different approaches to ambidexterity can be employed 
intergatively over time through a hybrid approach, and highlights the layered manner 
in which the different modes are interrelated. The study also contributes to expanding 
our understanding of the context-reshaping capability that shapes this hybrid 
approach.  
Paper two is titled “The practice of circumventing: interaction of the formal and informal 
organization as a dynamic capability”. Organizational ambidexterity is allied with the 
concept of dynamic capabilities and both relate to an organization’s ability to adapt 
and change in order to explore new and exploit existing capabilities. Dominant 
approaches to organizational ambidexterity refer to formal organizational features as 
the vehicle enabling the balance between exploration and exploitation. However, 
implicit in contextual ambidexterity, and to a lesser extent structural and dynamic 
ambidexterity, is the enabling role played by the informal organization and informal 
practices. There is growing recognition that the informal organization can play an 
important role in strategy implementation and organizational operations, but there is a 
gap in our understanding of the interplay between the formal and informal 
organization and how they combine and give rise to unexpected arrangements. Using 
ethnographic data, the paper identifies an emergent mechanism - ‘the practice of 
circumventing’ – akin to a positive deviant behavior, which arises out of the 
interaction between formal and informal organizational elements. This practice is 
found to be reflective of Teece’s (2007) three core processes of dynamic capabilities 
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and, under certain conditions, has the capacity to promote both explorative and 
exploitative activities. The study contributes a nuanced understanding of how formal 
and informal organizational elements interact in practice at an actor level, and expands 
our understanding of how emergent practices can function as and contribute towards 
dynamic capabilities.  
The third and final paper, “Historical embeddedness, crises and its influence on the 
pursuit of organizational ambidexterity” examines how organizational history and past 
crisis-trauma events influence an organization’s contemporary strategic change 
towards ambidexterity. Employing a longitudinal case analysis of JSC, this paper 
examines the organization’s founding imprints, history of crisis-trauma events and the 
consequential effect this had on the organization. The study identifies two historically 
embedded processes – sustained imprinting and the reprinting process – that actively 
influence the organization’s contemporary framing and approach to exploration and 
exploitation. Furthermore, the reprinting process when triggered by past crises is 
found to have a paradoxical influence on the organization’s approach to exploration 
and exploitation; for it engenders the organization to change and be open to 
exploration and exploitation activities, but simultaneously establishes rigidities by 
circumscribing the parameters defining exploration and exploitation, thus constraining 
the effective pursuit and manifestation of ambidexterity. The study contributes a 
multidimensional understanding of organizational history and its influence on an 
organization’s strategic present context, and provides insights into organizational 
imprinting and sensitive periods. It also shows how history contributes to developing 
paradoxical tensions existing within organizations.  
The thesis’ denouement addresses the overarching research questions, outlines 
possible managerial implications and suggests avenues for future research.   
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
The evolving hybrid: an alternative 
perspective on organizational 
ambidexterity and its antecedents  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In an increasingly complex demanding environment the ability to explore new 
capabilities whilst exploiting existing ones is considered essential for superior 
performance and sustained competitive success (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; He 
and Wong, 2004). March’s (1991) seminal treatise on exploration and exploitation in 
organizational learning highlights a tension between these two critical independent 
activities and argues that, though challenging, finding an appropriate balance between 
exploration and exploitation is a necessity for organizational survival. Thus, the 
question of how an organization manages to pursue both exploration and exploitation 
bares critical significance for academia and practice. Since March’s seminal (1991) 
publication, research interest and consensus has grown arguing for an ambidextrous 
perspective, where two seemingly disparate activities (i.e. exploration and exploitation) 
may be pursued at the same time (Gupta et al, 2006; Simsek et al, 2009), which throws 
challenge to conventional wisdom.  
The organizational ambidexterity concept has been theorized and defined in a 
variety of ways (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013; Simsek, 2009; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 
2008), but central to its premise is the significant relationship between ambidexterity 
and organizational performance (Junni, Sarala, Taras and Tarba, 2013). Empirical 
studies of real world ambidextrous organizations have helped to advance the concept 
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beyond theorization, providing further depth of understanding as to its viability (i.e. 
Adler et al (1999) study of Toyota; Holmqvist (2004) case study of a leading 
Scandinavian software producer; Heracleous (2013) investigation of Apple Inc., and 
Heracleous and Wirtz (2013; 2014) study of Singapore Airlines). In conceptualizing 
ambidexterity, scholars have sought to establish how organizations can adapt to 
achieve balance noting it to be a difficult endeavor with organizations struggling to 
operate ambidextrously (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Voss and Voss, 2013). 
Examination of the pathways to achieving organizational ambidexterity has been a 
topic of discussion in organization theory and management literature. Engaging a 
number of theoretical perspectives, including network theory (Stadler et al, 2014), 
organizational learning (Levinthal and March, 1993) and paradox perspective 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Schmitt and Raisch, 2013), researchers have sought to 
understand and explain the development of ambidexterity and the intra- and inter-
organizational factors that engender it. This has been broadened by investigations into 
enabling factors such as the role of networks (Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Stadler et al, 
2014), organizational learning (Holmqvist, 2004), ambidextrous leadership (Smith and 
Tushman, 2005; Lubatkin et al, 2006; Smith, Lewis and Tushman, 2016) and the 
influence of moderators (Auh and Menguc, 2005; Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Lubatkin et 
al, 2006). To date theorization on the pathways to ambidexterity are dominated by 
three antecedents:  (1) structural ambidexterity, (2) contextual ambidexterity, (3) 
temporal/dynamic ambidexterity. (Herein, this paper uses the terms ‘antecedents’ and 
‘pathways’ interchangeably to refer to the different approaches assumed by an 
organization in order to achieve ambidexterity). 
All three antecedents are presented as being distinct and differ in terms of 
organizational form – focusing either on structure and processes or behavioral systems 
– in addition to the level of implementation, and the way in which the antecedent 
habilitate the dual pursuit of exploration and exploitation. However, examinations of 
the ambidextrous pathways pursued by organizations in an effort to succeed in 
performing both dimensions of the exploration-exploitation tension have tended to 
look at the phenomenon through a single lens and focus on one mode of operating, 
thus implying that an organization adapting to become ambidextrous may engage with 
only one approach. Simsek (2009) notes that by looking at the ambidexterity 
phenomenon through one pathway as an explanation for its incarnation, current 
research in this field lacks an integrative understanding of organizational ambidexterity 
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and its manifestation across multiple levels. Interestingly, despite the differences 
between the modes to ambidexterity, scholars propose that these approaches are, in 
actuality, complementary (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) but what this means or looks 
like remains unclear and has not been expanded upon in literature (Kauppila, 2010; 
O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). For example, in Kauppila’s (2010) study of inter-
organizational partnerships and ambidexterity he hypothesizes that, in reality, 
ambidexterity is likely achieved through a combination of approaches and at various 
organizational levels rather than by means of just one antecedent, although he does 
not go further or provide deeper analysis or empirical support for his assertion. And 
more recently, Agostini, Nosella, and Filippini (2016:131) assert that “to date, an 
integration of all the approaches is still lacking, ‘leaving an important gap in our 
knowledge of the theory and practice of ambidexterity’ (Chang and Hughes, 2012)”. 
This raises key questions as to how the antecedents may be harmoniously engaged 
from within the same organization, and why would such a condition occur? 
Furthermore, we have a limited understanding of the micro-mechanisms supporting 
ambidexterity in practice (Asif, 2017). O’Reilly and Tushman (2011) contend that 
“what is needed is greater insight into the specific micro-mechanisms required for a 
manager to implement and operate an ambidextrous strategy” (p. 8), thus echoing the 
need for research to examine what organizational [micro-]mechanisms or features 
underpin and enable this to happen, and at what levels within the organization do 
these manifest?    
This paper seeks to address the aforementioned questions by conducting an 
empirically grounded, longitudinal in-depth case-study of a vital large organizational 
unit located at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston, Texas (USA). The 
following focuses on the NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) program which has 
evolved over time and recently underwent radical change in an effort to adapt and 
develop capabilities in balancing exploration and exploitation activities. The findings 
contribute to ambidexterity literature by demonstrating that the pathway to 
ambidexterity evolves progressively over time, with the different structural and 
contextual antecedents being integrated in a layered pattern, conceiving a hybrid 
layering mode. In being layered, the modes were interrelated by their shared 
commonalities (i.e. structural differentiation or degree of integration) However, in 
combining the different antecedents, the form and character they assume alters 
appearing to recast what has traditionally been depicted, leading to an alternative 
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perspective and understanding of how ambidexterity may be achieved. To this end, 
the study found that this hybrid mode to ambidexterity was borne out of the 
fluctuating disposition of the exploration-exploitation tension that surfaced in two 
regards. Firstly, in relation to the state of tension, findings indicated that the tension 
did not maintain a steady state but would shift in emphasis over time towards one 
element depending on environmental factors and changes to its internal context. And 
secondly, the relationship between the two dimensions (exploration-exploitation) and 
their management, as perceived by actors, changed from a condition of maintaining 
distinction and a degree of balance between the two conflicting dimensions to a state 
of reconciling them. From the analysis, it emerged that middle managers play a critical 
role in initiating, designing and driving the shape of this hybrid mode to ambidexterity, 
and what’s more, the micro-processes of dynamic capabilities – sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring (Teece, 2007) – were found to reside in and be enacted by middle 
managers. It emerged that what enabled these dynamic capability traits to manifest at 
the middle management level was (1) bidirectional cognitive dissonance between 
senior management and ground level staff, and (2) the deliberate engagement of 
unconventional informal practices endorsed by the senior director.  
This study contributes to ambidexterity literature by giving insights into the 
fluctuating and paradoxical nature of the exploration-exploitation tension and begins 
to expand our understanding of the varying evolving forms and modes that operating 
ambidextrously can assume, and how they may be conditioned by the organization’s 
circumstances. It also gives insights into the managerial capability to achieve 
ambidexterity, highlighting the significance of middle managers not only in its 
initiation, as conferred by Zimmermann, Raisch and Birkinshaw (2015), but also in its 
direct design and implementation. Secondly, the research case contributes to our 
understanding of where dynamic capabilities can be held in an organization by 
extending our understanding of how ‘reconfiguring’, by virtue of context shaping 
capabilities (Birkinshaw et al, 2016), can occur at organizational levels beyond senior 
management.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss the core 
theoretical concepts of organizational ambidexterity and its antecedents as held in 
literature. Thereafter, I describe the empirical context and detail the key findings of 
the case and develop theoretical insights of how the hybrid mode to ambidexterity 
evolved within a large organizational unit and its antecedents. I conclude with a 
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discussion of the key findings, its theoretical contributions and implications for future 
research and management practice.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Theoretical perspectives on the nature of the exploration-exploitation tension 
Exploration-exploitation as separate and conflicting  
An organization’s approach to managing exploration and exploitation, in an 
effort to attain ambidexterity, is dependent upon the perspective it assumes as to the 
nature of the relationship between the two activities. First postulated by March (1991), 
exploration-exploitation are regarded as two incompatible processes which compete 
for scarce resources and exist in a state of tension. In characterizing the nature of the 
exploration-exploitation tension, March (1991) and other subsequent scholars contend 
that the two activities are inherently at odds, presenting a trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation. This conceptualizes exploration and exploitation as being 
diametrically opposed. In reviewing the conceptual treatment of the exploration-
exploitation tension, Gupta et al (2006) note that in the case of this perspective, 
exploration and exploitation are deemed to be two ends of a continuum given that 
“the mindset and organizational routines needed for exploration are radically different 
from those needed for exploitation, making the simultaneous pursuit of both all but 
impossible” (p. 695). Hence, the logic implies that the simultaneous pursuit of 
exploration and exploitation requires an approach in which the two activities are 
managed mutually exclusively within or across domains (i.e. individual, subsystem, 
organizational unit). Levinthal and March (1993) contend the need for “sufficient 
exploitation to ensure [an organization’s] current viability and, at the same time, 
devote sufficient attention to exploration in order to ensure the organization’s future 
viability” (p. 105). This logic suggests that an appropriate level or degree of balance 
between exploration and exploitation is required and in equivalent magnitude (March, 
1991).  Lubatkin et al’s (2006) study of ambidextrous performance in SMEs found 
organizations achieved high performance levels when the balance of exploration and 
exploitation were both at their highest levels. In addition, Uotila, Maula, Keil and 
Zahra (2009) hypothesize that “a balance between exploration and exploitation should 
provide optimal performance levels, and that such a balance involves trade-offs 
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between exploration and exploitation” (p. 228). And Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) talk 
of striving for and maintaining balance across domains through different forms of 
alliances, where exploration and exploitation are relatively evenly represented. In 
Agostini, Nosella and Filippini (2016) recent study the writers define ambidexterity as 
simultaneously “achieving high levels” of the two activities of a tension (p. 129), thus 
implying the pursuit for similar optimal levels of exploration and exploitation.  
However, some writers question the logic of ‘balance’ between the two ends 
of the continuum as being the optimum position, and suggest that the ideal position 
may not lie somewhere in the middle with a similar emphasis on both activities, but 
depends on the relative importance of exploration and exploitation activities to the 
organization (Gulati and Puranam, 2009); thus suggesting that it may in fact appear 
asymmetrical (Lee, Kim and Joshi, 2017). Interestingly, this draws parallels with Cao, 
Gedajlovic and Zhang’s (2009) empirical analysis of organizational ambidexterity and 
performance. In their initial hypothesis, they proposed that a high degree of balance 
between exploration and exploitation, where both activities were closely matched in 
magnitude, contributed to a positive effect on firm performance; however, they found 
little supporting evidence. Similarly, although He and Wong (2004) study found 
positive evidence supporting the ambidexterity hypothesis it also detected that when 
organizations pursue both strategies with equal aggression (i.e. rated highly on both 
exploration and exploitation), they encounter organizational difficulties which could 
negate the positive interaction effect, however, the authors do not go on to expand or 
detail this further. Moreover, it has been suggested that other factors such as 
environmental dynamism (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008) and organizational context 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) are drivers that help determine an organization’s 
pursuit of either exploration or exploitation and its magnitude. Hence, this lack of 
agreement amongst researchers highlights knowledge gaps and questions around the 
character of the exploration-exploitation tension. If ambidexterity is to be attained by 
balancing two contradictory activities, then where the optimum point of ‘balance’ 
resides remains an issue of continuous debate.  Is it the equal balance of the two or is 
it a normative judgement shaped by the organization’s context and the actors engaged 
in attaining ambidexterity?  
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Exploration-exploitation as interdependent complements 
Other researchers assume a different stance and suggest exploration and 
exploitation do not preclude each other. Although they concede them to be different 
and independent, they are not considered incongruous but rather complementary 
activities coexisting within an organization (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Gupta et al, 
2006; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). This logic deems exploration-exploitation as 
orthogonal (Cao et al, 2009; Gupta et al, 2006; Putnam et al, 2016), thus organizations 
have the propensity to engage both activities in conjunction. This perspective reflects 
a continuous change process in which the pursuit of exploration does not negate the 
pursuit of exploitation and the two are mutually enhancing. Knott’s (2002) mixed 
method analysis of Toyota’s product development concludes that exploration and 
exploitation coexist as complements and within the same functioning unit, “since it is 
non-optimal to combine them if they are substitutes” (p. 340). Knott (2002) stresses 
the underlying mechanisms enabling the ideal combination of exploration and 
exploitation are significant to our understanding of how complementarity between 
these dimensions occurs.  Likewise, Heracleous (2013) analysis of Apple Inc. 
highlights how the firm engages operational efficiency (exploitation) and serial 
innovation (exploration) simultaneously in what he calls a ‘Quantum Strategy’. 
Heracleous shows that these two different activities exist in an integrative manner 
within the same organization and are not considered or treated as trade-offs 
constraining Apple’s strategic choices but rather it drives their industry leading 
performance.  
The idea holds that exploration and exploitation coexist within the same unit 
and can be managed in a complementary fashion implies organizational ambidexterity 
may be the result of an integrative approach to exploration and exploitation. And in 
Farjoun’s (2010) theoretical review of stability and change, which he equates to 
exploitation and exploration respectively, he presents a duality view of the tension. 
Farjoun contends that “duality suggests instead that stability and change in different 
units and hierarchical levels may intertwine and depend on common practices and that 
rather than negating and displacing one another, they can mutually reinforce each 
other in a process of renewal” (2010: 218). Furthermore, Farjoun (2010) asserts that 
the duality view “casts doubts on organizations’ ability to separate elements of stability 
and change so neatly” (p. 218), thus contesting the pragmatic viability of the dualistic 
assumption of tensions as diametric opposites. 
36 
 
Exploration-exploitation as interwoven paradoxes 
A third perspective pertinent to discussions surrounding the relationship 
between the exploration and exploitation tension has received growing attention in 
recent years; that of paradox (Raisch and Zimmermann, 2017; Smith and Lewis, 2011; 
Smith, Lewis, Jarzabkowski and Langley, 2017). Paradox, as defined by Schad, Lewis, 
Raisch and Smith (2016) refers to “persistent contradictions between interdependent 
elements. While seemingly distinct and oppositional these elements inform and define 
one another, tied in a web of eternal mutuality” (p. 6). Cameron (2017) explains that 
what distinguishes paradox from related concepts3 is that the elements are 
simultaneously mutually exclusive and contradictory but also present and accepted.  
Some scholars contend that as a theoretical lens, paradox can extend our 
understanding of organizational tensions for it embraces principles of dynamism and 
complexity and spans contexts, levels of analysis and time both within as well as 
across organizations (Clegg et al, 2002; Smith and Lewis, 2011; Papachroni et al, 2014; 
Smith and Lewis, 2011; Schad et al, 2016). The versatility of the paradox perspective 
makes it applicable to a variety of phenomena, including organizational ambidexterity 
and the exploration-exploitation tension (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Papachroni 
et al, 2016). It has been argued that the continuum and orthogonal perspective of 
tensions give a simplistic view of polar constructs and emphasizes the need to go 
beyond such distinctions (Lewis, 2000). In emphasizing competing logics and their 
concurrent interdependence, the paradox lens can be seen as synthesizing the 
continuum and orthogonal perspectives for it maintains that tensions are distinct 
contradictory forces, but are simultaneously complementary.  Westenholz (1999) 
conceptualization of paradox reflects on its composite nature purporting that 
“paradox is simultaneously ‘either/or’ and ‘both-and’”, a position she refers to as 
“both:: or” (p. 506). Hence, paradox can provide a more holistic understanding of 
organizational tensions and denotes a sense of continual motion in the nature of 
conflicting forces, a state Smith and Lewis (2011) refer to as ‘dynamic equilibrium’ (p. 
392). 
                                                          
3 Cameron (2017) makes a distinction between paradox and related concepts including irony, 
ambivalence, dialectic, dilemma and inconsistency.  Clegg and Pina e Cunha (2017) exposition 
provides an in-depth analysis of organizational dialectics, its points of difference and similarity 
with the concepts tension, paradox and dilemma.   
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Similarly, Cao et al (2009) deconstruct ambidexterity into two dimensions - the 
“balance dimension” and the “combined dimension” – a typology which can be seen 
to be reflective of the paradoxical state of ambidexterity for the authors recognize that 
though inconsistent, the exploration-exploitation tension simultaneously comprises 
elements of integration and separation, coexisting as “two sides of the same coin” 
(Lewis, 2000: 761). Within Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) study of how new product 
design companies manage the exploration-exploitation tension, they identify what they 
refer to as three nested paradoxes of innovation. Their findings indicate that in 
managing these tensions organizational actors saw these conflicting elements as 
paradoxes that interacted and reinforced each other, occurring at multiple levels of the 
organization. They also highlight that, in relation to paradoxical tensions, the 
combined use of integration and differentiation tactics is central to the ambidextrous 
performance of these organizations.  
In theorizing solutions on how to deal with paradox Poole and Van de Ven 
(1989) propose four analytical modes — ‘acceptance, spatial separation, temporal 
separation, and synthesis’ (p. 566-567) – and it can be said that these modes are 
mirrored in the prevailing antecedents to ambidexterity as purported in current 
literature. Researchers have also highlighted another response to paradox, that of 
transcendence (Bednarek, Paroutis and Sillince, 2017; Clegg and Cunha, 2017; Lewis, 
2000).  Bednarek et al (2017) explain that central to the concept of transcendence is 
“the notion of working through rather than resolving paradox” (p. 79) and that it 
“does not mean resolution through a tidy synthesis…the paradox persists but through 
this ‘higher level of abstraction’ (Lewis and Grimes, 1999, p. 2001) contradiction is not 
only accepted but enacted as something more workable” (p. 79). In examining 
responses to performing paradoxes Bednarek, et al (2017) expound upon the practice 
of transcending performing paradoxes and how it unfolds through discourse and the 
rhetorical practices of organizational actors (p. 79). The authors find that 
transcendence occurs as an dynamic ongoing oscillating process as opposed to being a 
static outcome, where paradox(es) are worked through continuously rather than being 
resolved or completely synthesized. Both continuity and change are important to the 
transcendence of paradoxes. Clegg and Cunha (2017) explain that transcendence looks 
not to resolve the tension but to sustain it, for neither dimension of the tension is 
neutralized but remains active in the organization.  
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Antecedents to organizational ambidexterity 
Ambidexterity research abounds with studies exploring how organizations can 
pursue exploration and exploitation simultaneously, although blind spots still persist in 
our understanding of this endeavor. One of these blind spots refers to the 
interrelations between the antecedents to ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Simsek et al, 2009). Although literature notes the equifinality of achieving 
ambidexterity (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009), studies analyzing the pathways to 
ambidexterity have typically assumed a single configuration (Agostini et al, 2016), and 
are dominated by three approaches – structural, behavioral and temporal/dynamic 
solutions (Simsek, 2009; Birkinshaw, Zimmermann and Raisch, 2016). Each 
antecedent is treated as a distinct solution and engages with either the structural or 
contextual features of an organization. Critically each of the antecedents to 
ambidexterity is underpinned by a particular conceptualization of the exploration-
exploitation tension and contends that the panacea to achieving ambidexterity is 
dependent on one of two imperatives: the principle of separation or the principle of 
integration.  
However, in Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) comprehensive review of 
ambidexterity research the authors point out that upon closer examination the 
different paths to ambidexterity appear to be complementary and interconnected. 
Other scholars articulate similar sentiments (Agostini et al, 2016; Kauppila, 2010; 
Markides and Oyon, 2010; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013), yet despite these claims 
research has given little explicit consideration to how the different approaches may 
interact during an organization’s pursuit of ambidexterity. The following discusses the 
antecedents to ambidexterity as treated in current research. (See table 4 for conceptual 
summary of the antecedents and underlying principles to ambidexterity).  
 
Principle of Separation 
 The principle of separation is grounded in the view that exploration and 
exploitation are conflicting polar opposites of a tension and therefore must be 
managed and treated separately in order to alleviate the conflict. Scholars from this 
school of thought assert that the exploration-exploitation conflict is best managed by 
separating the organization’s structural design. The use of structural design as a 
solution for ambidexterity is integral to two prevailing pathways advanced in literature 
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- the structural ambidexterity approach and the temporal/dynamic ambidexterity 
approach.   
  
Structural approach 
The structural ambidexterity approach is the prominent classical approach to 
ambidexterity in literature and has been the focus of multiple research studies (Turner 
et al, 2013). Rooted in Duncan’s (1976) concept of dual structures, the structural 
approach maintains that ambidexterity is realized by segmenting an organization’s 
structure into two different units. Each unit is focused on either exploration or 
exploitation and operates its own independent systems, subsystems, processes as well 
as possesses a culture relevant to its requirements (Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), so to lessen the conflict between these two supposedly 
contradictory elements.  Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) proposed that this solution of 
structural ambidexterity allows conflicting activities to be pursued simultaneously, thus 
advocating ambidexterity by virtue of maintaining a degree of balance between 
exploration and exploitation. Critical to this solution is the simultaneity it engenders in 
pursuing exploration and exploitation within the same instance of time, but in doing 
so it provides a static interpretation of ambidexterity and the organization’s structure. 
It suggests that the nature and relationship between exploration and exploitation 
remains in perpetual conflict and therefore the management of structural separation 
remains consistent across time.  
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Table 4: Conceptual summary of antecedents and underlying principles to ambidexterity 
Principle of 
ambidexterity
Separation
Integration
Interwoven
Exploration and exploitation are 
contradictory activities in a perpetual 
state of conflict and are managed 
independently
Nature of 
exploration-exploitation tension
Exploration and exploitation coexist 
as constant complements
Exploration and exploitation are 
paradoxical, fluid and interdependent, 
exist in a state of conflict and 
complementarity
Organizational Mechanism
Independent structural  systems, 
processes and sub-cultures
Temporal  dynamics with 
cyclical switching over time
Ÿ Internal organizational context
No one single approach to ambidexterity but a 
complex amalgamated dynamic endeavour. 
Strategy interweaves structural principles and 
behavioural flexibility
Strategic Implication for ambidexterity
Ÿ Mixture of structural systems, 
processes, sub-cultures, and  
internal organizational context  
Strategy centres on management building an 
organizational envrionement that enables 
individuals to decide how and when to perform 
explorative and exploitative activities. 
Dependent on people having the ability to fulfil 
both activities
Strategy focuses on maintaining constant physical 
distinction between exploration and exploitation. 
Separation can occur across different periods in 
time, and also in the same instance 
Ÿ Ambidexterous senior leadership
41 
 
Consequently, this antecedent leaves little room for the possibility that the 
nature and relationship of the exploration-exploitation tension may change over time 
and, subsequently, the structural approach may not serve in the same capacity. 
Furthermore, Jansen et al (2009) note that this structural approach “establishes 
differences across organizational units in terms of mind-sets, time orientations, 
functions, and product/market domains” (p. 799), thus suggesting inconsistencies 
occur on multiple organizational levels as a result of structural differentiation including 
operational activities and strategies, and implicit features such as cognitive logic and 
norms.  Extending the idea of inconsistencies arising from structural separation, Schad 
et al (2016) note that negative consequences may arise from this structural mode of 
operating which could possibly negate its benefits. The authors claim that “structural 
separation can help minimize conflict and avoid inertia, but can also create power 
imbalances, where one pole begins to dominate” (Schad et al, 2016: 28), which leaves 
questions in understanding the multivariate reasons underlying why one pole may 
dominate the other, the organizational imbalances that may arise and the impact of 
this on performance.  
 
Mechanisms enabling the structural approach 
With its emphasis on the separation of exploration and exploitation between 
distinct structural units, the structural approach has been criticized for not attending 
to the integration of exploration and exploitation.  Scholars have argued that, although 
structure is capable of supporting the achievement of both exploration and 
exploitation, it is insufficient for effective ambidexterity (Gilbert, 2006; Turner et al, 
2013) because an organization can generate value in recombining exploration and 
exploitation (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). In light of 
this researchers propose that whilst exploration and exploitation should be loosely 
coupled at the unit level it is important that these differentiated units are integrated 
and tightly coupled together at corporate senior management level (Benner and 
Tushman 2003; Harreld et al, 2007). Integration they theorize is dependent upon and 
resides specifically with leadership at the top of the organization (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008). O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) argue that “a company’s senior 
management team must be committed to operating ambidextrously even if its 
members aren’t ambidextrous” (p. 9), indicating that the functional capability and 
leadership processes of the senior team are a critical enabling feature for the effective 
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operation of the structural antecedent to ambidexterity. For this reason, senior 
management is regarded as an enabling mechanism whose coordination and 
integration of exploration and exploitation ensures the effective management and 
balance of both activities within an organization whose units are structurally separated 
(Lubatkin et al., 2006).  
Researchers have also sought to identify other high-level mechanisms 
integrating exploration and exploitation within the context of structural ambidexterity. 
Jansen et al (2008) and O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) posit that a common vision can 
link differentiated units for it “[brings] together all employees in a common cause and 
preventing organizational separation from turning into organizational fragmentation” 
(O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004: 8). Arguably, this responsibility sits under the purview 
of the senior management team who must formulate and communicate the vision 
throughout the organization, thus relating to the significance of senior leadership in 
structural ambidexterity. Other academics have explored further cross-unit integrating 
mechanisms within a structurally separated context, identifying nurturing and sharing 
as significant factors (Raisch, 2008).  
 
Dynamic/temporal approach  
The dynamic/temporal ambidexterity approach has been referred to using 
several different terms such as cyclical ambidexterity (Simsek et al, 2009), punctuated 
equilibrium (Gupta et al., 2006), dynamic ambidexterity (Luger, Raisch and Schimmer, 
2013), rhythmic switching (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), or organizational vacillation 
(Boumgarden et al, 2012; Kang, Kang, Kim, 2017). As with the structural approach, it 
is founded on the principle of separation, viewing exploration and exploitation as two 
conflicting elements where the pursuit of one precludes the other and occurs within 
the same organization or unit. However, its core focus is on the distinction of 
exploration and exploitation through time as opposed to structural differentiation 
occurring within the same instance. Despite its various labels, the dynamic/temporal 
approach refers to the sequential allocation of resources and structural shifts between 
periods of exploration and exploitation in a cyclical pattern over time; where 
exploitation is said to occur over long-periods of time punctuated by irregular short 
bursts of exploration (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). However, Asif (2017) 
categorizes punctuated equilibrium as a process-related antecedent in that it 
“represents actions and behaviors that create ambidexterity” (p. 1491), and explains 
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that “the primary emphasis of temporal cycling is to change the deep structures 
developed and solidified during long-term exploitation through periodic bursts of 
exploration” (p. 1495), thus representing a dynamic capability.  
In discussing the motivations for why an organization would incur the 
repeated disruptions to its structure and operations and undertake this 
temporal/dynamic approach of switching between exploration and exploitation, 
Raisch and Tushman (2016) outline three theoretical perspectives. Firstly, holding to 
contingency theory Raisch and Tushman (2016) suggest that organizations switch 
between exploration and exploitation as an adaptive response to changes in their 
environment. The second perspective deems the transitions as being part of an 
organization’s life-cycle and so periods in which exploration decreases and 
exploitation increases, and vice-versa, are a natural occurrence. Thirdly, Raisch and 
Tushman (2016) highlight the vacillation perspective, emphasizing that temporal 
separation between exploration and exploitation can dispel organizational inertia for it 
eliminates the conflicts which occur in the concurrent pursuit of both activities (Gulati 
and Puranam, 2009; Boumgarden et al, 2012). In contemplating the appropriateness of 
using the temporal approach with its oscillating sequencing, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
(2001) argue that it would be more suited to stable environments and small 
organizations who lack access or the disposition to access plentiful resources, 
especially given that the oscillating process can be highly disruptive to an organization 
and frequent radical change would be difficult to maintain effectively. This raises 
questions as to the practical viability of such an approach especially in large and 
established organizations which are more susceptible to structural and cultural inertia.  
 
Mechanisms enabling temporal/dynamic approach 
A core enabling feature of this approach is the act or practice of switching 
between exploration and exploitation which constitutes the dynamic motion 
characterizing this pathway to ambidexterity. This feature distinguishes it from the 
static structural and behavioral approaches to ambidexterity. Arguably, this dynamic 
trait gives credence to the concept of fluidity in the ambidexterity process, as opposed 
to ambidexterity being a fixed single state phenomena. This motion of cyclical 
switching back and forth between exploration and exploitation is the mechanism of 
balance, ensuring the failure traps of over-innovation and competency traps of 
exploitation are averted (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003).  
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Current research provides a limited understanding of the mechanisms that 
organizations use to enable temporal switching between exploration and exploitation 
(Stadler et al., 2014). Duncan (1976) proposes that ambidexterity is possible by 
switching between two structural forms: organic structures for initiating activities and 
mechanistic structures to implement them. Similarly, Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1997) 
grounded study demonstrates how organizations switch from building on the past 
(exploit) to look to the future (explore) via what they term ‘rhythmic time-paced 
transitions’ and ‘semi-structures’, and are concepts which draw parallels with Klarner 
and Raisch (2013) sequential rhythmic shift patterns. Taking another view, Simsek et al 
(2009) suggest instituting conflict resolution systems are another enabling mechanism 
of temporal separation for it aids in resolving conflicts in managerial roles during the 
challenging transition periods. And Boumgarden et al (2012) argue that firms can 
change and switch between formal structures of exploration and exploitation more 
easily than adjust the culture and the informal organization.  
Kang, Kang and Kim (2017) examination of vacillation between exploration 
and exploitation provides a somewhat different perspective of the transition by 
emphasizing a distinction between formal and informal organizational structures. The 
authors posit that “an ambidextrous organization emerges and then disappears during 
vacillation because changes in the formal structure are followed by lagged changes in 
the informal organization…As an informal organization for exploration gradually 
changes into an informal organization for exploitation and vice versa, the informal 
organization that is in transition temporally achieves the characteristics of both 
exploration and exploitation” (p. 1357). Hence, Kang et al (2017) suggest that during 
the transition from one dimension to another, whilst formal organizational elements 
are in a state of change, it is at this point that the informal organization temporally 
becomes the mechanism of ambidexterity and simultaneously operate exploration and 
exploitation. Kang and colleagues go on to explain that their study findings suggest 
that inertia is an enabling mechanism that supports the ambidextrous informal 
organization: “one benefit of inertia is that the temporarily emerging ambidextrous 
informal organization will retain the desirable ambidextrous characteristics longer for 
the organization with strong inertia…firms with weak inertia have to vacillate more 
frequently because their temporary ambidextrous informal organization will vanish 
more quickly” (p. 1357). However, Kang et al (2017) do not specify what constitutes 
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high or low inertia, or how one would determine if the boundary between high and 
low had been crossed. 
Questions arise over the feasibility of the temporal/dynamic approach if 
structure and culture change at different rates. This presents a source of organizational 
misalignment which has the potential to inhibit change and adaptation towards 
ambidexterity rather than enable it. Furthermore, this approach assumes that an 
organization’s management team possess the capabilities to proactively manage the 
different structural arrangements, administrative processes and systems, cultural 
orientations and mind-sets required for the effective transition between cycles 
(O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). 
 
Principle of Integration 
 The principle of integration conceptualizes exploration and exploitation as 
complements coexisting harmoniously within the same organizational unit or system 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Within ambidexterity studies this view of exploration 
and exploitation is embodied in the behavioral approach to ambidexterity, rooted in 
organizational context and culture literature (Simsek et al., 2009). With the behavioral 
approach, attention shifts to “non-structural elements of ambidexterity such as culture 
and values, incentives, mind-sets and strategic foresight” (Markides and Chu, 2009: 
325), signifying a multidimensional component to pursuing ambidexterity.  Academic 
discussions on the behavioral dimension to ambidexterity generally orientate around 
two levels of analysis: (1) the organizational level focuses on the wider internal 
context, and (2) the individual level, refers to the behavior and competencies of 
individuals and groups/teams. 
 
Behavioral approach: Organizational level  
At an organizational level, the behavioral approach suggests that the 
concurrent pursuit of exploration and exploitation within an organization/unit stems 
from cultivating an environment that engenders the behaviors conducive to 
accomplishing ambidexterity.  Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) first proposed the 
behavioral capacity as an alternative way of creating the capabilities needed for 
ambidexterity. Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) peer at ambidexterity through the lens 
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of the adaptability-alignment tension4 and develop the concept of contextual 
ambidexterity. Contextual ambidexterity emphasizes an organization’s context and refers 
to its systems and processes which interact to facilitate alignment (exploitation) and 
adaptability (exploration) simultaneously across the whole business unit (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004a; Lee, Kim and Joshi, 2017). Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004a) 
describe that an ambidextrous context is built to be dynamic and flexible, and 
manifests in the behavior and actions of organizational actors. They go on to contend 
that “ambidexterity is best achieved not through structural, task, or temporal 
separation, but by building a business-unit context that encourages individuals to make 
their own judgments” (2004a: 211, emphasis added). Markides and Chu (2009) 
investigation into how corporate parent companies with diversified firms become 
ambidextrous found that several non-structural solutions promoted ambidexterity, 
thus concluding that structure is but one of the elements of the organizational 
‘context’ underpinning ambidexterity.  
An individual’s capacity to decide how they allocate their time between 
adaptability and alignment orientated activities is a central feature of contextual 
ambidexterity, made possible by the organization’s internal environment developed to 
shape this behavior at every level of the hierarchy. Consequently, contextual 
ambidexterity implicitly assumes that organizational actors at all levels of the hierarchy 
understand the ambidextrous strategy and that the strategy translates universally across 
the whole organization and is homogeneously understood by all employees. However, 
this claim would appear to make broad assumptions on the motivations and individual 
capabilities of all workers. It does not fully acknowledge the complex challenges that 
this ambidextrous ideal places on a person’s intellectual, social and physical capacity 
(Holmqvist and Spicer, 2013), or that it may not be achievable by all people. 
                                                          
4 Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004a, 2004b) define each of the elements in the adaptability-
alignment tension. Adaptability is referred to as “the ability to move quickly toward new 
opportunities, to adjust to volatile markets and to avoid complacency” (2004a: 47) and also say 
that it focuses “on the future. It is the ability to respond to change, to be nimble, to progress” 
(2004b: 5). Its diametrically opposed but equally important capability, alignment is “a clear 
sense of how value is being created in the short term and how activities should be coordinated 
and streamlined to deliver that value” (2004a: 47) where it centers on “maximizing the 
present, leveraging existing ideas, exploiting markets” (2004b: 5). Arguable the adaptability-
alignment tension resembles the exploration-exploitation tension for adaptability orientates 
around flexibility and innovation, traits shared with exploration, whilst alignment concerns the 
maximization and efficient utilization of current capabilities, existing products and markets, 
which is akin to exploitation. Therefore, this paper views and uses the terms adaptability and 
alignment to be interchangeable with exploration and exploitation.  
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Papachroni et al (2014) provide an interesting alternative perspective to contextual 
ambidexterity perceiving it as a form of temporal ambidexterity. The authors contest 
that “…the concept of contextual ambidexterity itself relies on a form of temporal 
separation at the individual level” (Papachroni et al, 2014: 8), thus suggesting that 
ambidexterity results from the very act of switching rather than the context itself. 
Furthermore, proponents of the contextual ambidexterity approach place the onus on 
senior management as the ones who create the context that enables and encourages 
staff members to use their own judgement in deciding how to divide their time 
between exploration and exploitation activities (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) do not specify how it should be implemented, but do 
admit that there are likely to be costs involved in implementing systems and processes 
to achieve contextual ambidexterity. The authors do however contend that the costs 
of this approach may be cheaper than the traditional structural solution as costs only 
account to controlling and supervising employees, but the authors do not expound on 
the magnitude or nature of such costs.  
Furthermore, Kauppila (2010) point to further drawbacks in Gibson and 
Birkinshaw’s (2004) rendition of contextual ambidexterity in relation to its treatment 
of explorative and exploitative knowledge and how it is developed and used 
ambidextrously. Kauppila (2010) explains that “a shortcoming of the contextual 
ambidexterity model is that it does not consider how a firm can simultaneously 
conduct radical forms of exploration and exploitation. Rather it merely assumes that 
explorative knowledge is produced somewhere and that it is then selectively adapted 
to the organization’s purposes. Furthermore, the contextual model assumes that a firm 
exploits the knowledge that it has aligned, but does not explicate how this exploitation 
is organized” (p. 286).  
 
Mechanisms enabling behavioral approach: organizational level 
Drawing on Ghoshal and Barlett (1994) dimensions of organizational context, 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) contend that ambidexterity is generated by creating a 
high-performing environment in which hard organizational attributes of stretch and 
discipline are combined with soft features of support and trust. The authors argue that 
these four features are integral to contextual ambidexterity characterizing them as 
“interdependent, complementary features of organization context that are non-
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substitutable, and therefore all four must be present in order for a business unit to 
become ambidextrous” (p. 214). However, this begs the question as to whether these 
four attributes alone are sufficient in enabling ambidexterity, and what other features 
or mechanisms of an organization’s context presently unidentified in ambidexterity 
literature may contribute in an organization becoming ambidextrous?  
In Adler, Goldoftas and Levine’s (1999) study of Toyota’s production system 
the authors identify meta-routines and job enrichment as mechanisms that allowed 
employees to decide for themselves how to reconcile the efficiency-flexibility tension, 
and point to training and trust as two critical supporting contextual factors guiding the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms. It could be argued that Adler et al’s (1999) meta-
routines and job enrichment mechanisms are reflective of Birkinshaw and Gibson 
(2004) performance management dimension for it stimulates people to behave in a 
manner conducive to achieving ambidexterity by providing systems in which to 
operate. Likewise, Adler et al (1999) concept of training and trust reflects the social 
support context (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) providing people with the scope and 
license in which to make their own decisions on how to operate efficiently and 
flexibly. In another vein, Birkinshaw, Zimmermann and Raisch (2016) illustrative case 
study of GSK highlights how the organization’s vision, culture and people 
development enabled behavioral integration to balance scientific innovation and a 
commercial orientation. The authors explain how GSK created a vision that united 
and promoted innovation and commercial entrepreneurship throughout the 
organization. And had a culture focused on shifting mind-sets by employing cross-
functional teams and cultural principles of transparency, mutual learning, and support 
(Birkinshaw et al, 2016).  
Focusing on contextual ambidexterity, Turner and Lee (2012) examine human 
capital, social capital and organizational capital as mechanisms for ambidextrous 
exchange which interact in complex work structures revealing “the multiplicity of 
resources enabling ambidexterity, and the complexities of their interactions not only 
with each other but also with the processes of exploitation and exploration” (p. 192). 
In terms of people development Birkinshaw et al (2016) note that front line managers 
with blended skills were hired to sense and seize entrepreneurial opportunities whilst 
senior executives were responsible for shaping and reconfiguring the context in which 
exploration and exploitation could occur simultaneously. Additionally, Bierly and Daly 
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(2007) highlight team-based structures and human resource practices as organizational 
systems which support the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation.  
Arguably, contextual ambidexterity describes the conditions an organization 
should have to become ambidextrous but this does not necessarily explain or detail 
what organizational features a firm should change in order to build that environment, 
or how organizational leaders can promote new cultures that accommodate 
exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). 
 
Behavioral approach: Individual-level  
Ambidexterity scholars have also looked at the behavioral approach to 
ambidexterity at the individual level, emphasizing the integrative abilities of an 
individual to adjust between exploration and exploitation rather than the corporate 
context and culture of a unit (Simsek et al, 2009). At the individual level, the ability to 
successfully contend with and adjust between exploration and exploitation 
demonstrates cognitive and behavioral complexity (Smith, Binns and  Tushman, 2010) 
- where cognitive complexity is defined as “the ability to seek integration across 
seemingly contradictory tensions” and behavioral complexity, “the ability to engage 
multiple leadership behaviors that may seem in conflict with one another” (Smith et al, 
2010: 458) - constitutes a highly challenging mental balancing act, but successful 
leaders are able to demonstrate both (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004).  
Within extant literature individual level ambidexterity is judged a managerial 
capability and studies have examined senior leaders (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; 
Smith, 2014; Smith and  Tushman, 2005), and top management teams (Jansen and 
George, 2008; Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling and Veiga, 2006), general managers and middle 
managers (Burgess, Strauss, Currie and Wood, 2015; Fiol, 2002; Lüscher and  Lewis, 
2008; Taylor and Helfat, 2009) and front-line staff (Groysberg and Lee, 2009). Senior 
management has been the primary research focus of individual level ambidexterity. 
O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) advise that “ambidexterity is a specific capability 
embodied in senior leadership’s learning and is expressed through their ability to 
reconfigure existing organizational assets and competencies in a repeatable way to 
adapt to changing circumstances” (p. 200), a leadership ability that confers dynamic 
capabilities (O’Reilly and Tushman (2008). However, how top management actually 
do this and manage the conflicts requires further exploration (O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2013).  
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In highlighting the critical role of senior leadership teams for ambidexterity, 
Smith et al (2010) highlight building commitment to an overarching vision and goals, 
active learning behaviors at various levels, the direct engagement and management of 
conflicting tensions, dynamic pattern of decision-making and leadership team 
structures as characteristics necessary for senior management’s successful management 
of organizational tensions.  For instance, Smith (2014) found that top management 
teams effectively managed exploration and exploitation over time through dynamic 
decision-making which adopted and combined practices of differentiating—pulling 
apart the poles to amplify their valued distinctions—and integrating—accentuating 
their linkages to leverage synergies. Doing so allowed them to frequently oscillate 
support between the existing product and the innovation, such that both flourished 
simultaneously. Whilst Jansen, Vera and Crossan (2009) found exploratory innovation 
was associated with transformational leadership and exploitation with transactional 
leadership.  
Some proponents contend that top management teams are essential and 
needed to ensure integration across the different units (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; 
Smith and Tushman, 2005) and strategizing how the tension is translated downwards 
throughout the organization. Binns, Smith and Tushman (2010) imply that senior 
managers are critical and responsible for translating the contradictory complexity 
down to their middle managers. With paradoxical complexity held at the top, this view 
concludes that the role of middle managers is to focus on executing the strategy, 
perceiving them to be the ones who “support and implement the strategies and 
business models, but who have no direct influence on deciding on them” (Binns et al, 
2010: 458). This poses the question as to whether senior leaders are capable of 
translating complex tensions down to lower-levels of the hierarchy and what this 
would look like. 
Other scholars suggest ambidextrous organizations use lower-level integration 
mechanisms, such as middle managers and frontline staff, to stimulate lateral 
knowledge flows across units (Gilbert, 2006; Raisch, 2008). The role of middle 
managers in ambidexterity has received less attention than senior management, yet 
Van der Borgh, de Jong and Nijssen (2015) acknowledge the importance in exploring 
the role of middle managers in ambidexterity. Burgess et al (2015) highlight the 
significance of middle managers due to their role as mediators whose middle position 
in the organization enables them to adjust strategy (Floyd and Woodridge, 2000), and 
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span organizational boundaries and functions as organizational connectors (Taylor and 
Helfat, 2009; Wooldridge et al, 2008). Burgess et al (2015) focus on ‘hybrid’ middle 
managers “which represent professional workers […] who hold managerial as well as 
professional responsibility” and “are uniquely placed to forge workable compromises 
between knowledge exploration and exploitation” (p. S88). Burgess et al (2015) found 
the professional orientation and ability to develop appropriate social connections 
facilitated organizational ambidexterity for hybrid middle managers. Relatedly, in the 
context of technological transitions, Taylor and Helfat (2009) focus on middle 
managers as critical organizational connectors who through specific actions play a key 
role in implementing and maintaining organizational linkages between disparate 
elements. However, the authors explain that it is top management who specify the 
necessary linkages by instructing lower-level managers and shape the behaviors of 
middle managers by influencing economic incentives, social context, structural design 
and shared organizational cognition to encourage (or discourage) ambidexterity.  
Zimmermann and his colleagues (2015) provide a complementary view and 
identify the role of front-line managers in managing contradictory complexity of 
tensions as initiators of ambidexterity, where the management of complexity arises 
from the bottom up-rather than the top-down, as traditionally purported by structural 
ambidexterity.  This resembles Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, and Spee (2015) study 
highlighting that the complexity inherent in organizational tensions is not restricted to 
the senior leadership level but is experienced by middle managers and employees in 
their everyday work practices. It implies that the pragmatic identification and 
management of tensions may extend beyond the remit of leadership. Groysberg and 
Lee (2009) contrast the performance of star performing front-line professional service 
analysts hired to explore versus those hired to exploit. The authors found that the 
individual’s internal social capital and support structure (i.e. colleagues) affects the new 
hires performance where those hired to exploit existing capabilities of established 
markets performed better than those hired to explore a market new to them and their 
employers. This was due to a lack of established capabilities and competent knowledge 
in the new sector. It indicates the significant role played by historical learning and 
capability development at the individual, as well as firm level, in shaping and enabling 
the effective pursuit of ambidexterity at the individual and even firm level.  
Jansen et al (2009) give an individual level analysis of how formal and informal 
mechanisms at senior team level mediate the relationship between structural 
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differentiation and ambidexterity. Integration, they found, depicts hierarchical levels 
with social and formal integration across senior team members encouraging corporate 
level ambidexterity. At lower levels, ambidexterity is found to be achieved through 
more formal cross-functional interfaces. This insight also draws some parallels with 
Kang et al (2017) in showing how both formality and informality are required in some 
balance to achieve ambidexterity, and this can be part of the organizational structure 
as well as process design. 
 
Principle of Paradox   
Interrelations between antecedents to ambidexterity   
Despite increasing interest in ambidexterity, antecedents to becoming 
ambidextrous have largely been studied and conceptualized as distinct and even static 
forms, bar temporal/dynamic ambidexterity, thus supposing them to be standalone 
configurations.  However, few scholars have observed that complementarities exist 
between the different pathways to ambidexterity (Agostini et al, 2016; Birkinshaw and 
Gibson, 2013, Kauppila, 2010; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008), suggesting an alternative 
perspective that accounts for the complexity inherent in the ambidexterity process. 
However, researchers have not fully defined or expanded upon the details of this 
complementarity or how it may be embodied operationally. For instance, within 
O’Reilly and Tushman’s (2013) review of ambidexterity literature the authors submit 
that the pursuit of ambidexterity requires a mixture of contextual and structural 
approaches but do not expand upon such a composition in-depth. And Agostini et al 
(2016) affirm that “an ambidextrous organization is achieved through the coexistence 
of structural and contextual issues and managers’ roles, which appear to be strictly 
interlinked, whereas previous literature has mainly investigated only one single 
solution that usually does not provide the exhaustive functionalities required to deal 
with the entire range of boundary conditions and tensions faced by an organization 
over time” (p. 131).  
Raisch and Birkinshaw’s (2008) conceptual analysis cites commonality between 
enabling elements of structural and contextual ambidexterity, noting that the former 
requires a unitary overarching vision and culture, leadership capable of managing 
tensions and managers adaptable to implementing the strategy (Tushman and O’Reilly, 
1996; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008); and vice-versa, with an organization’s structure, 
systems and processes (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) being explicitly referenced for 
53 
 
contextual ambidexterity. Similarly, Cao et al (2009: 782) conceptualize two 
dimensions which they claim encompass ambidexterity – the “balance dimension” and 
the “combined dimension” - are distinct but related, and conclude that in 
simultaneously pursuing both dimensions the organization gains a positive enhancing 
effect on ambidextrous performance: “That is, we expect that, when combined, the 
two dimensions of ambidexterity [balance dimension and combined dimension] will 
have a synergistic effect on firm performance” (p. 784). In other words, the authors 
contend that the combined engagement of separation mechanisms (balanced 
dimension) along with integrative mechanisms (combined dimension) generated 
effective ambidexterity. However, the study falls short of explaining how an 
organization may combine these two different dimensions to gain the synergistic 
effect. In addition, Kauppila’s (2010) study of inter- and intra-organizational 
approaches to ambidexterity concludes that these two structural approaches are 
complementary rather than substitutes, which leads to the suggestion that there may 
be other complementary aspects to the different pathways to ambidexterity.  
In-depth studies have begun to emerge helping to illustrate how firms may 
engage different antecedents to manage organizational tensions and operate 
ambidextrously within an inter-firm context. Lavie and Rosenkpf (2006) examination 
of U.S. software companies suggests that firms use alliances to balance exploration 
and exploitation over time and across domains, and are able to deploy both 
ambidextrous strategies (exploration and exploitation at the same time) and 
punctuated equilibrium strategies (switching between exploration and exploitation 
across time). In another inter-firm study Raisch and Tushman (2016) comparative case 
analysis focuses on the parent-subsidy business model and examines how the inter-
firm relationship evolves as the subsidy units scale up. The study found that large 
incumbent firms set up separate new explorative business units outside their core 
business which were structurally differentiated from its horizontal counterpart in the 
core business but maintained a degree of vertical integration with the core firm’s 
management team. The subsidy units were later scaled up as their focus shifted to 
exploitation of their capabilities by switching to integrated mechanisms having 
achieved political and economic legitimacy. Interestingly, the authors delineate time 
and the scale up process into phases – exploration, the scale up transition and 
exploitation phase – which can be seen to be reflective of the temporal/dynamic 
ambidexterity sequence. The study provides insights into how inter-firm relations 
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modify over time and engage with differentiation and integration mechanisms at 
different levels and can be viewed as a macro representation of O’Reilly and 
Tushman’s (2011; 2013) concept of targeted integration. Nonetheless, it does not 
explain whether this inter-firm dynamic translates to ambidexterity within an intra-
firm context. And given that the study’s focal subsidies employed a focus strategy in 
dealing with exploration-exploitation activities (i.e. initially focused on exploration and 
then shifted to exploitation), it does not fully extend to understanding how an 
organization may manage the pursuit of both exploration-exploitation at the same 
time when bounded with the same firm.  
Other studies provide an intra-firm analytical perspective of how different 
antecedents to ambidexterity may be employed in an interrelated fashion. Adler et al. 
(1999) rich description of Toyota’s production unit gives insights into how multiple 
contextual mechanisms were employed to accommodate the dual forces of flexibility 
and efficiency. The authors describe how certain cultural mechanisms, structural 
partitioning and the sequential switching of employee roles were deployed to resolve 
the efficiency-flexibility paradox. Arguably this study gives credence to the view that 
different antecedents of ambidexterity can and are integrated within an organization. 
However, the study gives little insight into whether organizational tensions shift over 
time and how this may influence the pathway and transition to ambidexterity. In a 
one-year ethnography on work practices Smets et al. (2015) detail how reinsurance 
traders face tensions in exercising market and community logics by engaging in 
differentiation and integrating mechanisms. Differentiation involves segmenting 
spaces, times, and practices to address each logic, while integrating efforts, such as 
collaborative spaces and strategic problem solving, served to bridge the different 
logics so they inform and enable one another.  
Interestingly, Andriopoulos and Lewis’ (2009) multi-case study looks at how 
the exploration-exploitation tension is managed in ambidextrous firms through a 
paradox perspective. Their findings reveal that firms manage the tension using a 
blended mix of integration practices such as cultivating a paradoxical vision, 
purposefully improvising, and socializing employees; and differentiation tactics 
including diversifying product portfolios, iterating between project constraints and 
freedom, and separating work modes to manage the exploration-exploitation paradox. 
The blending of both tactics was found to be vital in stimulating the virtuous cycles of 
ambidexterity. Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) conclude that firms need to manage 
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the paradox at multiple levels and that their interactions across levels reinforces 
ambidextrous practices. Nevertheless, the study focuses on firms who due to the 
character of the product design industry, are designed with an ambidextrous intent 
from their inception. As such it gives little insight into the nature of change for an 
organization for whom the strategic pursuit of ambidexterity occurs later on in its 
lifecycle as a result of neoteric changes in its internal and/or external environment.  
How do these different antecedents to ambidexterity interact, why do these 
interactions occur and what it is the resulting consequence of these interactions? 
Considering the above, implicitly, ambidexterity studies can be seen to assume 
that firms adopt and change their differentiation-integration activities in line with 
changes in their needs for exploration and exploitation (Raisch and Tushman, 2016), 
and the nature of the market in which they operate. “For example, a simultaneous 
approach may be more appropriate in dynamic markets where conditions are changing 
while in more stable environments firms may be able to afford a sequential approach. 
Contextual ambidexterity within a business unit may promote the local innovation and 
change needed to continually adapt to small changes in the environment […]. It 
appears that structural ambidexterity is crucial in creating the context where 
incumbent firms can explore in the context of their existing strategy and history. 
However, once the exploratory units gain traction, firms may take advantage of this 
capability by switching into more integrated structures” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013: 
330).  Such a suggestion implies a contingency paradigm to understanding the 
complexities of an organization’s pursuit for ambidexterity. O’Reilly and Tushman 
(2013) also note that time, in a historical sense, may be a critical feature on which 
ambidexterity is contingent upon; however, the shaping influence of organizational 
history on the pathway to ambidexterity needs further empirical exploration. Van der 
Borgh, de Jong and Nijssen (2015) empirical analysis of exploitative and explorative 
selling amongst front-line salespeople provides evidence that both structural and 
situational mechanisms (i.e. overarching vision) play an important role in driving 
ambidextrous performance in individuals (salespeople). Similarly, Agostini et al’s 
(2016) statistical analysis finds support for integrating structure and context in order to 
align exploration and exploitation for innovation ambidexterity. The authors identify 
three underlying mechanisms – structural ambidexterity, social support and 
performance management – as enablers of ambidexterity.  
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Although ambidexterity literature is rich in insights and conceptualizations on 
the possible pathways and approaches to attaining ambidexterity, the succeeding study 
contained within this paper hopes to address some of the intra-firm ambidexterity 
gaps highlighted above. It seeks to explore how the various structural, contextual and 
individual level mechanisms may be employed in a combined manner within an 
organizational unit as it seeks to become ambidextrous. The following section 
discusses the methodological approach employed for this study. 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODS 
This study adopts an inductive, grounded-theory building approach (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967) by employing an in-depth case study of a large unit within an 
organization and their transition experience towards effectively operating science 
innovation (exploration) and engineering excellence (exploitation). In so doing, the 
study aims to advance our understanding of how structural, contextual and individual 
level antecedents may be engaged and interconnected, and explore the mechanisms 
and impediments influencing this transition.  Consequently, the single case study 
approach allows the researcher to look in detail at how the unit’s management of the 
exploration-exploitation tension evolves and also probe as to why it evolves and the 
selected antecedents during this process. In so doing it assumes a longitudinal 
perspective of the unit’s development from its initiation through to contemporary 
events, and the internal mechanisms and impediments as it transitions to efficaciously 
manage dimensions of an organizational tension. This follows in the vein of inductive 
in-depth case studies examining the approaches and mechanisms engaged in managing 
dimensions of organizational tensions (Adler et al, 1999; Harreld, et al, 2007; 
Heracleous et al, 2016; Jarzabkowski, Lê and Feldman, 2012; Raisch, 2008). Inductive 
case studies are suitable for addressing ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions and are 
particularly useful for developing theory on how complex organizational processes 
unfold over time (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) would suggest that this 
reflects an explanatory case dealing with ‘operational links that need to be traced over 
time, rather than frequencies or incidences” (p. 9).  
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Research Context 
The study’s empirical setting is a notable and sizeable organizational unit in 
operation at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) – namely the International Space Station 
(ISS) program. The ISS program is the largest unit in terms of budgetary funding and 
resources, is one of NASA’s major space programs and reports directly to NASA 
headquarters in Washington, DC.  JSC is NASA’s Mission Control center for all 
manned space missions, and the primary control facility for the orbiting U.S. segment 
of the International Space Station (ISS). Prior to the ISS program, JSC had been the 
operational center for all NASA Space Shuttle missions up until the program’s 
termination in November 2011. On the 25th January 1984, President Ronald Regan 
directed NASA to construct a permanently occupied space station “and to do it within 
a decade” in cooperation with the international community5. Development of the ISS 
begun in 1994 after much political tumult with a change in Administration, four 
rounds of design iterations and cost overruns in the region of $8 billion which 
undermined NASA’s budget credibility and lead to waning support from politicians 
for the ‘mega-project’ with multiple Congressional attempts to end the space station 
program (H.R.4451 Bill, 1993) (see appendix C for list of Congressional attempts to 
terminate the ISS Program). The ISS was a complex endeavor which took 13 years to 
assemble (November 1998- May 2011), required over 30 Shuttle missions and came 
about as a result of international engineering and scientific collaboration across five 
space agencies. With an estimated cost of $150 billion, the ISS Program is arguably the 
largest in size and complexity that NASA has ever undertaken owing to the challenge 
of integrating various systems developed and provided by the different international 
space partners (NASA Taskforce, 2001). The ISS is a low-earth-orbit (LEO) 
microgravity laboratory orbiting 220 miles over the Earth, and provides a research 
environment unavailable on Earth for multidisciplinary scientific research and 
discovery. Throughout its evolution the ISS program faced a number of pressures 
including significant cost growth, schedule issues, numerous design iterations and 
scope scale-backs, five changes in government administration coupled with periods of 
                                                          
5 Development and assembly of the ISS was the direct result of unprecedented international 
collaboration spanning over twenty years between five space agencies – the United States 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Russia’s Space Agency (Roscosmos), 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), Canadian Space Agency and the European 
Space Agency (ESA).  
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diminishing political support; all of which threatened the continuation of the program 
(NASA History, 2001)6. However, the program faced a challenge in pursuing 
exploration and exploitation simultaneously and effectively, an issue which came to a 
head when the space station platform was completed in 2011. The ISS program 
needed to adapt if it was to pursue exploration and exploitation activities 
simultaneously and effectively and so embarked on a change initiative known as RISE 
(Revolutionize the ISS for Science and Exploration). The program’s evolution 
involved the concurrent engagement of structural, contextual and individual level 
mechanisms which provides insights to help expand our understanding of how the 
antecedents to achieving organizational ambidexterity are engaged within practice.  
 
Research Methods 
To understand how the ISS program engaged with structural, contextual and 
individual level antecedents concurrently, and the mechanisms and impediments 
influencing this transition I conducted a qualitative study involving approximately 82 
onsite interviews between August 2014 and September 2015. Data collection occurred 
in four phases7 and it was during phase four, as a result of informal social interactions, 
that I gained knowledge of the ISS program’s strategic change program and pursed 
this avenue further and in greater depth. A number of these interviews took place with 
informants who had been or were at that moment highly integrated into the ISS 
program and therefore had intimate knowledge of the program’s internal mechanisms 
and organizational development and transition. Interviewees came from different 
levels – ground level, middle managers and management - and functions of the 
program, including the RISE change team, science innovation, and program routine 
operations. Each interview provided a slightly different perspective of the ISS 
program’s development and incorporating these views and experiences served to 
enrich the data, and contributed to establishing a fuller understanding of the 
phenomenon from those involved. During the course of the interviews, informants 
who had worked on the program side of the organization provided retrospective 
accounts of the ISS program and their experiences working in the unit, and how it had 
                                                          
6 Marcia S. Smith (2001). Testimony before the House Science Committee. Congressional 
Research Service 
7 Refer to ‘Methodological overview’ in chapter one of this thesis for details of the four phases 
of data collection.  
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operated structurally and culturally, which helped establish greater empirical 
contextualization (Ketokivi and Mantere’s, 2010). Interviews were semi-structured and 
lasted between 30 minutes to approximately 150 minutes, with key informants being 
interviewed at greater length. Interviews were recorded with informant permission and 
transcribed for analysis. Twelve participants did not wish to have their interviews 
recorded and therefore the researcher took detailed notes with the informants’ 
permission and developed write-ups of the conversation. Data collection occurred in 
four phases which allowed the researcher to conduct follow-up interviews and probe 
interviewees. Interviews served to be a critical data source for this study. 
To supplement the interview data, I also collected and examined internal ISS 
program documents including internal management presentations, program charts, 
internal communication materials and press releases, and review reports of milestones 
in the program’s history. In addition, published reports on the ISS program’s 
developmental progress, and archival transcripts of key ISS program individuals were 
also collected in order to gain a deeper understanding of the ISS program’s formative 
years and method of operating. I also had the opportunity to directly observe a private 
meeting and attend an industry conference in which senior ISS program members 
spoke explicitly of the ISS program’s change initiative, RISE, and how it underpinned 
their transition and the simultaneous operation of science innovation (exploration) 
and engineering excellence (exploitation). Combining multiple sources of data for 
analysis facilitated triangulation and contributed to validating the data and emerging 
analytical concepts.  
 
Data Analysis 
Qualitative research data analysis “manages words, language, and the meanings 
these imply” and has the “capacity to create rich descriptions and understandings of 
social life” (Walker and Myrick, 2006: 549). Thus, in analyzing the qualitative data 
gathered during this project I employed an inductive grounded approach to theory 
generation derived from raw empirical data (Walker and Myrick, 2006). A grounded 
approach can be seen as an organic process to theory building that centers on 
establishing a good fit on three levels – (1) fit between the raw data and theoretical 
categories identified by the research, (2) degree to which the theoretical categories fit 
and explain interpretations of the reality, and (3) whether the theoretical categories fit 
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and are relevant in explaining the core phenomenon being observed (Suddaby, 2006). 
This approach of overlapping data collection and analysis provided flexibility in the 
iterative data collection process, allowing for adjustments to be made during the data 
collection process. These adjustments allowed the researcher to probe emergent 
themes or to take advantage of special opportunities which arise in a given situation 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). So, as new data collection opportunities arose I was able to take 
advantage by altering my data collection process and this flexibility enabled me to 
develop new theoretical insights.  
Whilst conducting a series of interviews with participants I detected that the 
ISS program and the RISE initiative came up repeatedly, and constant comparison of 
first-order codes across the data confirmed this impression.  From initial coding and 
interpretation of patterns it became apparent from the recurring frequency by which 
the topic was coming up that this could be a significant avenue for research and would 
require further investigation. This discovery directed subsequent data collection in 
interview protocol – such as the type of questions posed to interviewees. Interview 
questions focused on understanding the history of the ISS program, the nature of the 
new strategy, the intentions of the strategic change initiative, how it had come about, 
its performance outcomes and the challenges/obstacles encountered.   
Further analysis guided me to expand the investigation. Interview data 
provided retrospective insights which gave further direction that analysis of the 
program’s history was required. To analyze the data I initially employed within-case 
analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) where I wrote a descriptive detailed case-study based on 
data gathered from the various interviews, analysis of documents and observations. 
The descriptive case was modified following the progressive collection of data to 
ensure new data was integrated, and the case reflected accurate information. This 
process was central to generating early insights into the case and helped the researcher 
become more familiar with the details of the case study.  It also helped me to decipher 
some of the main themes and manage the volume of data collected.  Furthermore, the 
within-case analysis allowed the researcher to identify preliminary emerging patterns 
which later contributed to analysis and the development of theoretical concepts.  
Whilst coding I moved back and forth between inductive and deductive 
thinking and this interplay grounded my theory in the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Alongside analyzing the data and building emergent concepts, I continuously referred 
back to the extant literature to find points of similarity as well as areas of differences 
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and explored the underlying reasons for this. Linking the findings to the literature was 
also important to establish internal validity, generalizability and in building theory 
from the case research (Eisenhardt, 1989). I also developed field notes scribing my 
personal thoughts and ideas of what was occurring in my analysis of the research as a 
way of combining data collection and ongoing analysis of the data (Van Mannen, 
1987; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Having established the first-order codes and initial themes I formed categories 
from related codes. I then looked for relationships among the categories, and as codes 
and categories were adjusted through the process of analytical iteration, so the 
relationships between categories and sub themes were also adjusted. Finding 
relationships and connections between the different categories can be seen to reflect 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) second phase of analysis, axial coding. Following this 
activity, I developed higher-order theoretical dimensions grounded in the categories, 
sub-themes and extant theory to further enable theory building and generalization. 
Table 5 below, is a table of the conceptual framework, core concepts and related 
concepts (Danneels, 2010) generated from the empirical data.  
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The study finds that the exploration-exploitation tension can exist in a continual state 
of flux where both activities are all together active, but in varying degrees. The 
simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation was found to evolve through a 
hybrid layered approach combining structural, contextual and dynamic antecedents, 
for which middle management were found to be a critical context-reshaping 
mechanism in embedding effective ambidextrous performance. The analysis consists 
of three broad core concepts each of which address a feature critical to understanding 
organizational ambidexterity and its manifestation in practice. Firstly, it examines the 
nature of the exploration-exploitation tension as experienced in practice by the 
organizational unit, the ISS Program. The study identifies that exploration-exploitation 
can coexist in a state of flux where the dominant emphasis shifts towards one element 
but does not negate the operative presence of the other. The underlying factors 
facilitating the fluctuating character were found to gives rise to the second core 
concept, the evolving hybrid approach to ambidexterity. The data shows how different 
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antecedents to ambidexterity, were progressively employed conjointly. Thirdly, the 
analysis identifies dynamic managerial capabilities as a feature exhibited by middle 
managers, and how they engage this capability to reshape the organization’s context to 
enable effective ambidextrous performance. The analysis provides supporting 
evidence that the pathway to organizational ambidexterity is complex, 
multidimensional and evolves over time. In practice, it is found to result from the 
integration of different approaches (antecedents) to ambidexterity and is underpinned 
by a fluctuating exploration-exploitation tension. The analysis also emphasizes the role 
and significance of middle managers in crafting strategy and exercising dynamic 
managerial capabilities, and the role of unconventional organizational structures and 
practices in shaping a hybrid organizational context to enable ambidexterity.  
 
1. Fluctuating emphasis between exploration and exploitation 
dimensions 
In analyzing the ISS program and its handling of the exploration-exploitation 
tension throughout its history, the data indicates that the nature of the tension is not 
static nor are exploration and exploitation activities pursued to the same magnitude or 
degree over time, but rather appear asymmetric (Lee, Kim and Joshi, 2017). The 
tension shifts from being in a state of conflict where the activities were managed 
separately to be reconciled and managed as integrated, complimentary features. The 
study found that the exploration-exploitation tension persisted throughout the 
development and operationalization of the ISS for it was inherent in the program’s 
vision – to enable research by building a platform that exploited existing knowledge 
and technical capabilities. Both exploration and exploitation were active and present at 
the same time, however the magnitude and degree of emphasis and focus is found to 
be dynamic, fluctuating between exploration and exploitation and across strategic and 
operational factors. The study found that the shifting emphasis occurred as a result of 
changing priorities driven by the external environment, and cognitive and behavioral 
mechanisms internal to the program. As illustrated in the section below, we see a 
fluctuating emphasis between exploration and exploitation arose inside the ISS 
program because of three different but interrelated factors: (1) contrasting, inter-
reliant capabilities and mode of operating, (2) programmatic lifecycle shifts, and (3) the 
convergence of priorities. 
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Core 
concepts     Second order concepts   
Related concepts with 
key references   Empirical data            
                                      
Fluctuating 
exploration-
exploitation 
emphasis: 
simultaneous, but 
shifting 
 
Changing lifecycle 
conditions 
 
Contrasting, but inter-
reliant capabilities  
 
Vacillation perspective 
(Boumgarden, Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2012;  Raisch & 
Tushman, 2016; Kang, Kang & 
Kim, 2017) 
 
- Engineering (exploitation) and science (exploration) 
activities simultaneously present activities occurring 
throughout the ISS program's development 
- Emphasis fluctuated  over time between engineering focus 
and science research at the individual (micro) and program 
(macro) level 
 Converging 
organizational priorities 
 
Oscillating pendulum (Markides, 
Oyon and Schnegg, 2017) 
- Program lifecycle shift from assembling the ISS vehicle 
(exploitation) to full utilization of the ISS platform for 
science (exploration)  
    
       
- Historical capabilities supporting the program and its 
present operations originate from previous program (STS 
Shuttle) and emphasised engineering 
- Shifting ISS program requirements give more to 
emphasise science (exploration) than previously 
           
        
Progressive 
layering of 
antecedents  
Separation model  
Structural differentiation 
(Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) 
 
- ISS program  initially structured with engineering and 
science as separate capabilities contained within 
independent offices, structures and processes 
 
Structural separation 
punctuated by limited 
degree of integration 
 
Targeted-integration (O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2011) 
 
- ISS restructure designed to integrate certain science 
focused activities into areas in the engineering offices, 
bringing a degree of task related integration     
 
Assimilating  contextual 
integration and structural 
differentiation 
 
'Balance dimension' & 
'combined dimension' 
synergistic effect (Cao, 
Gedajlovic & Zhang, 2009) 
 
- Performance measures indicated structural changes were 
not achieving strategic objective, and science ISS users 
continue to complain 
- RISE initiative undertaken to enable deeper strategic 
change to transform program wide culture and processes  
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Core 
concepts     Second order concepts   
Related concepts with key 
references   
Empirical 
phenomena           
                                      
                   
Context-
reshaping 
capability: 
dynamic 
capabilities and  
micro-
foundations 
(MF) 
 
Sensing, identifying 
change opportunity 
 Dynamic managerial capabilities 
(Helfat & Martin, 2015) 
   - human capital, social capital,  
       managerial cognition 
 
 - Voluntary, out of the norm training on strategy 
organized by middle managers 
 
    MF: non-routine 
learning 
 
 
 - Middle managers utilized network relations to share 
knowledge  
 
    MF: informal network 
relations 
 
    MF: intramural 
cognitive frame 
 
 
 - Experiential knowledge of the program, activities on 
the ground and management's strategic intention enabled 
middle managers to decipher dissonance and cognitive 
distance in translating strategy to operations. 
                   
    
Seizing, execute the 
change strategy 
 Middle managers & strategy 
formation: boundary spanning & 
translators (Floyd & Wooldridge, 
1999; 2000) 
 
 - Middle managers central figures in designing and 
executing cultural change strategy to assimilate context 
and structural differentiation to effectively support 
science and engineering capabilities 
    
    MF: middle managers  
 
    
    MF: unconventional 
practices and structures 
 Informal organization & informal 
practices (Blau and Scott, 1962; 
Chan, 2002); Loose coupling (Weick, 
1976) 
  - RISE team intentionally positioned outside the program 
structurally and geographically  
 - Reported directly to program director skipping layers of 
upper management     
 
 
                   
    
Reconfigure, long-term 
renewal 
 
Employee empowerment (Ford and 
Fottler, 1995; Lashley, 1999) 
 
 - RISE initiative provided framework empowering 
ground level staff to decide  and implement changes 
operationally in their areas attuned to the strategy and 
framework     
    MF: semi-autonomy at 
ground level 
 
 
                                      
Table 5: Conceptual framework of data
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i. Contrasting, inter-reliant capabilities and mode of operating (paradox) 
Contrasting, inter-reliant capabilities and mode of operating refers to the 
paradox of the fluctuating nature of exploration and exploitation. Paradox theory 
notes the two dimensions are in opposition yet interrelated and persistent over time 
(Bednarek et al, 2017). In the same way, analysis found that the ISS exploration-
exploitation activities and modes of operating were in conflict but simultaneously co-
dependent. Furthermore, fluctuations in the unit’s emphasis towards either 
exploration or exploitation occurred as a result of contextual factors. The fluctuating 
paradoxical nature of the ISS explore-exploit tension was found to be underpinned by 
two organizational paradoxes - features that are related and codependent in order to 
function, yet were operationally at odds: (a) strategic vision and operating level, and 
(b) historical capabilities and shifting current requirements. 
 
(a) Incongruity between strategic vision and operational translation 
An organization’s strategic vision presents the intended goals and actions the 
organization is to achieve, and within the strategy process is what becomes translated 
into operations. Hence, the strategic vision and organizational operations are related 
and go hand-in-hand. However, analysis of the ISS case found that the explore-exploit 
strategic vision and its operationalization though related were also at conflict in 
practice, for the dual focus of the strategic vision was in contention with the emergent 
dominant emphasis that arose in practice. 
 
Strategic vision (dual explore-exploit emphasis): From its outset, the strategic 
intention of the ISS space station was founded upon the dual strategic pursuit of 
exploration and exploitation – enabling the exploration of new scientific knowledge by 
means of exploiting existing engineering and technological capabilities – thus 
emphasizing both dimensions to the same extent and magnitude. Firstly, in relation to 
exploitation, the space station program was motivated to further NASA’s expertise 
and capabilities in space exploration; thus re-establishing America’s leadership in 
space, and represented a political response to Russia’s launch of the Salyut 1 in 1971 
and its development of the Mir space station (Brunner and Byerly Jr, 1990).  It served 
to reinforce two core objectives listed under the U.S. 1958 Space Act in contributing 
materially to, “(2) the improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, safety, and 
efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles, (3) the development and operation of 
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vehicles capable of carrying instruments, equipment, supplies, and living organisms 
through space”.  For NASA officials, the new space station was rendered “the next 
logical step” in the U.S. space program and was to be “built upon the operational 
capabilities of the Space Shuttle”8 following the Shuttle being declared no longer 
experimental but an “operational” routinized space vehicle by 1984. Congress also 
mandated that the space station would be built upon existing technological and 
knowledge capabilities developed from the Shuttle program and previous space 
missions: “[…] in 1988, Congress decreed that the station would have to be built from 
existing technologies to reduce costs and risks. Many re-designs took place” (Internal 
document, 2012)9. This reinforced the strategic exploitation agenda for efficiency and 
streamlined activity, as exemplified by a former director of the ISS who suggested that 
"we [NASA] came out of that [ISS] program design, a more lean, and much stronger 
program” (Internal document, 2012). In the 10 years prior to the commencement of 
the ISS space station, the Shuttle program had been the major technological 
development for NASA and the ISS provided an opportunity to exploit the 
knowledge and technological capabilities gained during the Shuttle program to build, 
maintain and operate the ISS effectively. Hence, the pursuit of exploitative activities 
was intentionally built into the strategy for the ISS:  
“One of the cornerstones of NASA's mission -- 
human space flight -- has crossed the threshold to 
permanent occupancy of space, using the remarkable 
capabilities of the Space Shuttle and its crew to 
assemble the International Space Station” (NASA 
History)10 
 
Secondly, ‘the expansion of human knowledge’ is one of NASA’s core 
objectives and is listed as number one in the US Space Act11. Knowledge expansion 
through innovation is a key feature of NASA’s space missions and the Agency’s 
operations, a trait highlighted by a NASA Administrator who expressed “we love to 
take on ambitious goals, especially those that inspire us to create innovative 
                                                          
8 NASA Administrator James M. Beggs (1981-1985): JSC Archives 
9 Quote taken from NASA Researcher News, Langley Research Center, (2012) (internal 
document)   
10 NASA History Office, Administrator D.S. Goldin’s accomplishments  
11 The NASA Objectives of Aeronautical and Space Activities contained within the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 2010 lists as its first objective “The expansion of human 
knowledge of the Earth and of phenomena in the atmosphere and space” (124 STAT. 3331)  
67 
 
technologies where existing tools fall short”12. Exploration at JSC traditionally 
orientates around technology and engineering innovation, a feature which has led to 
multiple NASA-originated technologies, patents and inventions that have been spun-
off, and contribute to the development of commercial products and processes: “Many 
of these advances and enabling technologies, originally developed to meet [NASA] 
mission needs, have spun off into commercial products that make life on Earth better 
today” (Senior technologist)13. The exploration agenda for the ISS is more nuanced 
going beyond engineering and technological innovation to focus on expanding 
scientific knowledge by stewarding experimentation and innovation to further 
scientific research and space discoveries – a core feature declared at its inception by 
President Ronald Reagan (1984): “A space station will permit quantum leaps in our 
research in science, communications, and in metals and lifesaving medicines which 
could be manufactured only in space”14. Hence, exploration and exploitation can be 
seen to be two core concurrent features of the US strategy for the ISS, where neither 
dimension has a pronounced emphasis and are interrelated.  
 
Operating mode and emergence of dominant emphasis: Despite the strategy’s dual 
strategic emphasis on exploration and exploitation, operationally, a dominant mode of 
thinking and behaving existed across program management and ground level staff 
emphasizing exploitation; and this pervaded the ISS program’s development and 
assembly. The ISS program operated under an engineering logic dominated by the 
principles of executing technical excellence, control restrictions, stability and safety 
with little margin for error or risk-taking. ISS program insiders described it as “taking 
a conservative approach and making safety paramount”15. The engineering logic 
maintained a drive and emphasis towards executing technical capabilities and became 
the focus of senior managers within the ISS program, as represented in the ISS 
Taskforce comments: “The management focus is on technical excellence and crew 
safety with emphasis on near-term schedules” which the Taskforce claims materialized 
in the program’s critical cost management systems: “the focus of the ISS program 
                                                          
12 NASA Administrator (Bolden Jr) NASA Spinoff (2013), p. 5 
13 NASA Spinoff magazine (2013), p. 7 
14 Ronald W. Reagan. State of the Union Address. January 25, 1984. 
15 ISS Task Force, 2001 (internal) 
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office has been tactical, near-term and budget oriented as opposed to strategic, long-
term and cost-based”16.   
The program’s dominating operating logic also has a strong focus on safety. 
This safety culture formed a core feature of the processes, systems and culture within 
the ISS program which reverberated throughout the wider JSC organization. As part 
of safety, the program’s systems and processes focused on maintaining stability and 
control in all operations due to the high-risk nature of manned space endeavors: “Of 
course, the microgravity environment in space is not conducive to human life, so you 
have to protect human life. I think we’ve learned those systems and those 
technologies. We know how to operate” (Division Director, phase 3/2015). This 
attention to safety reflects the effect the Shuttle disasters (Challenger in 1985 and 
Columbia in 2003) had on the operating behavior and thinking of actors within the 
ISS program. For example, one Division Chief (phase 2/2014) explained that:  
“Now, when you think about it, we had two major 
accidents with the shuttle. And that'll get your 
attention. And so, every time there was a Shuttle 
launch, we were focused. And before, you're making 
sure everything is done right. Every problem is just 
pounded flat until you understand every single 
problem down to the nth degree. That's the 
environment that shuttle was. And it made you do 
your job and do it well. And if you didn't, well you're 
out. We'll get somebody in here who can do it. So 
that's the sort of focused intensity that the shuttle 
brought”.  
 
As a consequence of the dominant logic and its focus on engineering and 
safety, the exploration agenda took a secondary position operationally during the ISS’s 
development and assembly. Although some scientific research activities were 
conducted during the space station’s development, there was less emphasis, focus and 
operating effort targeted towards exploration and science discovery. Instead, the 
program’s managerial and functioning focus centered on exploitation capabilities - 
engineering and the technical construction of the ISS.  
 
                                                          
16 Ibid  
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(b) Historical capabilities and shifting existing requirements 
Analysis found that an organizational unit is conditioned by the resources and 
capabilities it inherits from previous strategic programs/agendas. In utilizing resources 
and capabilities historically established the unit not only gains technical and tacit 
knowledge, but the behaviors, processes and systems formerly developed (Marquis 
and Tilcsik, 2013). Consequently, these can emphasize and be skewed towards either 
an explorative or exploitative disposition depending on the strategic purpose for 
which they were developed. However, when confronted with a contemporary 
requirement for ambidexterity, where exploration and exploitation are necessitated, 
the study finds tension occurs between the historical legacy and the changing 
organizational requirements needed to fulfil the new strategy, thus resulting in a 
fluctuating tension between historically framed capabilities and present explore-exploit 
conditions.  
 
Historically inherited capabilities:  The ISS program’s dominant mode of thinking 
and operating can be traced back to inheriting the legacy of its preceding program, the 
Space Transportation System (STS) program (also known as the Space Shuttle 
program). Existing capabilities and resources from the STS (Space Shuttle) program 
and the Shuttle’s development were transferred to and utilized by the ISS program, as 
illustrated by the excerpt below: 
 “Human Space Flight programs have historically been 
focused on protecting crew safety […]. A large 
percentage of employees working on the ISS program 
have gained their skills and experiences on the Shuttle 
and earlier manned programs. There are many 
indications this experience base and culture have been 
transferred to the ISS program” (ISS Task Force, 
2001)  
 
The Shuttle program was primarily an engineering endeavor, considered “a 
tremendous engineering achievement – a vehicle that enabled nearly routine and 
regular access to space for hundreds of people […]” (Hale, 2011). When it came to the 
ISS Program, STS afforded an operational and organizational blueprint upon which 
the ISS program’s managerial approach, engineering mindset, systems, processes and 
culture were modelled. The chief scientist (phase 4/2015) illustrated this point saying:  
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“there were a set of engineering requirements 
documents that told you all the things you had to be 
sure you had done before you would be safe to fly on 
a human space flight vehicle. And those things, some 
of them had been developed 20 years ago for the 
space shuttle. And then, the heritage of those 
documents had been passed down [to ISS]. ‘It doesn't 
have sharp edges so an astronaut won't get cut, it 
doesn't have any materials on the dangerous list’, and 
all that kind of stuff [...] And so it used to be that 
people treated [ISS] space missions as if you have a 
shuttle flight” 
 
 
Shifting requirements (explore-exploit emphasis): In 2005, during the construction 
of the ISS platform, U.S Congress passed the NASA Authorization Act declaring the 
U.S segment of the ISS a national laboratory. This enabled other Federal agencies, 
non-profit organizations and the private sector access to the space station for 
scientific and technological research discovery; “signaling a renewed dedication to full 
utilization of this structure for science projects […] and full-time scientific 
experimentation” (NASA, 2010)17. The Authorization Act marked a political emphasis, 
which directed the NASA strategy, towards scientific research which had not been 
reflected operationally in the ISS program under its historically inherited dominant 
engineering logic; 
“There are a lot of people in the scientific community 
that lost faith in NASA. They were already frustrated 
because it had taken so long for them to fly 
[experiments on board the ISS], because they came in 
with scientists’ unrealistic expectations of us following 
a schedule, which has never happened in the history of 
human spaceflight […]. It was, I would say, a pretty 
big low point in the history of ISS from a research 
perspective. All of that was happening right at the end 
of fiscal year 2004, I believe.” (a Division chief, 
2015)18 
 
 The 2005 Authorization Act also expanded science innovation opportunities 
by granting non-government researchers access to utilize the platform in ways 
previously unavailable: “Until recently U.S. research space on board the ISS has been 
                                                          
17 NASA Spinoff benefits from ISS (2010) (magazine)  
18 JSC Oral History Transcript, (2015)  
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reserved mostly for government initiatives. But new opportunities for commercial and 
academic use of ISS are now available, and 50 percent is set aside for them” (JSC 
history coordinator, 2015)19.  
With completion of the space station in May 2011 the platform officially 
became a National Laboratory. ISS program management sought to shift the 
program’s focus towards a new logic that emphasized science missions and 
experiments in greater measure. Although management’s focus shifted towards 
emphasizing exploration, and the program’s functional units were attentive to this, 
operationally the program struggled to adjust to the swing towards science research 
and innovation and was found on occasion to switch back to the dominant 
engineering (exploitation) logic in periods of uncertainty.  Operationally, the 
program’s focus and strategic emphasis fluctuated back and forth between research 
experimentation and engineering stability for the two domains were perceived to be 
semi-compatible. The pursuit of scientific research and innovation occurred under the 
proviso that safety and stability were not compromised, and in the event where this 
appeared to be challenged, the historically rooted dominant engineering logic would 
supersede signifying a friction: 
“People had this perception, if things were going 
safely and the supplies were good, then everything else 
was kind of gravy. And, so then the moment anything 
went wrong, they would just cancel the research - 
because that's what they were used to the priority 
being during assembly” (Chief scientist, phase 
4/2015).  
 
One division chief expressed the challenge the program faced in adjusting to 
the swing in emphasis between scientific research and the dominant engineering and 
safety logic: “we really had to do some work to change […] because people who had 
worked for a really long time having safe operations be enough were now being 
challenged that no, safe operations isn't enough. You have to do safe operations and 
you have to get a research program done”.  
For the ISS program, the shift towards science research challenged the 
prevailing operating logic and brought to light the contention between their prevailing 
                                                          
19 JSC Oral History, August (2015)  
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capabilities and traditional way of work alongside the new emphasis requiring a focus 
on research exploration.  
 
ii. Programmatic lifecycle conditions and fluctuations between 
exploration-exploitation  
The analysis indicated that the fluctuating emphasis between exploration and 
exploitation was conditioned by the programmatic lifecycle which defined NASA’s 
space missions. It was also the lens through which actors viewed the program’s 
activities and determined strategic focus and priorities. This feature draws parallels 
with Raisch and Birkinshaw (2016) theoretical perspective that organization’s adopt a 
dynamic approach and switch between exploration and exploitation as a natural part 
of the life-cycle stage transitions they experience. However, whereas Raisch and 
Birkinshaw (2016) refer to the dynamic and temporal shift between explore and 
exploit, where they are pursued alternatively, the findings herein find that explore and 
exploit remain simultaneously present but the emphasis and prominence is what 
fluctuates.  
The ISS program lifecycle evolves through a number of distinct work stages 
which a JSC CEMSA report suggests can be summarized for simplicity into “five 
major phases: definition, design, development, use and evaluation”, and each phase 
contains multiple work stages/milestones (JSC Archives, 1975)20. Within the space 
program, actors purported that the dominant engineering logic catered operationally 
to the development and assembly phases of the space station:  
“In the early years we were very, very fortunate in that 
everybody was really focused on building these 
vehicles, building these platforms, getting them 
assembled on orbit, and flying safely, just like we were. 
Other than the challenges we had along the way… 
Everybody’s focus was the same. ‘We have to go build 
this thing. We need to focus hard on that and get it 
done.’ […] it was always about building the Station, 
and that was the focus” (Director, 2015)21  
                                                          
20 JSC Archives - CEMSA Report “The Management of organizational change: Analysis of the 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) Management of the Lunar Science Program. Refer to JSC 
Archives for an expansion on the multiple steps and work stages constituting a NASA/JSC 
manned space program. 
21 JSC Oral History  
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The engineering logic with its technical execution was considered a necessity 
for the program’s initiation and successful development of the space station; and 
therefore justified the mindset and culture governing the program’s activities and 
focus, as explained by the Chief Scientist:  
“the program was very driven by the fact that they’re 
going to bleed money left and right if they don’t get 
assembly done, so you’ve got to get assembly done 
and it just doesn’t matter. If you don’t get assembly 
done, everything will fail, so getting a little research on 
the side is not important in that assembly phase”, and 
also expressed that “the engineering org that was ISS 
just wanted to focus on assembly and keep 
going”(phase 4/2015).  
Transitioning from assembly to full utilization denoted a change in the 
program’s lifecycle. The change from one critical phase to another necessitated an 
adjustment in the program’s focus. Utilization required a different logic and culture:  
“trying to start adding a culture of caring about science in this operational organization 
that was totally focused on assembly” (Chief Scientist). Despite the lifecycle transition 
to the utilization phase, the dominant logic persisted operationally across the program, 
governing the behavior and thinking of actors even though senior management’s 
focus and strategic intent had shifted towards science research; “safety was paramount 
and would stop experiments and mission success was still measured by safety and not 
by enabling scientific discovery” (a Division Chief).  
Interestingly, an interviewee noted the length of time in which the program 
had been in the assembly phase to be a significant factor, for it conditioned patterns of 
thinking, behaviors and the way processes were configured. The data suggests that the 
program had become organizationally entrenched within a particular lifecycle stage 
that suited the historical legacy of its capabilities and dominant operating logic, and 
therefore made it harder for the program to enter into the next lifecycle stage and shift 
its strategic emphasis:  
“In a way, I think if we'd been able to build ISS in a 
year, we wouldn't have set up those patterns 
[processes and cultural behaviors] that deeply, but 
because it took a decade to build it, it's taking a lot 
longer to disentangle that. It’s because it’s been so 
ingrained” (a Division Chief).  
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iii. Convergence of priorities: 
Analyses found that the relationship between exploration – exploitation did 
not remain static or in perpetual a state of conflict but altered over time, shifting from 
a state of conflict to one of convergence where the accomplishment of exploration 
and exploitation shared common priorities and purpose. This finding can be seen to 
be reflective of the paradox view of tensions where the dimensions of a tension are 
distinct yet interrelated in nature (Lewis and Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011), and 
therefore suggests that the relationship between the dimensions is fluid in nature.  
For the ISS the emphasis on exploration and exploitation is simultaneous and 
of relative equivalence, suggesting the convergence of priorities acts as another factor 
contributing to the fluctuating nature of the exploration-exploitation tension. With the 
transition to full utilization in 2011, exploration and exploitation were no longer 
independent activities but operationally interdependent, with combined priorities and 
strategic agendas: 
 “The hard part is when you’re doing something that’s 
different from the norm, what people were brought up 
to do. There are a lot of areas where this was a big 
deal, but one of the biggest for the ISS Program is 
when we started to transition from, ‘Okay, we’ve 
finished assembling this thing’ to, ‘Okay, now we have 
to utilize it.’ It was a different set of priorities” 
(Program director, 2015)22. 
 
Completion of the ISS’s assembly in 2011 marked a tempered emphasis in 
program stability and control (exploitation), and an expanded focus on flexibility and 
adaptation (exploration). Full utilization of the ISS represented a convergence of 
strategic priorities, where mission success for the exploitative engineering offices and 
the scientific exploration unit amounted to being one in the same. Mission success 
became an interdependent activity between these two areas, thus redefining the 
meaning of mission success:  
“So, there are a lot of implications there, especially 
from the operations directorate. Their whole motto 
from Apollo all the way through [to now], is failure is 
not an option. And we’re telling them, yes, it is. Your 
definition of success changes. Success is enabling 
scientists to make discoveries. Success is enabling 
scientists to perform their experiments. Keep the 
                                                          
22 JSC Oral History Transcript (2015)  
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laboratory up and running. It’s not saying that it all 
goes perfectly, okay. So, this is a difficult, a really 
difficult concept for a lot of people to understand. We 
always stress every time we talk about it, ‘safety of 
vehicle, safety of crew’ is non-negotiable. Those have 
to be in there…” (Change agent, phase 4/2015) 
 
Mission success constitutes a core aspect in the JSC community and ISS 
program. The motto ‘failure is not an option’ underpins the culture of the 
organization. Operationally, during the initial stages of the ISS utilization phase, the 
dominant engineering logic persisted and defined what mission success looked like. 
For actors across all levels of the ISS program this meant accounting for risks in 
advance and devising mitigating solutions. The ISS Change Lead explained that 
traditional program requirements demanded science researchers wishing to launch an 
experiment onboard the ISS had to show that their intended experiment would result 
in 100 percent mission success prior to actually completing the tests, thus leaving very 
little room for novel insights from experimentation and new knowledge discovery:  
“We were levying what we call [engineering] mission 
success requirements on the scientist. Everything they 
did, how their hardware worked, how everything went 
together had to be perfect and they had to prove to 
NASA that their experiment was going to work” 
(Change agent, phase 4/2015) 
 
The post-assembly phase created new internal organizational parameters 
within which exploration and exploitation activities were engaged, and redefined the 
program’s operating model. In this new context, the ISS program struggled to operate 
explorative and exploitative functions effectively and therefore embarked on a new 
change initiative known as RISE (Revolutionize ISS for Science and Exploration) 
intended to engender the ISS program to operate explore-exploit activities 
ambidextrously and effectively.  
 
2. Evolving hybrid approach: Progressive layering of antecedents 
  The fundamental challenge facing the ISS program, from the perspective of 
program actors, was balancing the execution of engineering and safety requirements 
whilst also enabling scientific exploration effectively. In analyzing the development of 
76 
 
the ISS program and how exploration and exploitation came to be managed 
simultaneously and effectively, the data indicates the ISS program did not engage in 
only one ambidextrous approach or configuration, but various antecedents.  The study 
found that the program engaged with a combination of structural and contextual 
approaches, similar to those presented in ambidexterity literature, progressively and to 
varying degrees. However, the study identified distinguishing features in the ISS 
program’s approach to effective ambidexterity differentiating it from the antecedents 
presented in ambidexterity literature. What made the pathway employed by the ISS 
program distinctive was that structural and contextual approaches’ were layered 
progressively over time forming an evolving hybrid configuration. As such, the data 
suggests complementarity between the different antecedent pathways enabling 
ambidexterity (Agostini et al, 2016; Kauppila, 2010). The study found that the 
approach to ambidexterity within the ISS program evolved over time in adjustment to 
internal and environmental dynamics, producing the hybrid approach. The following 
details how the program’s approach to ambidexterity evolved, why it evolved and the 
mechanisms that enabled it to occur.  
 
i. Traditional ISS program model: principle of structural separation 
During the planning and construction of the ISS (1993-2011), the program’s 
intra-organizational design was governed by the principle of structural separation 
(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Jansen et al, 2009) between office divisions. 
Exploitation units – the engineering division, operations and support – were each 
distinct with different systems, processes and cultures that were also separate from the 
science research unit: “As an example, a substantial sustaining engineering function 
has been established separate from the operations structure” (ISS Task Force, 2001). 
Influenced by its dominant engineering logic, the distinction between research 
interests and engineering operations was an intentional one, originating from the 
program’s initiation, and was deemed ideal and appropriate for the complex ISS 
construction, as exemplified by one division chief: “So ISS as a program was originally 
structured as an engineering organization to build and operate ISS successfully”. The 
ISS Taskforce report goes further noting that the “Science program is not integrated 
in the ISS management” (2001), thus indicating the separation between the explorative 
and exploitative program units in structure and management.  
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The ISS program is characterized by formal structured relations, defined 
processes, roles and responsibilities and a degree of bureaucracy, reflective of Burns 
and Stalker’s (1961) concept of mechanistic management systems.  With building and 
operating the ISS platform safely being the program’s main concern, its organizational 
design, processes and systems were driven primarily by engineering, hardware and 
systems development. This was reflected in the formal structure of the program. 
Organized by way of alphabetical significance, ISS program office divisions are coded 
and hierarchically ranked based on engineering and programmatic importance. The 
more important the office, the higher up in the alphabetical hierarchy it resides:   
“So originally, well there was a hierarchy of all of the 
offices when the ISS program was setup. You can see 
it in the organizational codes, it's still there today. So, 
OB is the vehicle office. OC is mission integration. 
OD is software and avionics. You can see, it like 
follows the engineer's mindset about how important 
different systems are […] and the ancestor of the 
[science] research integration office we have today was 
called the payloads office and it's OZ. So, that tells 
you exactly kind of how the engineers were thinking 
about that” (Change agent, phase 4/2015) 
 
For the ISS Program, engineering activities and operational support 
represented routine tasks and scientific research was an exploratory mode of working 
that was distinct to the routine tasks of building a space vehicle and was seen as 
auxiliary: “provided the safety of the crew and vehicle was maintained and tasks, such 
as attaching the ISS modules together and risky extravehicular activity (EVA), were 
successfully completed, all other activities were in excess of what was required” (chief 
scientist). Consequently, by maintaining separation between research (explore) and 
operational (exploit) units the program had to contend with incoordination, despite 
the ISS senior management team having oversight and direction over both areas. In 
2001, prior to the completion of the space station’s assembly, the ISS Taskforce noted 
that the lack of integration between the science unit and program operations created a 
detachment which manifested in issues with budget and management of the science 
unit: 
“A disconnect exists between research and the ISS 
program office. The research approach appears 
insular. It appears to lack coordination […]. It is not 
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part of an integrated financial management strategy 
and, ultimately, may be frustrating the development of 
a robust science program”  
 
ii. Structural augmentation: targeted-integration of exploration and 
exploitation  
 The progression or second layer of the program’s approach to ambidexterity 
built upon its established model of structural separation. This second configuration 
was conditioned and dependent upon a shifting emphasis in the program’s 
exploration-exploitation tension. The shift in emphasis was a result of explore-exploit 
priorities morphing from a state of independence to convergence and 
interdependence. With the completion of the space station’s construction in 2011 the 
program transitioned to full-utilization which represented a major shift and saw 
priorities for science research and operational activities converge.  
“That transition was a big transition for the team. You 
went from this NASA process—where just 
successfully getting a crew into orbit and back home 
safely was everything—to okay, so we have to keep 
the crew safe, surely, but we have a job to do. You talk 
about the means to an end—the end wasn’t the 
assembly of ISS. Really, the end was utilization of 
ISS.” (ISS Program Director)23 
 
In early 2012 the ISS program director proceeded to “fine tune its [the 
program’s] organizational structure to better focus on achieving the full scientific 
capabilities of the ISS” (Program Director)24 and announced that the program would 
be restructured from the top-down so that some of the exploration duties were 
redistributed across the operational office divisions. For example, the avionics office 
was given responsibility for all payload software related to science research activity as 
well as their routine charge of maintaining the ISS vehicle software: “The Avionics 
and Software Office (OD) now maintains all avionics and software related services 
needed for the execution of utilization on-board which allows for greater efficiency in 
planning and executing avionics and software maintenance with a priority on 
utilization” 25. The intention of this being that senior management had identified 
complementarities between capabilities and processes in the engineering and science 
                                                          
23 JSC Oral History Interview Transcript (2016) 
24 ISS Program Director internal presentation (2012) 
25 Adapted from Program Director internal presentation (2002) 
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units/offices, and sought to integrate the science element into the relevant engineering 
unit; thereby redistributing some of the science research responsibilities across the 
various operational program office. With utilization and science research integrated 
into operational (exploit) office divisions, management believed they could generate 
change and prioritize scientific research so there was a consistent emphasis across 
office divisions.  
“The ISS program director wanted to change the 
organizational structure and move relationships quite 
violently at his work level, to focus on [research] 
payloads. Insularly only payloads were talking but not 
the wider organization. [The program director’s] 
intention was to get everyone talking about [research] 
payloads and not just the payloads group. In the 
reorganization, it pushed [research] payloads into all 
the groups so the same org did systems, logistics, 
robotics etc., all had it for payloads to get everyone to 
think about payloads” (Change agent, phase 4/2015) 
 
Data analysis suggests the reorganization represented a punctuation of the 
program’s differentiated structural design. The separated operational units, each of 
which held formal processes and procedures, were partially integrated with elements 
of science research, bearing similarities to O’Reilly and Tushman’s (2008) concept of 
targeted integration. (See figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the ISS program’s 
reformed structure with targeted integration). The operational and science units were 
found to no longer be completely separate as per the structural approach in 
ambidexterity literature. Rather, the program structure maintained some degree of 
separation between the operational and research units as the different areas 
maintained a primary responsibility and focus to its office division’s objective. 
However, science was partially integrated into the objectives and function of the 
operational units. This approach departed from its traditional structural model which 
maintained separation between these activities: “The ISS restructure happened quickly 
and each of the program offices adopted their new research related responsibilities” 
(Division Chief), though “the [science] research payloads office (OZ) remained the 
principle steward of [science] utilization, serving science research users of the ISS” 
(Program Director). 
In initiating the structural reorganization, management utilized structural 
mechanisms in an effort to prompt change in the program’s dominant thinking so that 
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everyone, irrespective of discipline or office division, paid greater attention to science 
exploration activities and research customers. However, the reorganization did not 
produce the intended effect and negative customer satisfaction feedback from science 
researchers proved that the program was not operating its exploration and exploitation 
activities effectively.  
“We were losing [research] customers and payload 
developers were complaining about the process to 
interface with us to get to the ISS. The process was 
not customer friendly, and was not geared towards 
helping the science customers get to space station” 
(Change agent, phase 4/2015) 
 
ISS program senior management’s intention for the reorganization had been to 
shift the program’s emphasis towards scientific research, the study found the 
dominant engineering logic persisted, impeding the reorganization’s purpose and 
contributed to the negative science customer feedback. Consequently, the partial 
integration of science and engineering operations in formal processes and procedures 
alone was insufficient in generating effective explore-exploit ambidextrous 
performance. In reflecting upon the shortcomings, interviewees noted that the partial 
structural integration of operational and research activities had occurred at the 
program level (upper management), a feature reflective of structural ambidexterity’s 
promotion for integration at the senior level within literature (Jensen et al, 2009), and 
had not translated to the lower levels of the program and the operational tasks of 
frontline employees:  
“The intent was right, but the reorganization 
happened at a program level and didn’t go down into 
the organizations [program offices] to actually talk 
about how people do their jobs. What happened was 
that everybody brought into the reorganization, took 
in the new responsibilities and used their existing 
processes, their existing procedures, and their existing 
culture to bring it in and do it” (Change lead) 
 
 Interviewees observed that the lack of integration between science and ISS 
operational units was prompted by the operational units absorbing and performing the 
new science responsibilities into their existing processes and cultures. It suggests that 
the operational units did not adjust to accommodate the science priority, but rather 
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science activities were molded to fit into the existing systems of each of the 
operational units, thus tempering the emphasis towards science research. In trying to 
operate science exploration processes within the confines and under the logic of 
engineering held by exploitative office divisions, created a misalignment between 
processes and function and its explorative purpose. Consequently, this misalignment 
manifested in the attitudes and behavior of frontline employees who were unable to 
fully comprehend the purpose of the reorganization and its implications on their 
activities: 
“Reception to this approach was crazy. People did not 
get it and all they ended up doing was absorbing 
[research] payloads into the process of what they were 
doing and took on the responsibility…” (Chief 
scientist, phase 4/2015)  
 
 
iii. Hybrid mode: fusing contextual integration and structural 
differentiation  
From analyses, a third progression in the program’s pursuit of ambidexterity 
was identified and had evolved from and was layered upon the aforementioned 
structural augmentation - targeted integration. Within this third development, the ISS 
program sought not to dismantle its structural redesign and its distinct yet partially 
integrated units. Rather, it set about uniting the new structural form with a recrafted 
program wide contextual environment geared towards the ambidextrous management 
and support of science research exploration and operational routines. As the following 
highlights, this approach is akin to developing contextual ambidexterity at the 
organizational and individual level (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004) within the 
boundaries of a punctured program-wide structure characterized by an element of 
separation.  
In August 2014 the ISS program launched a new change initiative known as 
RISE – Revolutionize the ISS for Science Exploration. RISE was designed to 
transform the mindset and everyday behaviors of the ISS program functionally and its 
personnel by embedding an emphasis towards science (exploration) across the ISS 
program whilst simultaneously maintaining safe stable operations (exploitation) of the 
ISS platform effectively. The RISE change team reasoned that a renewed 
organizational structure, even with targeted points of integration, was on its own 
incapable of producing the change needed to transform the program to be effective in 
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managing science innovation and engineering execution. The RISE change team 
identified that change had to occur on two fronts – on the individual level and wider 
program level through cultural and contextual means.  
“Many, many people around here are so committed to 
human space flight, and are really not committed to 
science. They know it's like a necessary thing, if you 
don't do some science, nobody will fund your space 
flight project. But they're really all about putting 
astronauts in space. So, what RISE is about is trying to 
make that level of cultural change, where people see 
the importance of the researching in its own right and 
it even has elements of communication, making sure 
our own employees understand why the research is 
important” (Chief Scientist)  
 
 
The study found that this third progression in the program’s pursuit for 
effective ambidexterity emerged from building a context-reshaping capability through 
the RISE initiative. Doing so enabled the integration of structurally differentiated and 
contextually integrated antecedents within a restructured unit design.  
Figure 1 below illustrates the layered development of the ISS program’s 
evolving hybrid approach from its traditional model of structural separation to 
targeted integration and then contextual integration.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the ISS program's evolution from structural differentiation to hybrid of structural differentiation and contextual integration and 
hybrid (Illustration is author’s own depiction) 
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3. Context-reshaping capability: Dynamic capabilities and its 
microfoundations enacted through middle managers  
 Analysis of the program’s third progression or evolution is of particular 
interest as it relates specifically to the intersection of structural and behavioral 
antecedents to ambidexterity. It also provides insights into how the context-reshaping 
capability was developed and its effect on promoting ambidextrous performance. 
Analysis of the mechanisms and micro-mechanisms underpinning the context-
reshaping capability revealed particular skills, processes and decision rules enacted by 
the RISE team amidst its changing environment, which resembled dynamic 
capabilities and its microfoundations (Teece, 2007). To expound upon the 
development and subsequent effect of the context-reshaping capability that enabled 
effective ambidextrous performance of science exploration and engineering 
exploitation within the ISS program, the analysis draws on Teece (2007; 2014) 
analytical categorization of dynamic capability processes – (1) sensing and identifying 
opportunities and threats, (2) seizing and mobilizing resources to address opportunities 
(3) reconfiguring, combining and enhancing intangible and tangible assets for continued 
renewal. The study found that in the case of the ISS program and the RISE initiative, 
each of the three dynamic capability processes were underpinned by distinct skills, 
micro-mechanisms and structures which were foundational to enabling the 
manifestation of the context reshaping dynamic capability. The sensing process 
initiated the context-reshaping and was found to be undergirded by dynamic 
managerial capabilities (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Helfat and Martin, 2015; Kor and 
Mesko, 2013). The seizing process, which saw the design and mobilization of 
resources for context-reshaping, was found to be underpinned by unconventional 
structures and processes that depart from the organization’s norm, reminiscent of the 
concept positive/constructive deviance (Mertens, Recker, Kohlborn and Kummer, 
2016; Vadera, Pratt and Mishra, 2013). And to maintain the context-reshaping 
capability that enabled the program to perform ambidextrously effectively, the 
reconfiguring process was supported by semi-autonomy at ground level.  
The dynamic capabilities perspective maintains that the orchestration and 
configuration of an organization’s tangible and intangible resource base are the result 
of senior management skills (Teece, 2014). However, analyses that found middle 
managers were foundational to the development and direction of the ISS program’s 
context-reshaping capability and were the ones who actively planned, mobilized, 
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transformed and redeveloped the program resource base, as opposed to senior 
management. Hence, middle managers demonstrated the capacity to design and 
configure an approach to achieving organizational ambidexterity that integrated and 
layered structural and contextual antecedents, a hybrid, whilst senior management 
assumed a supporting auxiliary role.  
 
(a) Sensing: initiating context-reshaping through dynamic managerial 
capabilities 
Teece (2007) explains that “sensing new opportunities is very much a 
scanning, creation, learning, and interpretive activity” (p. 1322), features that 
Birkinshaw, Zimmermann and Raisch (2016) equate to exploration. With regards to 
the ISS program and RISE, initiation of the context-reshaping capability was 
underpinned by features echoing dynamic managerial capabilities – managerial human 
capital, managerial social capital and managerial cognition (Helfat and Martin, 2015). 
Through a combination of experiential knowledge of the program, new knowledge 
learning activities, and network relationships, ISS middle managers identified that the 
cognitive frame underpinning the program’s ‘dominant logic’ (Kor and Mesko, 2013) 
inhibited it from translating and operating exploration and exploitation activities 
effectively and simultaneously.   
 
Microfoundations to sensing: dynamic managerial capabilities 
i. Human capital: non-routine learning  
Human capital relates to managers acquiring skills and knowledge learnt 
through education and experiences (Helfat and Martin, 2015). In the case of the ISS, 
the sensing process and the subsequent discovery that the program’s dominant logic 
was an inhibitor emerged from a non-routine learning activity in 2014, during which 
middle managers developed the strategic skills to scan and interpret the organization’s 
external environment and understand the changes being experienced by the program. 
Sponsors of the training class believed that if middle managers could be trained to do 
strategy it would help to open up strategic discussions between upper and lower levels 
of the program.  
“Completely separate from anything we do in our daily 
work, some of the managers and deputy managers in 
space station wanted to do strategic planning for 
individuals for training, so we put together this class. 
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It was a day and a half class and in that class a 
facilitator took us through an activity of 
deconstructing our vision and mission […] it was only 
a day and a half class but it felt like three weeks. It was 
very intense” (Change Lead) 
 
The process of deconstructing the program’s vision and mission for science 
(exploration) and sustained development of the ISS vehicle (exploitation), provided a 
cognitive framework against which the group of middle managers compared the 
program’s current performance and operations based on their experiential local 
knowledge of activities and the broader program. What emerged from this cognitive 
deconstruction-comparison exercise was an identification of program issues which the 
group interpreted went deeper than the program’s structural reorganization.  
 
ii. Social capital: network relations of middle managers 
Managerial social capital involves the ability to access resources and knowledge 
through relationships (Helfat and Martin, 2015). With the ISS program, non-routine 
learning occurred as a result of network relations among middle managers. In 2014, 
approximately two years after the program’s initial structural reorganization, two 
deputy middle managers from different program offices organized a voluntary non-
routine training event. The topic of the training event was strategic planning and it was 
targeted specifically towards fellow middle managers. The event was sponsored and 
attended exclusively by middle managers. These middle managers shared relational 
experiences by virtue of their position in the hierarchy. Having worked closely with 
front-line staff in a supervisory role and upper management, the ISS middle managers 
utilized the knowledge they had built through these relationships. In sharing their 
knowledge and experiences with other middle managers at the training event they 
developed new knowledge of strategic issues. It was through this relational interaction 
with other middle managers that the group identified the issues inhibiting effective 
change in the program:  
“…what we had highlighted as a group, there were 
about 30 of us [middle managers] in that class, that 
what was stated in our vision and our mission was not 
how we behaved. We were still behaving in a manner 
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that’s appropriate for an assembling vehicle program, 
right” (Change Lead) 
 
 
iii. Managerial cognition: identification of organization’s dissonance and 
organizational cognitive distance 
Managerial cognition relates to the mental models and beliefs - ‘knowledge 
structures’, employed by managers in understanding circumstances and choice options 
(Helfat and Martin, 2015). In the case of the ISS program, the data suggests that these 
middle managers exercised problem solving and reasoning skills, rooted in experiential 
knowledge, to perceive and sense a misalignment between the program’s existing 
mode of operating and new strategic intent. Using their learning and existing 
knowledge of the ISS program, the middle managers formed inferential insights and 
deduced the mismatch between the program’s ambidextrous strategy and its current 
processes and operating behavior: 
“so, we [a few of the middle managers] brought a 
story forward to program management and said we 
need to reengineer, from the top down […] We, from 
our vision and mission, our processes all the way 
down at the lowest level, people aren’t getting it… 
And, he [ISS program director] agreed” (Lead change 
agent). 
 
The data suggests that the middle managers identified the existence of bi-
directional cognitive discrepancy at an organizational level was a factor underpinning the 
misalignment (scholars note that the term cognitive discrepancy and dissonance can 
be used interchangeably, e.g. Hinojosa et al, 2017). Drawing on cognitive dissonance 
theory, the term cognitive discrepancy in the context of this study refers to “a 
discrepancy between two or more cognitions” (Hinojosa, Gardner, Walker, Cogliser 
and Gullifor, 2017: 174). And in applying this concept, cognitive discrepancy is 
expanded beyond the individual level and relates to hierarchical strata’s within an 
organization. I intentionally define this form of dissonance as bi-directional because 
the misalignment and distortions between strategic vision and operational reality 
occurred in two directions simultaneously – originating from upper management 
towards ground-level staff, and dissonance originating from the ground-level towards 
top management.  
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The data indicates that bi-directional dissonance was a consequence of 
organizational cognitive distance – a lack of sufficient alignment in categories of thought, 
perceptions and shared knowledge, to understand other organizational actors, 
involved in achieving a common goal or strategy (Nooteboom, 2000; Wuyts et al, 
2004).  Firstly, the program’s upper management were highly strategic in their conduct 
and discussions on strategic planning and development tended to remain within the 
upper echelons, and did not filter through to the lower levels of the program. By 
virtue of their position, upper management were close to and understood the 
ambidextrous strategic vision and the need for the program to change, but they were 
considered to be distant and too far removed to see ground level activities. Hence, 
upper management were disconnected from the program’s lower ranks and were 
unable to translate the strategy to ground-level staff or communicate how the strategy 
materialized in daily tasks.   
“Program management already saw [the program’s 
strategic vision]. They already understood the vision. 
They were already making decisions towards the new 
vision. What they couldn’t see, was all the levels down 
lowest in the organization was these people [down 
here] they didn’t get it … [there was a] disconnect” 
(Change agent) 
 
Meanwhile, individuals in low-level program roles, had not understood what 
program management intended to achieve through its restructure, nor the direction 
management was leading the program, or why further change was needed. 
Furthermore, the program’s structure did not enable those in lower-level roles to see 
or comprehend the strategy. 
“…the bottom [ground level employees] do not 
understand the direction we’re headed, right… These 
guys [lower level staff] don’t see it and we’re not 
structured properly to get them to see it” (Change 
agent) 
 
Based on the data, one can inductively infer that because of human capital and 
social capital, the middle managers involved constructed a model of the organization’s 
existing reality and comparatively assessed it with the reality they perceived was 
required to make the strategy a reality. Hence, suggesting a bridging activity between 
dual cognitive models within the managerial cognition of middle managers.  
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(b) Seizing and mobilizing resources: context-reshaping  
The study found that the sizing and mobilizing process of dynamic capabilities 
was the result of two main factors: (1) the deliberate reshaping of both hard and soft 
organizational elements; (2) the ability to execute and mobilize resources was 
underpinned by micro-foundations - unconventional structures and practices. 
 
i. Reshaping soft organizational elements: 
The study found two soft elements in particular were pertinent to changing the 
ISS program: (1) redefining its value system, and (2) reprogramming its vernacular. 
  
Redefining the organizational value system 
An organization’s value system is one of the fundamental levels at which an 
organization’s culture is revealed (Schein, 1990). The data shows the RISE team 
determined that in order to change the program’s organizational context it needed to 
re-evaluate its value system on a broader level because the emphasis on science and 
supporting science research from external/commercial entities required a different 
outlook and belief system. This was highlighted by a change team member who 
expressed: “the value based system was fit for assembling the vehicle which needed it 
because it was precise, perfect and routine; but the value system does not fit in the 
context of where we are going with science research and commercial users of the ISS, 
which needs a different value system if we are to support science research users, so we 
need to do things differently”. 
To address this issue the RISE team set about deconstructing the vision and 
mission of the ISS, and re-evaluating its purpose, core values and the meaning of the 
values to ascertain the behaviors and capabilities required to enable scientific 
utilization alongside operational sustainability. 
“How do you get people to behave differently, so you 
get people to see it in the new world? Not saying that 
they were behaving badly but that they need to behave 
differently. It’s about getting them to understand the 
‘why’ […] we started with the ‘WHY’ questions. Why 
does ISS exist? Why were we doing everything we 
were doing? Why was it important we made these 
changes? Only when an organization knows its ‘why’ 
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can it define its ‘how’ and ‘what’. We were remaking 
ISS's why” (Lead change agent).  
 
Furthermore, informants explained that program management gave the RISE 
change team the latitude to put in place whatever they deemed necessary to change the 
program’s culture, including redefining ‘mission success’, a value concept that had 
been a big part of the culture of NASA and the ISS program, provided the change did 
not harm the safety of the vehicle or crew. Critically, RISE changed the program’s 
definition of mission success ownership. For the program, achieving mission success 
would no longer be defined as ensuring that experiments taking place on board the 
ISS produced successful results nor would the experiments end results be the 
responsibility of program operations and crew. Instead, responsibility was given to the 
experiment owners and mission success for the ISS Program was redefined as 
engendering scientists to perform experiments regardless of whether they worked or 
not: “we did 2 things from the requirements world is we essentially took the strict 
mission success requirements off from them [the research scientists] and […] whether 
or not their experiment works is up to them. So […] the risk element was put back 
in…It’s a huge shift” (RISE team member).  
 Interviewees related that this redefinition initially sent shockwaves throughout 
the program’s culture as those working in the operational units were uncomfortable 
with this change in mission success.   
“I will tell you that not everybody is comfortable yet, 
okay. So, there are a lot of implications there, 
especially from the operations directorate. Their whole 
motto from Apollo all the way through, is failure is 
not an option. And we’re telling them, yes, it is. Your 
definition of success changes. Success is enabling 
scientists to make discoveries. Success is enabling 
scientists to perform their experiments. Keep the 
laboratory up and running. It’s not saying that it all 
goes perfectly, okay. So, this is difficult, a really 
difficult concept for a lot of people to understand” 
(Lead change agent).  
 
 
Reprogramming organizational vernacular  
Edgar Schein (2004) identifies the creation of a common language and 
categories of meaning as an issue of internal integration explaining that “to function as 
a group, the individuals who come together must establish a system of communication 
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and a language that permits interpretation of what is going on” (p. 111). For the ISS 
program, the RISE team took the deliberate decision to change the language and 
vocabulary used by actors in an effort to shift mind-sets towards being flexible, 
supportive of scientific experimentation and provide a better communication interface 
with scientists, thus highlighting the significance of adjusting language and meaning to 
create a cultural context conducive to its emphasis towards science discovery. It was 
not enough to change the meaning of terms but the terminology and words 
themselves were important for the RISE team for it was not just meaning that was 
seen to carry value but also the label of the term itself.  
“We made a very conscious decision about changing 
the words that we used and bringing in new 
vernacular. Because when you do that and you use 
different words, you get outside of your own brain. 
And so we did it on purpose and so when I hear 
people talk about well, ‘that’s just that process, or 
that’s just that process’. No! This is what it’s called 
[referring to the new terminology being implemented]. 
It has a different meaning [so we’re fundamentally 
trying to change meaning itself]… It’s hard because 
not only do we have to keep saying it over and over 
and over. Other people have to adopt it and use it” 
(Change agent).  
 
The finding also signifies that the exploration-exploitation dimension requires 
nuances in language and meaning, and differences in language labels are connected to 
the different dimensions of exploration and exploitation. It reinforces the need to 
reconstruct a common language in which exploration and exploitation share a domain 
operationally where actors understand it and warrants its backing.  
 
ii. Reshaping hard organizational elements 
Borrowing Gibson and Birkinshaw’s (2004) conceptualization of hard 
elements (discipline and stretch), the study identified performance management 
features the RISE team employed to motivate individuals, in the new context, to 
perform and “deliver high-quality results and making them accountable for their 
actions” (p. 51). Having redefined its value system and soft elements the RISE team 
sought to stimulate the necessary delivery behaviors conducive for effective 
ambidexterity at the individual level by engaging in organizational features equivalent 
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to hard elements. In order to empower ground level staff to decide for themselves 
how to manage their activities between exploration and exploitation, the RISE team 
reengineered the key processes and enabling processes governing operational activities 
that needed to change – so to support the cultural change designed to enable 
ambidexterity, hard structural elements, processes, also needed to change.  
“To do process reengineering properly, you have to 
completely divorce people from process. We had to 
focus on the processes that were required to realize 
the vision, the WHY, of ISS, regardless of what 
organization people resided in in the program. Later 
we talked about what we would need to realign for the 
people to better fit with the core and enabling 
processes” (change agent) 
 
 
Redesigning critical processes framework and shifting locus of process change 
decisions 
RISE intended to provoke a deeper degree of cultural change by changing 
how people behaved in their everyday work, “in order to change our cultural norms 
we must change how we do our daily jobs” (Change agent). To this end the RISE 
team identified and redefined what they referred to as the program’s core enabling 
processes, the core capabilities which, though critical for the effective discharge of 
operations, were adjudged to be distinguishable from and eclipsing of the ISS 
program’s raison d'être as the RISE change agent illuminated: “Most of our core 
capabilities exist in our enabling processes. We know how to manage risk. We know 
how to talk someone through the safety process. We know how to write requirements. 
We know how to verify hardware for flights … those core capabilities support us and 
they are the necessary evils if you will that make everything work. But we don’t exist 
to be safe. We don’t exist to review requirements. That’s what we’re good at but that’s 
not why we’re here. And so we thought about it as the big ‘why’?” 
In addition, the RISE team identified and introduced specific ‘enablers’ -  
tangible resources permitting the workforce to execute activities and deliver products 
in line with the new strategy (i.e. tools, procedures, forums, people, training and 
reward systems). For the RISE team, these enablers were considered change devices 
that could empower personnel from the ground up to fulfil their tasks differently and 
more effectively, helping to transform the program from an assembly focused mindset 
to one that prioritized science discovery and commercialization.  
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“We started from scratch and so, what we did map 
were the issues. So, we mapped the existing issues that 
we had gathered from [science users] customers as 
well as from [science] people in the program. We 
mapped issues to the existing processes and then we 
remapped them after we designed them to the new 
processes to see where the disconnects were, where 
we needed to really dive in and make a change. And 
those changes are really, we call them enablers. They 
are tools, tangible products that, and this is kind of our 
coined phrase, ‘make the right thing to do the easiest 
thing to do’ ” (Change agent) 
 
A critical feature of the redesign process focused on creating a framework of 
enabling processes as a mechanism that pushed decision making authority on task 
related changes down to the level of enactment at ground level staff: “... And so part 
of the issue that we grapple with in space station is getting empowerment down into 
the lowest level working troops so they can go do the job that they were hired to go 
do, okay. And so some of our enablers that we put together, the lowest level “how’s” 
if you will, are designed to empower these people. So that allows them to make the 
change that’s in line with this” (Change agent) 
Interviewees indicated that due to the extensive size and complexity of the ISS 
Program RISE did not address all of the enabling processes on a gradual level but 
focused on the ones key to supporting science innovation that were critical to creating 
a mindset orientated towards science and the needs of scientific user. Areas the 
program struggled with the most. Having defined the program’s core purpose and key 
processes the team focused on detailing the intersections between science related 
processes and engineering operational processes. This served to ensure processes were 
aligned to the broader contextual framework, and combined elements needed for 
exploration and exploitation activities:  
 
“We [RISE middle managers] defined what our [the 
ISS program’s] core processes are, why does space 
station exist, why do we do it, who are the customers 
[scientific users of the ISS]? We then could look at it 
from the big picture, how are all of our processes 
interrelated, what are all of the inputs and outputs for 
everyone and that became our new requirements set 
for building the rest of our processes and trying to 
figure out how all of the issues we’re seeing today 
94 
 
mapped to existing processes, boards, panels, 
whatever; and remapped them to the new redesigned 
processes” (RISE change lead) 
 
 
Redefining performance management boundaries    
Early on, in the RISE initiative, the change team integrated RISE objectives 
into the formal personnel review process making it a priority in every individual’s 
performance expectations. Integrating RISE into the formal review process gave 
gravity to the RISE mission and helped to ground change into the mindset and day-to-
day behaviors of individuals across the program. This was a huge deal because the 
program’s culture was geared towards performance assessment plans; and what’s 
more, at the time there were 300 civil servants in the Space Station program and every 
single one of them had a RISE objective incorporated into their performance 
expectations plan.  
“I should tell you this because this is key. Last spring 
[2014] we wrote in every single – there are 2 to 300 
people at the space station program – every single 
performance review, what we call performance 
expectations, has RISE in it… And so that’s very top-
down. You have to go do this.” (Change agent)  
 
For the ISS Program and the wider JSC community individual performance 
reviews are a cornerstone of the organizations performance management procedure 
and culture with one interviewee expressing that “performance reviews are a big deal 
here”. In incorporating RISE objectives into the central performance review process 
RISE became embedded into the program’s formal governing systems and provided a 
mechanism through which behaviors could be monitored and adapted to fit with the 
overall strategy and the simultaneous push for science innovation and engineering 
execution:   
“Their [staff] position description and how they do 
their job everyday tells them what they’re supposed to 
go do, that’s what they’re supposed to go do. People 
usually follow the rules. So, until you tell them, you’re 
empowering to be creative and figure out a better way 
to do it, they’re not going to do it” (RISE lead).  
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It became apparent the redesign of the program’s hard and soft elements was 
undergirded by these micro foundational elements – break out structural 
differentiation and the endorsed informal practice of circumventing. 
 
Microfoundations to seizing and mobilizing resources: unconventional 
structures and practices (positive deviance) directed from ‘the middle’  
i. Strategizing directed by middle management: translators and boundary spanners: 
The study found that having sensed and identified the challenges and the 
opportunity for change, the middle managers seized the opportunity to trigger and 
direct change by molding a context-reshaping capability. The study identified that 
seizing and mobilizing was triggered and directed by middle managers who functioned 
as translators of management’s strategic vision for the program (Floyd and 
Woodridge, 2000), taking it from the abstract high level into the program’s functional 
reality. Hence, middle managers acted as boundary spanners on multiple levels: 
strategy-operations, upper management-low level staff, and existing operating 
cognition-new ambidextrous cognition.  
 To address this opportunity the ISS program director approved the change 
proposal presented by the middle managers and commissioned a lead change agent 
from amongst the group of middle managers to form a team (which came to be called 
RISE) to strategize and transform the program to bring alignment between its 
ambidextrous vision, processes and behavior. The RISE team lead selected ten middle 
managers from various office across the program, forming a cross-functional 
integrated team each possessing a different knowledge base and capabilities set. A 
conscious decision was made to exclude senior managers and their deputies from the 
RISE team and instead engaged only middle managers to overcome the internal 
contextual issue of bi-directional dissonance.  
“So, when we set up the team, yeah we didn’t have – 
there were no deputies [refers to senior manager 
deputies] on the team. We went down to this level 
[middle managers]. And really at that point it was a 
conscious decision because the deputies, they don’t 
know enough about what’s going on down here 
[referring to ground level workers, those below middle 
managers] to have those discussions, right. But these 
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guys [referring to middle managers] know enough 
about what’s going on up here [referring to upper 
management] and also what’s going on down here 
[referring to lower level workers]” (RISE team lead) 
 
ii. Transient structural and spatial separation 
Structural and spatial separation are modes of differentiation featured in 
ambidexterity. The former relates to the separation of structural forms, processes and 
systems in an organization and the latter refers to physical separation across time and 
space, including geographic proximity where elements are in different locations 
(Jansen et al, 2009). In applying this concept, transient structural separation refers to 
the creation of a temporary unit, structurally separated from the body of the 
organization for a term and then assimilating the unit back into the organization. And 
transient spatial separation is the relocation of a unit to a geographical location 
different to the main body of the organization for a short-period of time, and then 
integrating it. 
The study found a micro-feature that enabled middle management to design, 
plan and develop the cultural change required to support the program’s ambidextrous 
strategy was the transient structural and spatial separation of the RISE team which 
broke out from the rest of the program for a set time period. At the insistence of the 
change lead, and with authorization from the program director all ten members 
(middle managers) of the RISE team were deliberately pulled off their routine day-to-
day jobs, processes and their department functions for 100 percent of the time, and 
were geographically relocated to a different building. The separation divorced the team 
structurally, functionally and culturally from the rest of the ISS program allowing the 
RISE group to create an environment as a distinct unit where they focused on 
exploring and designing the context-shaping capability and processes that would see 
science exploration and the needs of ISS science users actively prioritized and engaged 
within the operational engineering processes of the wider program.  
 
“I was very insistent on finding the right place for the 
team to meet away from their jobs. I did not want the 
team in the same beige… stale environment. I needed 
a place for people to get their creative juices flowing. I 
worked with [JSC] center facilities to have full use of a 
brand new collaboration facility before it even opened 
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to the [rest of the organization]. I needed people to 
think differently, and they cannot often do that in the 
same environment” (RISE Lead) 
 
By separating the change agents from the rest of program the RISE team lead 
intentional sought to avoid the difficulty that comes with switching between activities 
when having to divide one’s time and commitment between the busy routine activities 
of a day-job and the entrepreneurial thinking and exploration required to formulate a 
new change strategy as a side project, as the RISE lead pointed out: “everything is so 
busy in the office. People had been trying to make changes for years and we weren’t 
getting anywhere… And so, part of it was the focused, dedicated time to go really look 
at it from the top down. We needed to have it [a separate space away from the 
program], because inevitably what would happen is that day to day work would 
overtake and people wouldn’t spend the time on it [exploring the strategy for 
change]”. Although switching between explorative and exploitative activities had been 
a mechanism previously employed by the ISS program to engender change it had 
proven ineffective because the exploitative routines of daily activities dominated time 
and thinking, gradually nudging out scope for exploration. Furthermore, what made 
the RISE team different from other project-focus teams (i.e. tiger teams) was its 
complete focus on redefining organizational and cultural aspects of the program. This 
non-technical focus was markedly different to the change/problem solving project 
teams historically used by the program.   
 
iii. Loosely coupled structures (unconventional) 
The term loose coupling connotes elements and systems being “tied together 
either weakly or infrequently or slowly or with minimal interdependence” (Weick, 
1976: 5), and provides a solution to problems that maybe costly in tightly coupled 
systems. In application to this study, loose coupling refers to an independent 
organizational unit that is structurally separate from the rest of the organization, is 
empowered to operate differently to the rest of the organization has limited 
interaction with other organizational members outside of its unit. For the ISS 
program, this structural arrangement constituted an unconventional approach as it was 
different to the routinized, process orientated and directed way of operating followed 
by the rest of the program. 
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The data found the use of loose structural coupling for the RISE team was a 
positive contributory factor. Being structurally separated from the program, the RISE 
team who consisted entirely of middle managers, were intentionally placed outside of 
the program’s hierarchical chain of command, which further differentiated the RISE 
unit from the broader program and enabled the group to explore and develop the 
context-reshaping capability independent from the program’s operational activities. 
Having the support of the program’s executive director, the team reported directly to 
the executive director of the ISS thereby circumventing several layers of upper 
management – including their own line managers; “we essentially were working on 
behalf of the program manager. We did not report to our managers at all” (RISE 
Lead).  This arrangement allowed the program director to monitor RISE strategic 
development and gave them the director visibility of workings on the ground. 
The study found that in structurally circumventing upper levels of 
management, the RISE reporting structure exercised an informal practice and assumed 
a ‘strategic leadership’ position in reporting and communicating directly and strictly 
with the program director.  The direct support of the director legitimated the informal 
reporting practice creating a dual management structure. One that reflected the formal 
structure and functional flow of the organization that was focused on maintaining the 
program’s stability. The second pseudo like leadership team being the RISE middle 
managers were charged with exploring and designing a strategy to take the 
organization forward and forge the processes, systems and cultural features needed to 
enable the effective operation of science innovation and functional maintenance of the 
ISS vehicle.  
“We were given full [strategic] design freedom from 
the beginning, and authority [from program director] 
to look at the solution set however we saw fit. We 
were given no boundaries aside from keeping the crew 
and vehicle safe, and retaining the organization 
structure, which we still made recommendations to 
change” (Change agent).  
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(c) Reconfiguring, enhancing and combining 
 
Semi-autonomy from the ground up 
Reconfiguration, Teece (2007) explicates “is needed to maintain evolutionary 
fitness…In short, success will breed some level of routine, as this is necessary for 
operational efficiency. Routines help sustain continuity until there is a shift in the 
environment” (p. 1335). In the case of the ISS program and the RISE initiative, the 
study found the ability to reconfigure and maintain the change operationally going 
forward occurred on three interrelated levels – ground level, middle management and 
senior management. 
 At ground level, as a consequence of RISE and the development of a context-
reshaping capability, going forward low-level employees were empowered to explore, 
identify and decide how to make changes on a granular level to specific operational 
tasks and processes for which they were responsible or directly involved. The RISE 
context-shaping capability created the framework boundaries and expectations within 
which low-level workers had to operate, and it simultaneously decentralized an 
element of change decisions by giving workers semi-autonomy and ownership of the 
changes in their work activities – in other words long-term incremental task changes 
would become a routinized action from the bottom up – a point exemplified by the 
following interviewee comment: 
“What we did, in the whole philosophy and the 
purpose of RISE as the team, was to build that 
framework and then we hand it over to the people 
who own that work, and we give them the 
expectations. Here’s, here are the values. Here’s the 
enablers that we’d like you to go put in place. Here are 
the things we want you to tackle. It’s theirs to go 
figure out how. The people who own the work today 
are the ones who are going to go update how they do 
it ... [we] empowered them to make that decision… 
[we] changed who the decision makers were” (Change 
agent) 
 
The RISE context-reshaping had been initiated, designed and implemented by 
middle managers. The data suggests that in developing this capability, the group 
established a framework inside which the program’s intangible cultural and tangible 
processes and structural features were recrafted. Having spent four months designing 
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the context-reshaping capability most of the RISE group members purposefully 
returned to their regular ISS Program offices but continued to work on the RISE 
initiative in a refining and implementation capacity. In moving the developers of the 
context-reshaping capability back to the program and into their routine jobs, the role 
of the middle managers shifted to integrators of the context-reshaping capability, able 
to translate the strategy into practice within the structural constraints of their distinct 
program office; and in the long term these actors served as an embedding mechanism 
close enough to observe and oversee task related changes occurring at the lower-
levels. 
“I [RISE team lead] took their [upper middle 
managements] best people for 4 months, and I knew 
when I came out, I was going to need their [upper 
middle management] help to implement this. Not only 
their help but they have to do it … I needed [RISE] 
people to go back to their jobs so their managers 
could see them. So, they [RISE members] could start 
integrating and influencing and bringing in the 
vocabulary and the changes and everything else” 
(RISE team lead) 
 
Notably, the RISE team lead did not return back to their routine program job 
role but remained in this role, and for the next two years continued to spearhead the 
context-reshaping capability process and its effectual change. Critically, the RISE team 
lead was elevated to ISS program management status which endowed positional 
power to ensure continued renewal “… because program management put me up on 
staff I have been able to direct a lot of changes”. Thus, corroborating with extant 
literature on the significance of senior management in directing long-term change and 
authorizing the reconfiguring of resources. Due to RISE, the ISS program underwent 
effective change which enabled the dual pursuit of science (exploration) and 
engineering (exploitation). An example of the RISE’s success in enabling science 
exploration and executing operational efficiency is seen in the DNA sequencing 
project which went through the new processes, structures and cultural behaviors 
developed through RISE. It resulted with the scientists and JSC ISS program winning 
a prestigious award for producing revolutionary science: 
“NASA’s Johnson Space Center and Oxford 
Nanopore Technologies’ MinION™ DNA 
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sequencing team were honored with the prestigious 
Arthur C. Clarke Award […] The sequencing project 
was a part of Johnson’s 5x2015 initiative, created … to 
send exploration prototypes to the International Space 
Station (ISS). This initiative tests a streamlined 
development process for flight projects [RISE]” (JSC 
Features, 2016; 2017).  
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This paper set out to examine how an organization engages different 
antecedents in managing exploration and exploitation activities simultaneously, and 
what organizational features contribute to this development? Extant literature posits 
that an ambidextrous organization is achieved as a result of both structural and 
contextual solutions; however, to date research articles examining ambidexterity have 
tended to focus upon one antecedent solution rather than examine the combined use 
of modes, thus providing a limited understanding of how these approaches are 
employed integratively (Agostini et al, 2016; Simsek, 2009). Employing a longitudinal 
case analysis of the ISS space program – a large organizational unit at JSC – this study 
examines its development in managing science research (exploration) and engineering 
(exploitation), and provides empirical insights to address this question. As such, it 
offers an enhanced understanding of how ambidexterity ‘works in practice’, and the 
underpinning mechanisms engaged.  
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Figure 2: Framework of dynamic exploration-exploitation tension and the evolving hybrid approach to ambidexterity 
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The main theoretical insights emerging from this study concern the dynamic 
emphasis and allocation of resources between exploration and exploitation, and the 
micro-mechanisms, structures and processes engendering an organization’s pathway to 
becoming ambidextrous. The study provides an alternative perspective of how 
antecedents to ambidexterity may be engaged in an integrated manner, showing a 
progressive layering pattern culminating in a fused hybrid approach to ambidexterity. 
In sketching an organization’s pathway to effectual ambidexterity, this paper 
contributes to understanding how the shift towards an ambidextrous strategy can 
constitute a change in an organization’s paradigm and requires the combined 
engagement of structures, cultural features and micro-mechanisms in establishing 
ambidexterity. It combines theoretical concepts and empirical insights from 
ambidexterity literature, dynamic capabilities and organizational change to analyze how 
an organization becomes ambidextrous, the approach it employs, the underlying 
factors that give rise to it, and the mechanisms that support and hinder its transition 
process. The study helps to address a gap in our understanding of how the various 
approaches can be used interrelatedly and highlights the complexity inherent in the 
process and the organizational features that engender the interrelations.   
Figure 2 presents an empirically-grounded framework of the three core 
concepts critical to understanding the manifestation of ambidexterity in practice - 
fluctuating exploration-exploitation relationship, layered hybrid approach to ambidexterity, and 
context-reshaping dynamic capability – and demonstrates the relationships and direction of 
influence between these concepts. 
Conceptions of temporal, structural and contextual ambidexterity are well 
documented, yet the collective application of these constructs to a multi-level 
organization or functional unit requires further attention (Turner et al, 2013). Current 
empirical studies favor structural approaches to ambidexterity, quantitative empirical 
analysis, and give limited attention to the (micro) mechanisms that underlie and enable 
the pursuit and eventual achievement of ambidexterity. 
 
Fluctuating exploration-exploitation tension (A) 
The first core concept, represented as (A) in figure 2, centers on the nature of 
the exploration-exploitation tension. The findings show that nature of the relationship 
between the explore-exploit dimensions plays an important role in understanding the 
approaches employed by the organization to manage ambidexterity.  
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Finding and maintaining an appropriate balance between exploration and 
exploitation activities is considered a key feature to operating ambidextrously (March, 
1991), and by ‘appropriate’ academic logic has largely been nondescript in defining its 
magnitude, referring to terms such as achieving ‘high levels’ (Lubatkin et al, 2006; 
Agostini et al, 2016) or being relatively evenly balanced (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). 
Although March (1991) does not define or clarify what the appropriate level should 
look like, researchers have implied and suggested the appropriate level for 
ambidexterity to be the ‘balance’ of exploration and exploitation. This perspective 
suggests the exploration-exploitation tension maintains a static constant form (Lewis 
et al, 2017), persisting strategically and operationally. However, findings from the 
study highlight a somewhat different view of the nature of the exploration-
exploitation tension. The data indicates that the nature of the explore-exploit tension 
is not static or constant over time, nor are exploration and exploitation activities 
pursued to the same magnitude or degree over time, but appears asymmetric (Lee, 
Kim and Joshi, 2017). The findings demonstrate that the ‘balance’ of exploration and 
exploitation can be mutable, in that both dimensions are simultaneously in operation 
but rather than exist in a state of balance the study finds that the degree of emphasis 
given to the dimensions fluctuates at different levels (i.e. individual tasks, wider 
program); and this dynamism is context dependent. In the case of the ISS program, 
exploration and exploitation were deemed significant but did not carry equivalent 
emphasis at the same time but was in flux. The shift in emphasis over time towards 
one element depending on environmental factors and changes to its internal context. 
 However, the shifting nature did not take the form of cyclical or sequential 
cycles, with one dimension of the tension replacing the other over time as offered by 
the temporal approach to ambidexterity (Boumgarden et al, 2012). Both dimensions 
were functionally active and required management simultaneously. However, the 
‘appropriate level’ and emphasis given to exploration and exploitation, as per resource 
allocation, management’s focus and employees operating behaviors, shifted between 
the two dimensions. As such, it recasts the idea of dynamic ambidexterity (Luger et al, 
2015) and temporal separation (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003) by stressing the 
fluctuations between exploration and exploitation which may occur in its operational 
emphasis and magnitude in addition to time and organizational lifecycle, and that 
these shifts in magnitude can constitute a dynamic character. 
105 
 
Figure 3, provides a graphic illustration of what the shifting emphasis between 
exploration and exploitation could look like in comparison to the traditional 
temporal/cyclical perspective of the exploration and exploitation tension and 
ambidexterity. For example, the organization is continuously engaged in both 
exploration and exploitation activities but at t1, exploration has a greater emphasis, 
but in t2 the emphasis switches to exploitation. This study’s contention that the 
‘appropriate level’ for balance can be dynamic empirically embraces Raisch et al’s 
(2009) assertion that organization’s may move from a primary emphasis on one 
dimension of a tension towards another. It also corresponds with Markides et al’s 
(2017) ‘oscillating pendulum’ approach and provides support to Gulati and Puranam’s 
(2009) claim that the balance of exploration-exploitation activities depends on its 
relative importance to the organization. In the case of the ISS program, these 
fluctuations were conditioned by context dependent priorities and the organization’s 
dominant operating logic rather than strategic intent, all of which were contingent 
upon the national political agenda, its internal and external environment and evolving 
strategic objectives for the program. The study’s findings would suggest the 
continuous maintenance of exploration and exploitation in ‘balance’ may be unsuitable 
and ineffectual under certain circumstances. Nor does it necessarily reflect the reality 
seen in practice, particularly when an organization’s activities are subject to 
programmatic/project or development lifecycle phases, or in cases where the 
organization’s strategic agenda is prone to changes.  
 
Figure 3: Illustration comparing traditional view of temporal ambidexterity and dynamic 
ambidexterity based on fluctuating degrees of organizational emphasis between exploration 
and exploitation 
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Layered hybrid approach to ambidexterity (B) 
The second core concept, represented as (B) in figure 2, refers to the evolving 
hybrid approach the organizational unit employed over time to manage exploration-
exploitation ambidextrously. In combining the different antecedents, the form and 
character they assume alters appearing to recast what has traditionally been depicted, 
leading to an alternative perspective and understanding of how ambidexterity may be 
achieved. To this end, the study finds that this hybrid mode to ambidexterity was 
borne out of the fluctuating nature of the exploration-exploitation tension (concept 
A).  
The dynamism in the exploration-exploitation tension renders its management 
more complex than presented by the static antecedent models proposed in literature. 
Drawing on contingency theory and the efficiency-flexibility tension, Ebben and 
Johnson (2008) contend that “efficiency and flexibility can be viewed as pure or ideal 
configurations, while a combination of efficiency and flexibility would require a hybrid 
configuration” (p. 1251). The authors go on to argue that the hybrid configuration 
needed to operate efficiency and flexibility possess inconsistent organizational 
attributes; a view seemingly shared by Raisch et al (2009) who contend that combining 
differentiation and integration processes “creates a paradox that is difficult to resolve” 
(p. 687).  However, data from the ISS RISE case demonstrates that a fused 
configuration is possible and does not necessarily produce distinctly inconsistent 
organizational attributes. The findings show that the ISS program’s structural 
separation of engineering (exploitation) and science (exploration), exemplifying a 
structural separation did not allow for the effective management of the dynamism and 
oscillation between engineering and science which defined the ISS program’s strategy 
and function. Instead it produced organizational attributes that were unconducive to 
the program’s exploration and exploitation dynamic. Consequently, this finding 
highlights a limitation in the structural separation approach to ambidexterity. Current 
prescriptions of this approach maintain a separation of exploration and exploitation 
respective of the relationship between the two dimensions of the tension; nor does it 
account for the possibility that the relationship between the two dimensions may 
evolve and change over time from a state of conflict to one of convergence and 
synthesis. The fusion approach combining differentiation and integration, as identified 
in the ISS case study, reflects an interweaving akin to Smith and Lewis (2011) dynamic 
equilibrium model which invokes the idea of managing paradox through ongoing 
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micro-shifts, a proposition similar to the ISS program’s progressively fused approach 
to managing exploration and exploitation effectively.  
For the ISS program, in an effort to bring forth better alignment between the 
engineering and science domains, senior management pierced the structurally separate 
domains with an element of integration by placing responsibility for certain science 
orientated processes and tasks within engineering offices; an act resembling Tushman 
and O’Reilly’s (2013) targeted integration concept. This semi-integrated structural 
approach was overlaid over the program’s original structural differentiation approach. 
In sharing structural elements, combining these two approaches did not represent a 
radical disruption to the organizational unit. The disruption was found to be more 
localized and orientated around work processes and routines tailored to exploration 
and exploitation.  
However, over time this targeted integration approach was insufficient in 
resolving inconsistencies in the program and effectively managing the explore-exploit 
activities. Though management devised a program wide shared vision (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 1996; 2004) this proved ineffectual in translating the strategy to operations 
on the ground. In the ISS case, the study found the intentional creation of what I term 
‘cross-boundary contextual integration’ amidst structural units, which are chiefly discrete, 
enabled the fusion of structural differentiation and contextual integration. This cross-
boundary contextual integration represents the adoption of a third approach and was 
integrated with the existing targeted integration approach. Cross-boundary contextual 
integration refers to the contextual integration approach of Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004), whereby a cultural environment was designed through the ISS RISE initiative 
which made seemingly incompatible processes and operating logics compatible and 
developed a shared understanding between the engineering (exploitation) and science 
(exploration) divisions. In doing so, it altered actors’ perceptions of the exploration-
exploitation dynamic, whereby engineering and science were reconciled and 
compatible operationally as well as strategically and accommodated for the oscillating 
dynamism in the program’s exploration-exploitation activities. However, this form of 
contextual integration occurred whilst the organization still employed a degree of 
structural separation – hence contextual integration needs to cross the boundaries of 
structurally separate units. It represents a further hybrid approach in merging 
structural differentiation and contextual integration.  
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According to Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), the interaction of Ghoshal and 
Bartlett (1994) four attributes – discipline, stretch, trust and support – form the 
organizational context that shape and engender individual-level and collective 
behaviors which enable ambidexterity over time. Evidence from this study of NASA’s 
ISS program found additional mechanisms not fully captured by Ghoshal and 
Bartlett’s four attributes were critical to developing the context required to create an 
environment that enabled the ISS program to behave ambidextrously. Findings from 
the case study found that the change team pursued an approach that first re-
established the program’s contextual soft elements and then translated these to its 
hard contextual elements, thus recrafting its contextual environment. Gibson and 
Birkinshaw’s (2004) conceptualization of soft elements (the combining support and 
trust) are said to provide the social support dimension of an organization’s context, 
providing individuals with “the security and latitude they need to perform” (p. 51) 
allowing actors individual freedoms rather than exercising formal authority to enable 
ambidexterity. The study found that in order to create a social support system that 
empowered actors with the freedom to direct their behaviors to perform 
ambidextrously, the organization had to establish parameters in which soft elements 
could be exercised in a manner conducive to the new ambidextrous context in which 
is sought to establish. In other words, the soft elements were conditioned by a new set 
of cultural parameters redefined by the RISE change team in order to ensure that the 
freedoms and latitude exercised by actors adhered to supporting and emphasizing 
scientific research alongside operational routines, and did not fall back into the 
program’s traditional dominant logic and emphasis of engineering capabilities.  
Furthermore, the findings highlight the role of language and vernacular as a 
supporting mechanism in accommodating an ambidextrous strategy. However, the 
significance of language and reconfiguring it in the context of ambidexterity is 
underexplored in literature. This opens the door for further study as to the role of 
language and its impact in an environment in which exploration and exploitation must 
coexist and yet where terminology of processes has held different meaning. What is 
the cognitive impact? The significance of discourse in generating an ambidextrous 
environment – significance of deconstructing and configuring discourse for discourse 
simultaneously forms part of the structural and contextual fabric of the organization. 
It forms part of the structural element in that the formal systems and processes 
engaged in establishing ambidexterity take on a different form and different meaning. 
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And in terms of the contextual element, language forms a part of the intersubjective 
experience and mindset of the employees and in changing vernacular the cultural 
mindset may be impacted.  Learning to become ambidextrous requires a new way of 
thinking, behaving and speaking.  
 
Context-reshaping dynamic capability (C) 
The third core concept, represented as (C) in figure 2, refers to the dynamic 
context reshaping capability that influenced and shaped the solutions pursued by the 
unit.   
The dynamics capabilities perspective contends “the key to ambidexterity is 
the ability of the organization to sense and seize new opportunities through 
simultaneous exploration and exploitation” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013: 238), a 
capability they contend rests critically with leadership. However, this study recasts the 
role of middle managers in the strategy process, in relation to organizational 
ambidexterity, and highlights their role in not only executing the strategy but in 
designing and developing the approach to effectively manage exploration and 
exploitation simultaneously. The ISS case demonstrates the key role of middle 
managers in contriving cross-boundary contextual integration and reshaping the 
program’s soft and hard organizational features which was critical to forging the fused 
differentiation-integration approach employed by the ISS in managing engineering and 
science ambidextrously.  
The research study contained within extends our understanding of dynamic 
capabilities and dynamic managerial capabilities as features demonstrable by middle 
managers and the significance this can have on shaping and enabling the effective 
operation of exploration and exploitation. By strategizing from the middle, the ISS 
program overcame the constraints of cognitive distance and dissonance, highlighting 
the significance of middle managers in reducing strategy ambiguity and their 
contribution to designing and translating an ambidextrous strategy into reality on the 
ground by virtue of the insights they gain from their structural position (Wooldridge et 
al, 2008). Thus, middle managers can play a central role in facilitating ambidexterity 
and reshaping internal processes, systems and context.  
 Another important feature associated with the hybrid mode is the informal 
organization – namely the knowledge and skills developed as a consequence of 
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informal network relations and the use of unconventional structures and practices. 
The application of informal processes and structures present within the case study 
highlights its significance for organizational and strategic routines (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000). It also suggests the informal organization is an enabling mechanism in 
crafting a hybrid fused approach to ambidexterity. Thus, the findings contribute to 
broadening our understanding of the significance of unconventional practices, and the 
informal organization more broadly speaking, as an enabling mechanism contributing 
to the manifestation of dynamic capabilities in unconventional setups. 
Similarly, the role and influence of executive managers and top management 
teams on ambidexterity has been studied. Relatively little has been demonstrated from 
a ‘middle management perspective’ (Wooldridge et al, 2008) regarding the role and 
influence of mid-level managers in managing and orchestrating exploitation and 
exploration towards ambidexterity. It emerged that middle managers play a critical role 
in initiating, designing and driving the shape of this hybrid mode to ambidexterity, and 
what’s more, the micro-processes of dynamic capabilities – sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring (Teece, 2007) – were found to reside in and be enacted by middle 
managers. It emerged that what enabled these dynamic capability traits to manifest at 
the middle management level was (1) bidirectional cognitive dissonance between 
senior management and ground level staff, and (2) the deliberate engagement of 
unconventional informal practices endorsed by the senior director. The study 
contributes insights into the managerial capability to achieve ambidexterity, 
highlighting the significance of middle managers not only in its initiation, as conferred 
by Zimmermann et al (2015), but also in its direct design, formulation and 
implementation. Secondly, the research case contributes to our understanding of 
where dynamic capabilities can be held in an organization by extending our 
understanding of how ‘reconfiguring’, by virtue of context shaping capabilities 
(Birkinshaw et al, 2016), can occur at organizational levels beyond senior management. 
 
Avenues for future research  
This paper’s findings open avenues for further research but herein I briefly 
focus on two that appear to be most promising. Firstly, it demonstrates the dynamism 
that occurs in the exploration-exploitation tension and how this conditions the 
approach an organization or unit takes in managing the tension. The analysis helps us 
understand some of the drivers for the dynamism that occurs between these two 
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dimensions, and provides an empirical demonstration of how it plays out in reality. 
However, it would be useful to expand our understanding of the dynamism, its drivers 
and the organizational contexts in which it arises and the areas in which it does not.   
Furthermore, studies could examine other organizational tensions to see if this 
oscillating dynamism between the two dimensions is a condition experienced beyond 
the exploration-exploitation tension, and what motivates and underpins the dynamics 
in these tensions.  
Secondly, the study explores how different approaches to ambidexterity can be 
fused and used interrelatedly, however, existing research is limited in looking at the 
interrelations between different approaches and how differentiation and integration 
modes can be engaged harmoniously within an organization. Thus, there is value in 
exploring how different organizations may utilize and combine seemingly 
incompatible approaches and attributes harmoniously. To further this research one 
could include a comparative examination of the differences in approaches taken by 
various organizations, the features shaping their chosen approach and the effect it has 
on their ambidextrous performance.  
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Chapter Three 
 
 
 
The practice of circumventing: interaction 
of the formal and informal organization as 
a dynamic capability 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizational ambidexterity is allied with the dynamic capabilities concept 
(Birkinshaw, Zimmermann and Raisch, 2016; Carter, 2015; Jansen et al, 2009b; Jurksiene and 
Pundziene, 2016; Lee and Rha, 2016; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). Both concepts pertain to 
an organization’s ability to adapt to perform competitively within a rapidly changing 
environment, and centers on aligning internal and external firm specific competencies and 
routines with changes in its environment (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). The ability to 
explore new opportunities and exploit existing capabilities ambidextrously is central to an 
organization’s adaptive process for it requires they exercise the ability to reconfigure 
structures, processes and competences in line with environmental changes (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008; 2011). Hence, dynamic capabilities constitute the “distinct skills, processes, 
procedures, organizational structures, decision rules and disciplines that enable the senior 
leaders of a firm to identify threats and opportunities and to reconfigure assets to meet 
these” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008: 189). The dynamic capabilities perspective on 
ambidexterity emphasizes the role of strategic leadership in orchestrating organizational 
structure, culture and processes to facilitate the dual pursuit of exploration and exploitation 
(O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). Thus, central to the concept of dynamic capabilities and 
ambidexterity is the organizational ability for change and adaptation to accommodate 
exploration and exploitation activities.   
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Within literature, studies on the pathways to ambidexterity (i.e. the simultaneous 
pursuit of exploration and exploitation) are broadly dominated by the structural and 
contextual approaches and explicitly refer to formal organizational mechanisms such as 
structure, processes, systems and a deliberately designed cultural environment, as the 
vehicles enabling the organization to orientate towards pursuing exploration and exploitation 
simultaneously.  Researchers largely contend that senior management’s ability to devise or 
reposition these formal organizational elements are a central feature to achieving 
ambidexterity. Implicit, however, in the conceptualization of contextual ambidexterity is the 
notion that the informal organization plays a supporting role in enabling individuals to 
satisfy the dual demands of exploration and exploitation (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).  
The importance of the informal organization in strategy making is becoming widely 
recognized (Chakravarthy et al, 2003; McEvily, Soda and Tortoriello, 2014; Mintzberg 1979), 
and research on the dynamics of ambidexterity has begun to explore the interplay between 
the formal and informal organization and how this interaction can engender ambidexterity 
within an organization (Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Soda and Zaheer, 2012). In defining the 
informal organization this paper refers to it as ‘the emergent patterns of individual behavior 
and interactions between individuals, as well as the norms, values and beliefs that underlie 
such behaviors and interactions’ (Gulati and Puranam, 2009: 427). Within the strategy 
process literature, scholars have developed integrative frameworks that offer explicit 
recognition to the role of the informal organization on strategic decisions and actions 
(Burgelman, 1983; Chakravarthy and White, 2002).  
Although the informal organization is said to define the daily work routines and 
knowledge flows that are fundamental to an organization’s operations and productive 
performance (Nickerson and Zenger, 2002), exploration of the role of informal 
organizational practices in the context of ambidexterity and its interaction with formal 
organizational elements is limited within management literature. There is a gap in our 
understanding of how formal and informal organizational elements interact and even 
combine giving rise to unexpected arrangements and/or processes that influence an 
organization’s pursuit of ambidexterity (Gulati and Puranam, 2009).  Less is known about 
informal organizational practices as a dynamic capability mechanism or routine which may 
support an organization’s adaptation process. Furthermore, the emphasis in dynamic 
capabilities theory and research has been on the ability of managerial actors, and little 
attention has been given to the role and capacity of non-managerial actors and their potential 
to exercise and contribute to the manifestation of dynamic capabilities.  I would argue that 
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there is an inherent benefit in examining the informal organization during an organization’s 
transition as it can shed light into how informal practices interact with and influence formal 
elements, and vice versa (Nohria and Gulati, 1994); and, also contributes to understanding 
the practical realities and complexity that arise in promoting exploration and exploitation 
activities when seeking to become ambidextrous.  
This study adopts a strategy-as-practice (SAP) approach as it seeks to address the 
question “how do emergent informal practices interact with formal organizational elements, and vice-versa, 
to engender ambidexterity, and does this interaction play a role in contributing towards the organization’s 
dynamic capabilities?” A strategy-as-practice (SAP) approach suits an examination of how 
informal elements interact with the formal organization to promote exploration and 
exploitation activities. The practice perspective focuses on what members of an organization 
‘actually do’ (Jarzabkowski, Balogun and Seidl, 2007; Whittington, 2003), studying the 
processes, practices and social activities that embody the organization (Golsorkhi et al., 
2010). DeKeyser (2007) explains that practice involves specific activities that individuals 
deliberately engage in with the intention of achieving a goal. In the context of organizations, 
it signifies the activities of organizational members and is essential for the ongoing 
operations of organizations (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). As such, it recognizes the 
significance of actors and their actions, as well as the broader organizational context of the 
organization in which they function (Schatzki, 2005; Whittington, 2006).  
To address this question, an ethnographic examination of an established organization 
in the process of transitioning from a focus strategy to an ambidextrous one was conducted. 
Rich qualitative data (Geertz, 1973) was gathered concerning the practices and activities 
enacted by the informal organization whilst adapting to an ambidextrous strategy. Using a 
grounded theory approach the study identifies an emergent informal practice, which I refer 
to as the practice of circumventing (POC), and represents an unconventional means of supporting 
change by actively promoting exploration and exploitation activities. This paper defines POC 
as: the deliberate side-step or jump-over either a formal process, elements within a process, 
or layers of hierarchy with the intention of achieving change in support of the strategic 
ambidextrous objective. POC constitutes a set of actions, borne out of the interaction 
between formal and informal organizational elements. It is important to note that this paper 
observes the distinction between the terms practice and practices (Jarzabkowski, 2003; 
Whittington, 2006). References to POC relate specifically to the actual informal activity of 
people ‘in practice’ – what they do and how they do it (Whittington, 2006). This study 
advances our understanding for it empirically analyses and gives explicit attention to an 
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underexplored area by examining the role of the informal organization in the adaptive 
process of becoming ambidextrous. It also provides an opportunity to explore in practice the 
dynamics between formal and informal organizational elements and its consequential role in 
dynamic capabilities, something existing literature has given little attention to. Such an 
investigation is important since the informal organization constitutes to a large extent the 
actual practices, knowledge flows and relations that determine the way an organization 
functions day-to-day; it has inherent implications for strategy implementation, organizational 
change, and the related mechanisms and outcomes.  
This study contributes to our understanding in two ways. Firstly, it provides insights 
into organizing and strategizing (Whittington and Melin, 2003) in practice by elaborating 
how elements of the informal organization, through emergent enacted practices, interact 
with and influence elements of the formal organizational. Secondly, it develops a perspective 
on how through this interaction informal practices have a dynamic capabilities role and can 
promote exploration and exploitation activities and, under certain circumstances, can enable 
long-term change. The research identifies the existence of strategic goal attachment in line 
with the formal strategy within the informal organization and finds that a lack of strategy 
specification creates a context in which the informal practice of POC is enacted. In addition, 
the study finds that the informal organization through POC provides an unconventional 
flexible solution to perceived weaknesses within the formal organization inhibiting its goal 
for ambidexterity. Furthermore, the outcomes of POC was found to be mixed but, under 
certain conditions of high formal authority and informal status, it has the potential to 
provoke the reconfiguration of resources and engender long-term change in features of the 
formal organization. This demonstrates that the mode of interaction between the formal and 
informal can go beyond the supporting and compensatory fit models (Gulati and Puranam, 
2009) conceptualized in existing literature. The findings also suggest that the practice of 
circumventing is a form of proactive behavior, namely positive deviance, actioned by the 
informal organization whose performative outcomes may contribute to the organization’s 
operational and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997).  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The theoretical foundations underlying this study stem from the fields of strategic 
management and organizational behavior. Firstly, the study draws from the dynamic 
capabilities and organizational ambidexterity research, which implicitly acknowledges the role 
of the informal organization in conceptual terms, yet has done little to empirically examine 
or theoretically enrich it.  Secondly, it draws attention to the interaction between the formal 
and informal organization, and its interactive influence on outcomes and behavior.  
 
Dynamic Capabilities Perspective and Organizational Ambidexterity  
The dynamic capabilities perspective has been highly influential in ambidexterity 
research, and studies have sought to integrate the two concepts (Čirjevskis, 2016; Lee and 
Rha, 2016; Harreld, O’Reilly and Tushman, 2007; Vahlne and Jonsson, 2017). Dynamic 
capabilities are said to be “at the heart” of an organization’s ability to be ambidextrous 
(O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008: 190). Some scholars emphasize the existence of a set of 
universally effective dynamic capabilities applicable across organizations (Teece, 2007; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), whilst others argue that dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic 
and are therefore contingent upon and conditioned by the context in which they operate 
(Birkinshaw et al, 2016; Winter, 2003). Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) define dynamic 
capabilities in terms of competencies that generate an alignment with a shifting environment 
and refer to it as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address rapidly changing environments” (p. 516). While Helfat et al (2007) 
emphasizes the augmentation of an organization’s resource base, referring to “the capacity of 
an organization to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base” (p.4), where the 
term ‘resource base’ comprises of “tangible, intangible, and human assets (or resources) as 
well as capabilities which the organization owns, controls, or has access to on a preferential 
basis” (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009: 94). Importantly, Teece (2016) emphasize that an 
organization’s dynamic capabilities direct how it “integrates, builds and reconfigures internal 
and external competencies” as it attends to changes in its environment (p. 18).  
Ambidexterity is itself classified as a dynamic capability for it “embodies a complex 
set of routines including decentralization, differentiation, targeted integration, and the ability 
of senior leadership to orchestrate the complex trade-offs that the simultaneous pursuit of 
exploration and exploitation requires” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2011: 6). This paper adopts 
March (1991) definition of ambidexterity as an organization’s ability to simultaneously 
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pursue exploration including “search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, innovation” and exploitation involving “refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, execution” (March, 1991, p.71).  
According to Teece (2007, 2012, 2016) the necessary organizational processes that 
constitute dynamic capabilities can be categorized as the ability to: (1) sense and identify 
opportunities, trends and threats in the changing environment, (2) seize the identified 
opportunities and threats by mobilizing resources to execute possible chosen actions, (3) 
reconfigure resources, be it through integration or enhancements, to transform the 
organization in alignment to the changing environment and generate continual renewal of 
core competences (Teece, 2007; Teece et al, 1997). Correspondingly, O’Reilly and Tushman 
(2008) contend that these processes – sensing, seizing and reconfiguring - are necessary if 
ambidexterity is to be successful. These three processes or capacities are underpinned by 
what Teece (2007) refers to as the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. These 
microfoundations are deemed to be “distinct skills, processes, procedures, organizational 
structures, decision rules, and disciplines” (p. 1319), and as a framework captures a host of 
embedded managerial and organizational elements that provide for and enable dynamic 
capabilities and generate change.  Arguably, these embedded managerial and organizational 
elements are features, processes and structures pertaining to the formal organization as well 
as the informal organization and therefore in studying and elucidating these dimensions we 
can hope to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of dynamic capabilities and their 
micro-foundations. Furthermore, extant literature gives little attention to whether the 
informal organization has the potential to contribute to dynamic capabilities or its 
underpinning micro-foundations and how such a development may transpire. Though extant 
literature makes no explicit distinction as to whether the micro foundational elements of 
dynamic capabilities are formally designed and operated mechanisms or informal, unofficial 
and non-directed, this ambiguity does not exclude the possibility that the informal 
organization and informal practices can contribute to and play a micro-foundational role in 
dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity.  
 
 
The Formal and Informal Organization 
Since its early development, management theory concedes that an organization’s 
function consists of more than the formally prescribed rules, structures and official network 
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ties to which it conforms. Its official blueprint does not fully determine the everyday 
practices and social relations of an organization (Blau and Scott, 1963). Everyday operations 
are driven by the informal organization, patterns of interactions between employees that 
deviate from formal prescriptions, structures and norms underpinning these interactions 
(Gulati and Puranam, 2009). However, current research has tended to focus on examining 
the formal organization and/or the informal organization in isolation, focusing on one 
dimension exclusive of the influence of the other. Seldom has the interaction between the 
formal and informal organization been examined empirically from a practice perspective, 
particularly within ambidexterity literature; nor have its implications on actor performance 
been expounded upon (Soda and Zaheer, 2012).  Very few studies explicitly account for the 
interaction between formal and informal organizational components and its role in 
engendering ambidexterity (Gulati and Puranam, 2009); and its effect on the performance of 
individuals (Kleinbaum, Stuart, Tushman, 2013; Soda and Zaheer, 2012), however, gaps 
remain in our understanding. First, we lack a practice based understanding on the nature of 
the interaction between the formal and informal organization, its influence during the 
implementation of an ambidextrous strategy; and the potential strategic performance 
outcomes.   
To examine the interaction between the formal and informal organization in the 
context of ambidexterity, it is first necessary to define the terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
organization as they relate to this research paper. 
 
Defining the formal and informal organization 
The distinctive characteristics delimiting the formal and informal organization 
remains a matter of intellectual ambiguity. Within management and organizational theory, 
the formal and informal organization are recognized as distinct co-existing systems. Some 
scholars structurally describe the formal and informal organization as “opposing poles of a 
duality” (Hunter, 2016; Gulati and Puranam, 2009), suggesting the dimensions exist in a state 
of tension and conflict. Douglas (1988) notes that these two systems (the formal and 
informal) have been presented within literature as being mutually exclusive and fragmented. 
However, reality indicates that organizations do not solely exist in one dimension but rather 
within the intersection, where the formal and informal overlap (McEvily et al, 2014), and 
thus represent complementary engaged dimensions (Skivington and Daft, 1991).  In Penny’s 
(1967) study of informal social relations the author proposes that the formal and informal 
organization should be looked upon as dimensions of organizational behavior which exist 
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and are defined by different “degrees of formalization” (p, 271). This perception of formal and 
informal organizational dimensions connotes blurred boundaries and grey zones where the 
limits of the formal and informal organization are indistinct and exist on a graduating scale. 
This implies that there is variability in interaction of the formal and informal organization 
with “a variety of combinations that affect each other in important ways” (McEvily et al, 
2014: 302). For example, in Biancani, McFarland and Dahlander’s (2014) study, the authors 
propose another unconsidered structural dimension, the semi-formal organization. This 
occupies “a plane intermediate between the formal and the informal” (p. 1307) and signifies 
a third dimension that extends beyond the general terms of the formal and informal 
organization. However, Biancani et al’s (2014) study is limited in expanding our 
understanding of the interplay between the formal, semi-formal and informal dimensions as 
its empirical focus intentionally omits the informal organization. Consequently, this 
highlights the difficulty in separating the formal and informal in action (Morey and Luthans, 
1991), for “neither the formal nor the informal can be more important than the other, as 
they are mutually dependent” (Morey and Luthans, 1991: 599). Recognizing that both the 
formal and informal are functionally co-dependent, for the purpose of analysis, this paper 
follows suit with Morey and Luthans (1991) in artificially separating the formal and informal, 
referring to them as distinct terms.  
Conceptually, these dimensions have been categorized in various ways, from 
structural and interpersonal process views (Noble, 1999b), to hard and soft factors (Yang et 
al., 2010), framework and process modalities (Skivington and Daft, 1991), and behavioral 
factors (Noble and Mokwa, 1999), each referring to nuanced components of formal and 
informal organizational dimensions. The formal organization refers to the established 
structures and processes, official rules, procedures and communication channels for 
operating (Blau and Scott, 1963; Penny, 1967). Designed by management, the formal 
organization sets what Scott (1981) calls the “blueprint for behaviors” (p. 82). The formal 
organization connotes authority-responsible relationships, organizational structure and 
design and chain of command. A behavioral perspective where roles and social systems 
spanning across the organization are prescribed based upon institutional rules that govern 
systems, procedures, structures and administrative controls (Daft and Mackintosh, 1984; 
Gupta, 1987), in addition to resource allocation and employee job roles. Douglas (1988) 
refers to structural relationships as a component of the formal organization, associating it 
with chain of command and authority-responsible relationships. Similarly, Diefenbach and 
Sillince (2011) focus on hierarchy and differentiate between its formal and informal character 
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– “between the official structures and rules allocating formal roles and positions at different 
levels and unofficial stratification among members of a social system because of conscious 
or unconscious social processes” (p. 1516). These designed formal structures are not a full 
indication of the actual routines, knowledge flows or the practicalities that operationally 
govern an organization. Blau and Scott (1962) contend that an examination of the informal 
organization and the relations it encompasses is of critical importance if we are to 
understand the formal organization and the processes and practices within it. Nevertheless, 
the informal organization has received comparatively less attention from practitioners and 
research scholars (Morey and Luthans, 1991).  
In contemplating how an organization confronts the dual demands of exploration 
and exploitation activities simultaneously, the structural antecedents to ambidexterity 
concentrate primarily on an organization’s functional design and centers primarily on the 
deliberate configuration of organizational elements devised by management (Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008). For example, structural and dynamic ambidexterity emphasize 
differentiating structural mechanisms to engender exploration and exploitation activities to 
be performed either simultaneously or sequentially. Ambidexterity theory maintains that 
such structural solutions create and are sustained by distinct processes, operating logics, 
control systems, and cultures designed and steered by senior leadership specific to the 
requirements for exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). Furthermore, 
exploitation is associated with “mechanistic structures, tightly coupled 
systems…routinization, control and bureaucracy” (He and Wong, 2004: 481), features that 
resemble the designed mechanistic blue print of the formal organization.  However, the 
structural solutions to ambidexterity largely ignore the role of the informal organization, how 
it engages with formal organizational mechanisms and its significance.   
 
Scholars have equated the informal organization to various elements and the 
proliferation of terms adds to the complexity of the concept, but studies have tended to 
emphasize certain aspects. Friedrichs (2015) notes that the proliferation of elements studied 
as part of the informal organization highlights its multidimensionality. The informal 
organization has been referred to in terms of unofficial social ties (Blau and Scott, 1962; 
Penny, 1967), group dynamics (Caldwell, 1956), informal networks of employee relationships 
(Krackhardt and Hanson, 1993; McEvily et al, 2014), social systems of interconnected 
patterns of behaviors (Fulmer and Ostroff, 2016), and peer groups whose actions are 
influenced by shared motives and loyalty (Biancani et al., 2014; Cooley, 1956). Other 
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researchers have equated the informal organization to the shared norms, beliefs and values 
(Gulati and Puranam, 2009), behaviors, attitudes and discourse/communication systems 
(Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011), forms of power (non-positional), and social relations 
(Douglas, 1988). Researchers suggest that exploration is associated with “organic structures, 
loosely coupled systems, path breaking, improvisation” (He and Wong, 2004: 481), features 
that would appear to correspond with qualities in the informal organization. 
In relation to organizational ambidexterity, contextual ambidexterity speaks of a 
behavioral orientation whereby individual actors determine for themselves how they divide 
their time between exploration and exploitation orientated activities (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Individual empowerment is deemed to be a direct result of a context 
intentionally crafted by an organization’s management, suggesting that contextual 
development is a formal strategic activity ordained by leadership. In distinguishing the 
informal organization from the formal McEvily et al (2014) refer to the “locus of decision 
rights” as a key feature. The authors explain, “whereas formal organization concentrates 
interaction decision rights in a limited number of roles (typically leaders, managers, or 
supervisors charged with directing the activities of others), in informal social networks those 
rights are dispersed to and shared among the actors themselves who are engaging in the 
interactions” (McEvily et al (2014: 305).  Extending this line of argument to ambidexterity, it 
suggests that the contextual approach implicitly harnesses the informal organization, and that 
the informal organization may be a vehicle enabling the achievement of ambidexterity.  
McConkie and Boss (1986) explain that everyday routine tools exist in the informal 
organization which enable it to create a change of climate, suggesting that “many mundane, 
everyday tools already exist in the organization at the informal level which can be used to 
create a climate of change…to change an organization in an enduring way, one must move 
not only the formal but the informal portions of the organization” (McConkie and Boss, 
1986: 203). In emphasizing the informal organization’s capacity to bring lasting change, this 
stance, in the broadest sense reflects the dynamic capabilities concept for it can be seen as an 
organizational device with the capacity to change to an organization’s resource base 
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). Helfat and Peteraf (2003) emphasize that to qualify as a 
dynamic capability it not only needs to change the resource base, but it also needs to be 
embedded in the firm, and ultimately be repeatable. Arguably, this conception of dynamic 
capabilities can be seen to reflect the informal organization. The inherent nature of the 
informal organization means that this feature is idiosyncratic and embedded within the 
organization in which it exists, and as an everyday routine tool the informal organization is 
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embodied in the repeatable actions, relations and interactions of an organization and its 
members. Furthermore, with organizations becoming increasingly complex, McConkie and 
Boss (1986) contend that an organization’s approach to change also needs to reflect and 
accommodate this complexity, meaning accounting for the informal as a mechanism of 
change, if it is to be successful.  
Whilst the co-existence of the formal and informal organization has long been 
recognized in sociology studies and by organization management scholars (Blau and Scott, 
1963; Caldwell, 1956; Roethlisberger and Dickinson, 1939), research has begun to take a 
holistic approach looking at the interplay between formal and informal organizational 
components and the extent to which their organizational architecture complements or 
supplements the other to influence organizational or individual performance (Gulati and 
Puranam, 2009; Soda and Zaheer, 2012; Zenger, Lazzarini and Poppo, 2002). This paper 
departs from earlier works by going beyond the architectural elements of the formal (i.e. 
structure and hierarchal relations) (Chen, 2002; Gulati and Puranam, 2009) and informal 
organization (i.e. social network ties) (Biancani, McFarland and Dahlander, 2014; Krackhardt 
and Hanson, 1993; Soda and Zaheer, 2012). Moreover, by adopting a practice perspective, 
the study aims to capture the performative actions and behavior, praxis (Whittington, 2002; 
2006), of the informal organization and its interaction with the formal organization mapped 
by cultural norms, rules (Meyer and Rowen, 1977) and scripted behavior and practices 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997), whilst it seeks to implement an ambidextrous strategy. 
The strategy-as-practice (SAP) perspective focuses on the everyday activity of what 
people do and spurs an interest in the micro-activities of practitioners involved in the 
making and doing of strategy (Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 2003). Although this 
approach focuses on the role of formal strategic practices (Jarzabkowski, 2003; Whittington, 
2003), it recognizes the informal as part of praxis (Macintosh, Maclean and Seidl, 2010). One 
can therefore argue that an SAP approach is appropriate to helping us understand the 
interplay between the formal and informal organization and its practices as engaged by 
practitioners during the strategic implementation of ambidexterity. The SAP perspective 
supports the exploration of patterns and actions in relation to the informal organization 
considering individual practices in context to the broader organizational environment.  
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Interaction of the formal and informal organization 
An accepted premise in literature proposes that the structures, systems and processes 
that constitute the formal and informal organization influence one another (Dalton, 1959; 
Khandwalla, 1973; Mintzberg, 1979; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). Nevertheless, very few 
empirical studies examine how this interaction manifests in practice. McEvily, Soda and 
Tortoriello (2014) review of extant literature on formal organization and informal social 
structures highlights that studies have generally given limited attention to the interplay 
between these two dimensions.  
Within strategy process literature, discussion defining the informal organization is 
limited and there is a gap in exploring the broader scope and practices of the informal 
organization within strategy process literature. Furthermore, there is little research that 
explicitly explores the influence of the informal organization, in terms of informal practices, 
on organizational activities or how it interacts with the formal organization in practice to 
influence the strategy process (Marx and Lechner, 2005). Chakravarthy et al. (2003) 
framework depicts the influence of organizational context, defined as management systems 
and the informal organization, on what the authors identify as the two core elements of the 
strategy process – decisions and actions. However, while the model recognizes the 
coexistence and complementary nature of the formal and informal organization, it does not 
provide further detail into the interaction between the two dimensions or the effect this 
interaction could have on the strategy process. In another study, Diefenbach and Sillince 
(2011) analysis of various organization typologies (i.e. bureaucratic/orthodox, professional, 
representative democratic, hybrid and network), and the nature of the formal and informal 
within these arrangements provides a nuanced perspective, emphasizing what McEvily et al 
(2014) refer to as a reciprocal influence. Diefenbach and Sillince (2011) propose that formal 
and informal hierarchical structures and processes exist, and the degree of influence one has 
on the other varies depending on the type of organization and the nature of the relationship 
between them. The authors conclude that the relationship between formal and informal 
elements is not static or universally consistent but fluid, existing across a graduating 
spectrum; “it seems that whenever formal hierarchy decreases, informal hierarchy increases…constitutes 
a continuum of dynamic relationships of formal and informal hierarchy” (Diefenbach and 
Sillince, 2011: 1530. Italics copied from original text). Although Diefenbach and Sillince 
(2011) focus primarily of the relations between formal and informal hierarchy their 
perspective of the dynamic relationship between formal and informal organizational 
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elements corresponds with the definitional view of the formal and informal as graduating 
degrees rather than static organizational states.  
Thus, in exploring the dynamic between the formal and informal, we can deepen our 
understanding of the complex internal constitution of organizations and the realities of 
enacted practices that influence strategic outcomes.   
 
Primacy of the formal organization and its interaction with the informal organization 
The assumption traditionally held in the literature posits that the formal organization 
influences and shapes the form of the informal organization (Dalton, 1959). Thus, changes 
in the formal organization also cause changes in the informal organization. This resonates 
with McEvily et al’s (2014) research categorization of the formal organization as contouring 
and determining the boundaries of the informal. Utilizing Krackhardt’s graph theoretical 
dimensions of the informal structure, Hunter (2016) analyzes relations between formal 
structure (i.e. span-of-control and levels of hierarchy) and informal networks (i.e. trust 
networks and advice networks respectively). Hunter (2016) concludes that hierarchal 
position in the formal structure influences the formation of ties between individuals within 
the informal network. Likewise, King and Nembhard (2017) study on the interplay of the 
formal and informal organization shares Diefenbach and Sillince (2011) hierarchical 
interpretation of both dimensions. Analyzing 12 community health centers, the study looks 
at how the network structure and group interactions of members formally positioned in the 
middle of the hierarchy alters when they receive an expansion of power as a result of change 
in a formal role. King and Nembhard (2017) find expansion of power for those 
hierarchically positioned in the middle has a mixed effect on the informal organization. On 
the one hand the formal organization has a positive effect on the informal by reducing 
relational inertia – “holding onto existing relations and relationships, often undermines 
formal organizational change efforts” (King and Nembhard, 2017: 1252). However, formal 
role-power expansion also has a negative effect by inducing combative informal interactions 
through the escalation of status conflicts.  
Burgelman’s (1983) model of strategic behavior highlights management’s ability to 
manipulate the structural context as a way of controlling behavior and keeping it in line with 
its strategic intentions and identity. This is reflective of the formal organization used as a 
mechanism by management to influence Burgelman’s concept of the strategic context, which 
can be said to resemble the informal organization. Nickerson and Zenger (2002:552) speak 
of “pegs” provided by the formal organization around which the informal organization is 
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organized and augmented, however, they do not specify what these “pegs” are or how they, 
as a mechanism, come to augment the informal. The authors contend that the informal 
organization is contingent on the rules, and cultural norms of the formal organization and so 
shapes and determines how the characteristics of the informal organization are perceived, for 
“formal structure is therefore a mechanism through which the informal organization can be 
shaped” (Nickerson and Zenger, 2002: 551). Under this general premise the informal 
organization may be considered as influenced by the formal organization, suggesting that the 
source of change emerges from the formal organization. On this Gulati and Puranam (2009) 
explain that the formal structural mechanisms of grouping and linking (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1997) influence the shape of the informal organization by specifying vertical and 
horizontal communications and interactions between individuals. Arguably, these 
communication channels are task orientated and revolve first and foremost around the roles 
and responsibilities of those involved.  This differs from the informal social structures and 
relational channels attended to the role of the informal organization. Schein’s (1965) view 
denotes the informal to be an output of the formal stating “(informal) relationships tend to 
arise in all formal organizations” (p.9), that “formal organizations tend to breed informal 
organizations within them” (p.27. Cited in Penny, 1967: 271). In reference to the stream of 
influence this perspective gives primacy to the formal organization over the informal as 
shaping and directing the latter.  
 
Primacy of the informal organization and its interaction with the formal organization 
An alternative proposition observes and emphasizes the informal organization 
(McEvily et al, 2014). It also suggests that informal networks emerge and act in response to 
shortcomings of the formal organization in addressing a specific issue (Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2002; Simon, 1957), thereby implying that the informal network can problem solve 
and accomplish results unachievable by the formal, and as an organizational mechanism can 
enhance member performance. Chakravarthy and White (2002) theorize that the informal 
organization is an important lever able to engender change in the organization but note that 
there is a gap in our understanding of its role. In this regard, informal behaviors exhibited by 
actors are aligned with Burgelman’s (1983) concept of autonomous strategic behavior which 
sits outside the organization’s structural context and has the capacity to “escape the effects 
of the structural context” (p. 67).  
Friedrichs (2015) also contends that “the informal organization not only determines 
the functionality of formal organizational elements but also affects psychological and 
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personal aspects of employees… On the other hand, employees are urged to re-define 
formal prescriptions and to improvise in unprecedented situations when the formal 
organization gives no or unsatisfactory answers, and to provide innovative behavior. 
Therefore, the informal organization is an inevitable firm feature” (p. 3). Similarly, Aalbers, 
Dolfsma and Koppius (2004) suggest that the informal organization has the potential to 
bypass, and even undermine, the communication structure within the formal organization. 
Although they make specific reference to communication structure and the informal 
organization’s influence over the formal in this regard, they lay ground to the prospect that 
the informal organization has the potential to bypass other organizational structures beyond 
communication (ibid.). Krackhardt and Hanson (2000) advance this argument suggesting 
that in bypassing formal organizational elements, the informal organization operates as an 
autonomous mechanism that can enhance individual and firm performance. The authors 
comments that “designed to facilitate standard modes of production, the formal 
organization is set up to handle easily anticipated problems. But when unexpected problems 
arise, the informal organization kicks in. Its complex webs of social ties form every time 
colleagues communicate and solidify over time into surprisingly stable networks. Highly 
adaptive, informal networks move diagonally and elliptically, skipping entire functions to get 
work done” (Krackhardt and Hanson, 2000: 104). In this regard, the informal organization 
provides a mechanism for flexibility, adaptability and experimentation in a manner 
unavailable through the strict structures and procedures directed by the formal organization.  
An example of the skipping, bypassing behavior purported by Krackhardt and 
Hanson (2000) has been studied in communication and psychological behavior literature on 
employee dissent under the term: circumvention. Kassing (2007) explains that 
“circumvention entails expressing one’s dissent to someone higher in the chain of command 
than one’s immediate superior” (p. 57), classifying it as an upward dissent communication 
move exercised by employees to share concerns about their supervisor’s performance 
capabilities. Viewing circumvention in the context of dissenting behavior, Garner (2015) 
argues that the status quo is challenged by the dissenter who perceives their own actions of 
circumvention to be in opposition to managerial expectations. This behavior contradicts the 
formal expected behaviors promoted within an organization which Warren (2003) refers to 
as formal norms (e.g. rules, procedures, codes of conduct); and is congruent with his 
categorization of informal norms- actual exhibited or repeated behavior. Therefore, 
circumvention has been viewed as illustrative, if not exemplary, behavior featured in the 
informal organization.  
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Table 6: Conceptualizing interaction between formal and informal organization  
– Organizational design perspective 
(A) Theoretical perspective Network perspective; individual performance
Defining formal 
organization
Defining informal 
organization
Overlapping of formal and informal
No-overlapping of formal and informal
Studies 
(B) Theoretical perspective Reorganization; organizational ambidexterity 
Defining formal 
organization
Defining informal 
organization
Compensatory 
Supplementary 
Studies 
Organizational design and architecture perspective: 
Normative social systems designed by managers and can be 
changed rapidly
Emerging pattern of internal social interactions within an 
organization (i.e. advice, gossip, informal conversations)
Modes of interaction 
(formal and informal 
organization)
 - Inconsistency exists between the  formal and informal 
organization with one element moving in a different direction to 
make up for weaknesses  in the other may be replicated
 - Consistency exists between formal and informal organization. 
Both elements move in the same direction and emphasize the 
same employee behaviors 
Gulati and Puranam (2009); Hannan (2003); Nickerson and 
Zenger (2002); Siggelkow (2002)
 - Degree to which consistency exists between the network 
architecture of the formal and informal organization. Ties across 
the formal and informal network may be replicated
 - Degree to which inconsistencies exist between the network 
architecture of the formal and informal organization. Ties across 
the formal and informal network are different
Soda and Zaheer (2012); Scott and Davis (2006); Miller (1992); 
Nadler et al (1997)
Pattern of advice and information relations between actors 
Formal workflow, structures, processes, roles
Modes of interaction 
(formal and informal 
organization)
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Table 7: Conceptualizing interaction between formal and informal organization  
– Behavioral perspective 
 
 
Interactive effect of the formal and informal organization on performative outcomes 
Strategic management studies examining the interplay between the formal and 
informal organization draw upon organizational design and architecture literatures. 
Underpinning these conceptualizations is the concept of consistency and the degree of 
organizational fit between elements of the formal and informal organization (Gulati and 
Puranam, 2009). The dynamic interactions under the scope of organization design and 
architecture are presented as dual dimensions, whereby the interaction is viewed in opposite 
directions (i.e. overlapping or non-overlapping). In characterizing the informal organization’s 
(A) Theoretical perspective Dissent strategies
Defining formal 
organization
Defining informal 
organization
Circumvention
Studies 
(B) Theoretical perspective Proactive behavior
Defining formal 
organization
Defining informal 
organization
Studies 
Behavioral
Governing ideas, procedures or policies assumed and followed by 
the majority
Individuals or a group in opposition to the governing ideas and 
policies
Bateman and Crant (1993); Bindl and Parker (2010); Fay and 
Frese (2001); Griffin et al (2007); Morrison and Phelps (1999); 
Parker, Bindl, Strauss (2010); Scott and Bruce (1994); Spreitzer 
and Sonenshein (2004)
 - Upward communication move where an employee expresses 
dissatisfaction to a superior above their immediate supervisor 
Modes of interaction 
(formal and informal 
organization)
Kassing (2000); (2002); (2007); (2008); (2009); (2011)
Behavior conforming to the current way of working and does not 
attempt to engage in or instigate change activity
An individual's way of behaving at work, shaped by individual 
differences and situational forces
Modes of interaction 
(formal and informal 
organization)
Personal Initiative / Taking charge / Employee voice / Individual 
innovation / positive deviance
- Self-directed and future-orientated action that aims to bring 
about change in a work related situation (e.g. introducing new 
work methods, influencing organizational strategy)
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influence upon a firm’s innovativeness, Friedrichs (2015) emphasizes the concept of 
consistency and inconsistency between the formal and informal organization. Studies 
highlight the informal organization as a complementary and supportive function to formal 
structures (Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Soda and Zaheer, 2012), indicating a united strategic 
orientation which serves to meet the organization’s strategic goals. In relation to 
ambidexterity, this line of argument would suggest that the informal organization has the 
capacity to facilitate and promote explorative activities given the assumption that the formal 
organization prescribes how existing activities are to be executed (exploitation activities). 
Kang et al (2017) assert that “an informal organization, defined as organizational routines 
supporting a formal organizational structure, cannot be modified as quickly as a formal 
organization structure” (p. 1357). However, in exploring the role of the formal and informal 
organization in relation to ambidexterity, Kang et al (2017) find that the informal 
organization provides for the temporal achievement of ambidexterity as the formal 
organization vacillates from exploration to exploitation because of its inertial lagged 
response to change, it possesses both exploration and exploitation characteristics as it 
undergoes the vacillating transition. I would therefore argue that extending this line of 
argumentation can help us broaden our understanding of the nature and influence of the 
informal organization on strategic activity.  
On the other hand, studies also demonstrate that inconsistency between the formal 
and informal can hold value and result in ambidextrous outcomes and increase individual 
performance (Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Soda and Zaheer, 2012). Notably, Schilling and 
Fang (2013) recognize that the informal organization also has the capacity to negatively 
affect an organization’s functioning, particularly when individuals engage in activities 
motivated by self-interest and agency. Table 6 summarizes the general conceptualizations of 
the organizational design perspective and the different terminology that has been used to 
describe the dynamic modes of interaction between the formal and informal organization, 
emphasizing different nuances and characteristics.  
 
The behavioral perspective draws on factors different to the organizational design 
stance and provides an alternative understanding of the modes of interaction between the 
formal and informal organization and its performative outcomes. Organizational behavior 
literature on dissent and proactivity gives different insights on behavioral modes of 
interaction between the formal and informal; expanding our understanding of the interaction 
and its manifestation in practice. Table 7 summarizes general conceptualizations of the 
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behavioral perspective on the interaction between the formal and informal organization. 
Literature on dissent and proactive behavior highlight practices and behaviors active in the 
informal organization that interact with and even seek to change features of the formal 
organization. Organizational dissent describes when one or more employees, for the good of 
the organization or for personal gain, explicitly disagree with current practice or policies 
(Garner, 2012; Kassing, 2011). When considered as a beneficial form of deviant behavior 
(Warren, 2003) the dissenter is one who deviates from organizational rules, procedures and 
workgroup norms, challenging the status quo, which they perceive to counter managerial 
expectations (Garner, 2015). Studies have shown that dissent can enable creative problem 
solving and individual creativity (De Dreu and West, 2001; Shahinpoor and Matt, 2007).  
Similarly, the broad and diverse literature on proactive behavior and initiative 
(Griffin, Neal and Parker, 2007; Morrison, 2011) has parallels with this study. Proactive 
behavior has been defined as “taking initiative in improving current circumstances or 
creating new ones; it involves challenging the status quo rather than passively adapting to 
present conditions” (Crant, 2000: 436); and has been linked conceptually and empirically to 
superior performance (Griffin et al., 2007). At the individual level studies found proactivity 
can lead to individuals performing more effectively in their jobs (Ashford and Black, 1996; 
Morrison, 1993), and at an organizational level it was found to predict positive financial 
performance (Aragón-Correa et al., 2008) and engender greater engagement in organizational 
activities (Aragón-Correa, 1998). Proactive behavior draws similarities to an underdeveloped 
area in organizational studies - positive deviance (Herington and van de Fliert, 2017). 
Spreitzer and Sonenshein (2004) define positive deviance as “intentional behaviors that 
significantly depart from the norms of a referent group in honorable ways” (p. 841), making 
it distinct from negative deviant behaviors that threaten an organization and its members. 
However, Vadera, Pratt and Mishra (2013) argue that constructs such as proactive behavior 
and positive deviance fall under the ‘umbrella term’ of constructive deviance and should to 
be examined integratively.  
Furthermore, research findings repeatedly show that organizational cultures and 
climates can foster or impede dissent and proactive behavior (Kassing, 2008; 2011). 
 
Organizational actors and their interaction with the formal and informal organization 
The formal and informal organization is composed of actors from multiple levels of 
the organization’s hierarchy. The interaction between the formal and informal organization is 
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dependent upon the actors who engage with these organizational elements and are the ones 
who enact practices that underpin the interaction, affecting the organization’s functionality 
and strategic change activity. Current literature in the field of strategy-as-practice, dynamic 
capabilities and ambidexterity primarily focus theoretically and empirically on the top 
management team (TMT) (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2011), and to a lesser extent the role of 
middle-level managerial actors (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984; Heracleous, 2000).  
However, empirical research has mostly neglected the role and potential influence of low-
level and non-managerial individuals and the practices they engage in when embedding 
strategic activity (Yang et al., 2010).  
Diefenbach and Sillince (2011) highlight the significance of organizational actors 
claiming that “much of the way in which the formal and the informal interact depends on 
the actual people involved, how they perceive and interpret the social situation they are in, 
how they act, how they continue to reflect on their social practices – and how this feeds back 
into the principles and mechanisms of the social system and contributes to its continuation, 
change or discontinuation” (p. 1533). The knowledge and experience employees possess to 
perform their routine tasks and fulfil official job responsibilities also simultaneously enables 
them to find ways around official channels. Diefenbach and Sillince (2011) explain “those 
who know the rules also know how to bend or bypass them, whom to approach if they want 
to get things done a certain way or whom and what to avoid if they do not want to do 
certain things” (p. 1521). It may not turn out explicitly positive for the individuals in the firm 
to deviate from formal prescriptions. They may do so with good intentions, but formal 
appreciation or sanctioning mechanisms may not honor the outcomes or may punish the 
deviations given that employees and managers “are held accountable to the map, not the 
road conditions” (Brown and  Duguid, 1991: 42). This has implications for the study of 
informality in firms, and our understanding of how actors engage with formal and informal 
organizational elements and the practices enacted by organizational actors.  
This paper contends that organizational practices that influence strategic activity are 
not constrained to the formal organization or formal strategic practices but can reside also 
within the informal organization. Figure 4 illustrates the framework of concepts pertinent to 
this study. For the informal relates to the actual enacted habits and behaviors of actors and 
these play an important role in determining an organization’s operational performance 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2002). By analyzing the organization through two dimensions – the 
formal and informal - this paper explicitly highlights the significance of the informal 
organization and its interaction with the formal organization, as a component that influences 
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strategic activity, ambidexterity, and is distinct yet related to the formal organization. 
Furthermore, it expands the conceptualization of organizational actors beyond the top 
management team to include actors across the organizational hierarchy in managerial and 
non-managerial levels. 
 
 
Figure 4: Framework of concepts 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Research Design 
This study’s grounded (Strauss, 1987), single-case approach (Yin, 2014) 
follows the tradition of rich in-depth case studies on the inner context of 
organizations in relation to their organizational structures, processes and social 
behaviors. Exemplar cases include Selznick’s (1949) seminal study of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) and the limitations of the formal organization and its 
structures; Pettigrew’s (1973) study on UK retailers Brian Michaels and changes in the 
distribution of power and status over time and its effect on decision-making; and 
Harreld, O’Reilly and Tushman’s (2007) study of IBM’s transformation to become a 
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leading global information-technology solutions service provider and its strategy 
execution.  
 This research approach allows for the study of complex phenomena in a real-
world context, helping to capture the interaction between the formal and informal 
organization during strategy implementation as it transpires within an organization 
transitioning towards ambidexterity.  Further, it aims to provide an empirically 
grounded theory that contributes to understanding practice in the informal 
organization, as employed by practitioners, and its effect on the dual pursuit and 
management of exploration and exploitation. I focus on the everyday activities of 
organizing and recurring patterns of actions at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
in Houston, Texas (USA).  
The initial intention of the study was to develop an empirically grounded 
theory of how an organization such as JSC pursued exploitation activities whilst 
simultaneously maintaining its exploration capabilities. While conducting this 
investigation the significance of the informal organization and certain practices 
enacted by it and within it during its strategy implementation process emerged and 
became increasingly apparent. 
To understand ongoing practices in the informal organization, I adopted an 
ethnographic approach (Van Maanen, 1988). In so doing, this ethnographic approach 
allows for the significance of the informal to be recognized beyond formal systems 
more so than current knowledge permits, and is in a vein similar to Morey and 
Luthans’ (1991) ethnographic study of a bureaucratic organization and its informal 
organization. Furthermore, the ethnographic approach aims to address the call by 
Bettis et al. (2015) for more qualitative empirical studies to aid in generating new 
insights within the field of strategic management.  
 
Data Collection  
Data was drawn from diverse sources including interview transcripts, field-
observations of meetings and corporate events, internal documents and secondary 
sources. In total 82 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 57 informants 
form different departments and various levels of the organizational hierarchy (see 
table 8). In the field data collection occurred in four phases between August 2014 and 
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September 201526. Interviews lasted between one to three hours and all but twelve of 
them were recorded with informants’ permission and were transcribed. For the 
interviews not recorded hand written notes were made as a record of the interview 
where the informant’s consent was provided. An interview protocol was employed 
initially, containing standardized questions about informants’ employment history at 
JSC and their perceptions of the strategic change plan and its implementation. 
Questions were then customized depending on hierarchical level, organization 
division, employment type (i.e. contractor or permanent staff), and employment 
tenure. Subsequent interviews became progressively more structured as themes 
emerged from the data. Follow up interviews were conducted with several informants 
and served to inform or refine emerging themes that arose from earlier interviews. In 
certain instances, they allowed discussions to be expanded, covering new, unexplored 
topics not previously touched upon. For example, it emerged that innovation was 
defined not at an organizational level but at the division, group and even individual 
level. This has implications on the formal and informal activities engaged to 
implement the organization’s strategic goal. New themes such as these were deemed 
worthy of exploring as it highlighted complex unexpected issues in the 
implementation of ambidexterity that transcended across organizational levels and 
formal and informal actions.  
 
Field notes based on approximately 64 days of onsite observation were also 
gathered. I observed team meetings, progress updates and ongoing activities; Center 
wide communication events on JSC’s strategic plan and its implementation; poster 
sessions communicating in-house innovation projects; informal meetings between 
individuals and groups in social settings, and employee interactions and social 
behaviors. Informants were aware of my presence and topic of investigation and were 
notified that participation in the research was voluntary. I tried to maintain an 
unobtrusive presence throughout to ensure that observations reflected the usual 
behaviors of the participants. This allowed for informal practices to be observed and 
captured and later confirmed and elaborated on in interviews.  I noted observations, 
                                                          
26 Refer to the methodology section in chapter one of this thesis for details on the four phases of the 
research data collection process.  
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reflections, other field references and emerging theoretical concepts in a field journal 
and employed this information in subsequent analysis.  
 
 
Table 8: Interview Data 
 
Secondary data was also gathered from public sources (i.e. press releases, case 
studies focused on NASA/JSC, media articles, published books, industry reports, 
news videos and relevant documentaries), as well as internal organizational documents 
for analysis. I also snapped approximately 74 photographs as a way of documenting 
aspects of JSC’s physical environment. Organizational members were not captured in 
photographs, unless they granted permission for me to do so. Interview transcripts, 
observational data, and secondary data sources were triangulated to ensure reliability 
of interpretation and the conceptual development of data.  
 
Informants
Executive officers 1
Directors 2
Assistance directors 2
Division manager 1
Division chiefs 6
Division deputy managers 4
Deputy manager 1
Branch chiefs 6
Managers 2
Project manager 1
Team leads 7
Senior technical specialists 2
Senior office manager 3
Senior analyst 2
Technical Specialist 1
Office manager 7
Officer 4
Contractor 14
Intern 2
Former Employees 10
External industry experts 4
82
Number of 
interviews
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Data Analysis 
Interviews, observational field notes and other sources of data were analyzed 
using inductive qualitative techniques (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The first stage of the 
analysis consisted of multiple, iterative readings of interview transcripts and 
observational field notes to identify themes and patterns in informant accounts and 
events. Following the analysis of interviews and observational data from research 
phases one and two I identified within the data particular ‘episodes’ – an event or 
specific activity (Chuang, Wang and Judge, 2015) - of informal practice relating to the 
ambidextrous strategy and its implementation which was either revealed by informants 
as they explained their experiences or was directly observed by me as the researcher 
and captured in my field notes. From this I detected emerging patterns of behaviors 
being exhibited by individuals and groups across different levels of the organization – 
individual, middle managers and senior management, which did not fall within the 
formal organization’s prescribed procedures. These behaviors appeared to challenge 
the formal blue-print, going against formal procedures and the organization’s 
prevailing context. For example, an individual bypassing set steps within an official 
approval process; or a group of managers overcoming formal structural constraints to 
encourage greater communication and innovation in lower level employees. During 
this stage line-by-line open coding, using NVivo qualitative data analysis software, was 
conducted resulting in a number of codes about the dimensions of the informal 
behavior, its interactions with formal organizational elements and the contextual 
conditions shaping it. At each of the four phases of the investigation I would 
continually reassess, question and modify codes so that they accurately captured the 
essential elements of the data and were analytically relevant (Coffey and Atkinson, 
1996). Research phases three and four provided the opportunity for the researcher to 
return to the field and intentionally look for and gather data of other episodes of this 
informal practice in action. This data was fed back into the analysis and helped to 
generate initial theoretical ideas. 
These first-order codes were grouped into clusters forming subcategories and 
broader categories. Memos and brief notes of analytical insights (Strauss, 1987) were 
generated whilst analyzing the various data sources throughout the course of the 
project and were continuously matched and compared to develop and refine themes 
and theoretical interpretations of the data (McCracken, 1988) and their 
interrelationships (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2012).  Through a process of 
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constantly comparing first-order codes within themes second order codes were 
developed in line with Gioia et al. (2012) second order labeling approach.  In reaching 
theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) the themes and theoretical 
interpretations developed formed the basis of an underlying framework integrating the 
concepts for the practice of circumventing. Figure 5 summarizes the emergent 
structure of the data. Table 9 depicts the theoretical categories of the study – themes 
and illustrative quotes from informants.  
 
 
The Case: The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) is one of 10 publicly funded field 
centers with a core focus on the development of human performance science and 
technological innovation for the enablement of deep space exploration. JSC functions 
as a decentralized unit but its Center operations and processes are governed by its 
national legislature and regulations. As a consequence of declining budget allocations 
over time JSC has to learn to operate under the constraints of scarce resources and 
combine explorative and exploitative activities simultaneously. Recent changes in the 
space industry, including the commercialization of space and the emergence of 
credible competition from private investors and from other sovereign nations 
combined with the end of one if its major human spaceflight program’s in 2011, have 
permanently changed the dynamics in which JSC must operate and raises difficult 
questions over its future.  
In 2012 a new executive director was appointed at JSC who established a new 
strategic change plan, ‘Vision 2.0’, intended to reinvent the organization and bring it 
into alignment with its rapidly changing environment and decreasing budgets by being 
‘lean, agile, responsive and adaptive to change’ (Internal JSC document, 2014a) whilst 
also pursuing its vision to advance human space exploration and emphasis on the 
importance of innovation and the solicitation of new ideas. The organization set about 
implementing ways to be sustainable, affordable and efficient whilst simultaneously 
encouraging further innovation in ideas and actions; in essence, a strategy akin to 
organizational ambidexterity. Change efforts of this kind often rely on alterations 
occurring in the structure, reporting systems and processes of the formal organization, 
although design efforts may also be made to influence social groupings and employee 
relationships within the informal organization (Biancani et al., 2014). The 
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implementation of a new strategy is critical to JSC if it is to continue to remain 
relevant and achieve organizational ambidexterity.  
JSC is considered as a unique and revelatory case (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007) for an initial focus on understanding the shift towards an integration of 
explorative and exploitative behaviors, and subsequently the significance of the 
informal organization and its interaction with formal organizational elements. As a 
single case, JSC provides an opportunity for unusual research access (Yin, 2014) and is 
particularly well suited to study the informal organization and how it can impact 
strategy implementation. As a complex government funded body the organization’s 
internal environment and its mission is shaped by the nation’s federal legislation and 
the political agenda of the incumbent government. Therefore, being government 
funded one would expect the formal organization to be the primary emphasis at JSC. 
Its ability to implement change is bounded by bureaucracy and therefore its informal 
organization acts as a mechanism with the potential to execute positive improvements 
and change organizational characteristics. JSC has a strong history in human space 
flight and its legacy permeates and conditions the organization’s structures, processes 
and culture even today. Because the organization is in the process of implementing its 
strategic change program in an effort to become ambidextrous in operating 
exploration and exploitation activities simultaneously, it provides a valuable 
opportunity to witness the strategy implementation process as it occurs within a 
complex organization and observe the formal and informal mechanisms and how they 
are engaged. 
 
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The findings show how the informal organization, through the practice of 
circumventing, can sense and identify inhibitors in elements of the formal 
organization hampering the transition to ambidextrous operations; and how this 
practice is reflective of a dynamic capability and can provide a means of promoting 
exploration and exploitation during the implementation of an ambidextrous strategy. 
The paper finds two dimensions of the informal organization - (1) strategic focus 
(sensing), (2) divergent proactive behavior (seizing) - engages with the formal 
dimension, the prevailing organizational context, to produce the enacted practice and 
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that this interaction culminates in mixed outcomes. While analytically speaking these 
dimensions can be seen as independent, their combined configuration engenders 
interactions between formal and informal organizational elements that produce a 
distinctive effect on the case organization’s strategy implementation. The study also 
examines how two contextual mechanisms moderate and influence resulting 
outcomes, including the reconfiguration of resources, as a consequence of the practice 
of circumventing: (1) positional formal authority, and (2) degree of informal status. 
The following firstly discusses the three core dimensions central to the practice of 
circumventing and the interrelations between the formal and informal organizational 
elements involved. It then explains how formal positional authority and informal 
status have a combined influence that can lead to differential outcomes for strategy 
implementation of exploration and exploitation activities.  
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Figure 5: Data Structure 
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Aggregate 
dimensions
Second-order 
theme
Illustrative quotes
“We're alpha types here. So just give us something. Give us a mission and let us go do it" (Office manager)
“Our job is to execute the mission that we’re given. So because of our heritage there is a perception that our only concern is to execute technically what you are 
given to do” (Division Chief)
"We’re very mission oriented...because when you work here and live here you just get sucked into the bubble" (Senior office manager)
"They [certain divisions] are very mission driven. They know what to do and how to make things work …" (Office manager)
“One of the things the [division director] realized was that we had a whole generation of engineers that had never cut their teeth on a real large hardware 
project. That had never built something from first principles” (Senior technical specialist). 
"It's not enough to talk and think we understand [the relationship to other internal organizations]. We're going to lay this out and draw a set of interface 
diagrams for all of this...this is done to a degree quite frequently, but what I don’t feel like is  not done enough is diagram out how systems work…technical and 
people processes. The interface of all of that" (Technical specialist)
"There's a tension between those who are there and just waiting versus those who are proactive" (Workshop participant)
“As I moved over and was responsible for the directorate on Apollo, it became pretty obvious to me that one of the areas of key weakness in the whole program 
was that nobody really knew what the other guy was doing in the program. There was an awful lot of specialist area, and the program office was trying to keep 
them coordinated from a program office point of view –“ (Archives, 1970)
Structures "Now it’s a very clear distinction [speaking of technical and business divisions] and right now in fact it’s clearer than it should be. Because the truth is we the 
mission should, and are starting to make much better use of the [business] resources. But for a long time is was, we know what we’re doing. We can do best for 
us. So we will do it ourselves " (Technical specialist)
"All the orgs are structured but it’s the level of structure that differs" (Workshop participant)
"First I was like, okay, who’s my next chain in command?  Oh, here’s your Lead. Who’s his chain? There’s your Chief. Okay" (Team Lead)
"It’s very, 'you have to run it up your chain, you have to go to the change board, you have to go to the pre-change board, post-pre change board" (Team Lead)
"Technical organizations are seen to have an elevated position over business functions, with the latter being seen as second-class" (Workshop participant)
"I think to, that there is a certain territoriality on the part of certain managers and directors. And sometimes that’s about funding and then sometimes that’s 
about ego and the org" (Office Manager)
"It’s about budget!" (Officer)
Prevailing 
organizational 
context
Dimensions, themes and quotations
Identifying 
micro-
operational 
issues
Strategic focus Goal 
attachment
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Conformity "I mean they [speaking of a particular division] have institutional paralysis worse than anybody else onsite"  (Technical specialist)
"It’s very much ‘you don’t know your place’, ‘you need to make sure you’re talking to me about it’. And that’s a lot of the culture here" (Team Lead)
 "Well this is the hole, I think you have the right finger size to plug that hole up" (Contractor)
"In some areas, conformity is celebrated" (Workshop participant)
"Because we're a government agency we can't do marketing to the public" (Branch Chief)
"I think it's different for each one of--  like I said that I-- and a lot of it, for me, is how you were brought up in the business world, you know" (Branch Chief)
"One of the points that we tried to make with those events was that an innovation can be something that alters the state of the art, state of the technology, 
whatever it is, but it can also be a small shift that leads to doing something better. We very expressly made the points with people who are coming to share their 
innovations in that Innovation Day activity, was that we didn't want just all technical, that we expected the legal office to be bringing forward some, or we 
expected the Chief Financial Officer's office to bring forward innovations, that this was for everybody. It wasn’t just the technical, because we should all be 
seeking to do new and better things in every aspect of what we do" (Deputy Division Manager) 
"an innovation is not just the technical shuttle thing, but it could be a processor…"  (Branch Chief)
" So it [innovation and efficiency] maybe -- change maybe the for them just a change in style, or change or something that not necessarily for efficiency purposes, 
but the new idea.  But from a resources  standpoint, budgetary standpoint, it's really a process that makes you more efficient" (Branch Chief) 
"innovative in the resources budget  world, is more process  oriented. Meaning doing things better more efficient. From a technical standpoint, it could be just a 
fresh new idea" (Branch Chief) 
“That’s another thing at JSC that also happens, is you bring forth an idea, one person goes this is s*** and it just disappears…. So we did stuff about new ideas. 
How new ideas are vetted, and it shouldn’t be primarily though Chiefs” (Team Lead)
"I'm thinking...okay, how at the Center can an idea be vetted and given control outside of their major management chain?" (Team Lead)
"It goes back to not conforming but being different. It creates lots of uncertainty ..." (Workshop participant)
"...It can't always come from the top-down even though that's some peoples warm and fuzzy, 'somebody tell me what to do'. But taking control of your own 
actions. And really, cos if I am going to have to live with it I don’t want somebody who’s going to be retiring in 2 years figuring this out for me. It’s gonna be me. 
And I know that’s a little bit of an offensive attitude to have here. But it is, it’s like, you’re not going to be living with this in the next 10 years it’s going to be 
me. It should be me making that decision." (Team Lead)
"There is definitely a fear of the unknown here. And that for me is one of the most frustrating things when I encounter it. Because the unknown is at the heart of 
what we do, you know, and so to a degree if you’re afraid of the unknown if you’re unwilling to confront the unknown, what are you doing working here? And 
that's an aggressive statement but that's where I am in terms of frustration because I really do think there's no place for that" (Technical Specialist)
Non 
conformist 
disposition
Divergent 
proactive 
behavior
Strategy 
specification 
gap
Prevailing 
organizational 
context
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Table 9: Data Table   
 
 
 
 
" ...I also enacted something where people talk directly to the Director and not their Chief. It’s sort of like a skip level meeting...Which is something that a lot 
of [divisions] won’t do because they're very hierarchical". (Team Lead)
"I’d gotten more traction you know doing my own thing and going to a random class then going through the traditional chain"(Team Lead)
"We even have something called, and this is a horrible name, a [named initiative]. So, you get four or five people from the directorate and they just walk around 
with our director. And, and whatever is on their mind she’ll ask them questions, they’ll ask her questions... when [named initiative] were first 
introduced challenged the formal way of doing things... The joke is when mangers say they have an “open door” policy is easy to say when you have an empty 
office due to too many meetings". (Team Lead)
"And it is about who you know. And a lot of people use that to their advantage" (Team Lead)
" It’s this very like inbred sort of…we knew each other for 20 years. And then the younger generation is, well I worked with them in that one class. Or I met 
them in that one meeting and they don’t have that long history" (Team Lead)
"And the longer people stay here, because the average age here is I think in the 40’s. 40 or 45. So  when somebody’s 20's, 30, you’re sort of looked upon like 
some zygote whose going to meetings with you even though you have just as much education, you have just as much experience but for some reason they feel 
like you haven’t fully cooked yet" (Team Lead)
"You shouldn’t judge my idea no better, no worse just for the fact that I haven’t worked here for 32 years" (Team lead)
"There are some of those things to do from a top down perspective ; to say no you’re not all going to buy these things separately. This is the one best solution 
you’re all going to use it" (Technical specialist)
"There's an authority and respect thing here" (Contractor)
"But still, the culture is very much driven by technical experts" (Office manager)
"One of my mentors happened to be a [talks of a particular role at a senior level in the organization], who are treated like little demi-gods really" (Team Lead)
"National politics has  power over JSC and determines its mission" (Division Chief)
Authority 
(formal)
Enacting 
practice
Moderator of 
outcomes
Status 
(informal)
Divergent 
proactive 
behavior
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Strategic Focus  
With the practice of circumventing, data shows that the informal organization 
is capable of having a strategic focus that is in alignment with the formal goals of the 
organization. The strategic focus of an individual or amongst a group of members 
emerged as a core dimension of the practice of circumventing and actors engaging in 
the practice are focused on realizing a specific strategic goal of the organization. This 
dimension consists of two second-order codes: (1) goal attachment, and (2) 
identification of micro-operational issues (sensing). The first dimension is an attribute 
shared by both the formal and informal organization, representative of strategic 
consensus between both elements. In relation to the formal organization, the new 
strategy geared towards the dual pursuit of exploration and exploitation is established 
through formal mechanisms (i.e. senior management) and the implementation process 
is attached to this strategic goal and seeks to embed it within formal structures and 
processes.  
For the informal organization, goal attachment relates to actors being 
intrinsically motivated to fulfilling the organization’s strategic goal, promoting 
members to adopt an awareness of the exploration-exploitation agenda within the 
informal organization. The second dimension, the identification of micro-operational 
issues (sensing), is a capability shared by both the formal and informal organization, 
however, how it is manifested in relation to the practice of circumventing is found to 
be different. In the formal organization, this capability relates to resources where the 
detection of issues (and opportunities) is an intentional feature of its design. However, 
with the informal organization it pertains to an organic capability performed by actors 
who through tacit knowledge and experience perceive and identify, in both the formal 
and informal organizational elements, operational obstacles and opportunities 
affecting the effective implementation of formal strategic goals in their daily activities 
and this is motivated by actors’ goal attachment.  
 
Goal attachment  
As part of implementing the new strategic plan at JSC a new organization 
structure was announced internally in 2014 with the goal to “enhance collaboration 
and reduce stove pipes and coordinate JSC exploration activities and resources” 
(Internal JSC document, 2014b), emphasizing internal exploration and innovation 
activities. The reorganization was motivated by “the need to create a ‘Vision 2.0’ 
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organizational structure and governance model – one designed to advance human 
exploration and to be more lean, agile, responsive and adaptive to change” (Internal 
JSC document, 2014a), thus emphasizing the simultaneous pursuit of exploitation 
activities.  
With the practice of circumventing data shows that JSC’s formal and informal 
organization share a drive to execute its new organizational goals of exploration and 
exploitation and this defines and shapes the performance of the formal operations by 
which it functions and underpins the motivations of the emergent practice behaviors 
displayed by the informal organization. The drive to execute and achieve its strategic 
goals is evident throughout JSC’s history.  JSC was intentionally designed to execute a 
specific mission – lead in the advancement of human space flight – and since its 
inception it has been at the forefront of revolutionary technological achievements in 
this field. For JSC, the execution of the organization’s goals is central to the way in 
which the organization is formally structured and its prevailing culture: 
“The organization, the way it is organized today is around 
executing with excellence the project or programs and the 
work we have… (Division Chief, phase 2). 
 
JSC’s performance focus on fulfilling its strategic goals exists not only in the 
formal organization but permeates its informal organization. Informants expressed an 
innate drive and motivation to achieve JSC’s goals with one informant stating, “we 
believe we have a void in ourselves without a mission, although it may not be true”. 
This perception of being attached to the strategic goals of the organization is a feature 
shared across the formal and informal organization and in this regard they overlap 
(Soda and Zaheer, 2012), which is important in understanding the practice of 
circumventing at JSC, although this dimension also indicates a degree of influence 
held by the formal organization over the informal. For those enacting the practice of 
circumventing, data shows that the performance drive of goal execution in the 
informal organization is aligned with achieving specifically goals in JSC’s new strategic 
change plan, ‘Vision 2.0’. Those engaging in the practice of circumventing have an 
attachment to strategic goals and are driven to execute and fulfill particular goals 
defined by ‘Vision 2.0’ in their daily activities. For example, employees expressed the 
drive to encourage innovative collaboration with external partners, one of the 
organization’s new strategic goals:  
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“when I'm out there talking to them [referring to an external 
partner organization] I paint JSC as willing to be risk taking, 
able to work with the outside community with systems set 
up to enable collaboration with the outside world” (Deputy 
manager).  
 
Other informants spoke of achieving the organizational goal to be ‘lean’ by 
realizing efficiency in their day-to-day work activities “we have a lot more splinter 
sections and informal forums where we talk about different things for our office to 
operate efficiently” (Branch Chief). There is therefore a drive within the informal 
organization at JSC which is intertwined with the formal organization, to implement 
strategy and realize strategic objectives. For the practice of circumventing to manifest 
the data suggests an element of the informal organization must share and adopt the 
strategic focus as defined by the formal organization to fulfill the organization’s goals 
in their daily activities, and that this acts as a trigger to the subsequent interactions 
between formal and informal organizational elements in this practice. 
 
Identifying micro-operational issues (sensing)  
The data shows that the informal organization contains the capacity to sense 
and identify, on a micro-level, operational issues (and opportunities) within the 
organizational environment affecting the implementation and fulfilment of JSC’s 
‘Vision 2.0’. This ability to identify micro-level issues spans across JSC’s formal and 
informal organization and is a trait comparable to Teece’s (2007) sensing category for 
dynamic capabilities. Official forums and review boards, such as the Flight Operations 
Panel (FOP), are established formal mechanisms designed to address technical and 
operational program and project related issues as well as opportunities. Within the 
informal organization however, it is the unprompted organic identification of micro-
level operational issues that emerges. The data show that with the practice of 
circumventing individuals and groups across various divisions and hierarchical 
positions sense and informally identify micro-level issues in everyday formal processes 
or levels of hierarchy impeding the implementation of JSC’s strategic goals in diurnal 
operations by virtue of their experiential intricate knowledge of the organization’s 
current processes, systems and scrutinizing its contextual environment. For example, 
when a team lead (middle manager position) identified an area of inefficiency in 
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operating practices they remarked: “we were notorious for getting customer surveys 
and doing absolutely nothing with the data”.  
The ability to sense and identify micro-level operational issues and the drive to 
attain the organization’s formal goals are both strategically orientated characteristics 
that span across JSC’s formal and informal organization, simultaneously existing in 
both. Thus, there is a high-order strategy point of overlap and alignment whereby the 
formal and informal interact (Soda and Zaheer, 2012). The strategic focus dimension 
plays a role in shaping the next core dimension, prevailing organizational context, by 
virtue that formal organizational goals will underpin the constitution and nature of 
formal structures, processes and systems implemented. In addition, it simultaneously 
drives and shapes the form and perceptions of emergent informal actions and 
behaviors assumed by actors as they attempt to realize a specific goal. And in relation 
to the formal organization and the organic capability to sense and identify micro-
operational issues (and opportunities), actors exercise this ability by scrutinizing the 
prevailing organizational context against their perception of the organization’s 
strategic goals to be realized.  
  
Prevailing Organizational Context 
The prevailing organizational context dimension refers to the defined systems 
and prescribed behaviors that are established by the formal organization, contributing 
to the established organizational environment that defines the official way of doing 
things at JSC.  The prevailing organizational context at JSC is characterized by variant 
forms of structure and conformity, in both processes and social behaviors. This 
represents the formal organization at JSC and stands in contrast to the third core 
dimension of the practice of circumventing, divergent proactive behavior.  Informants 
recognized the prevailing organizational context, however this recognition was not 
necessarily confirmation of acceptance by the informal organization.  The 
organizational environment and culture at JSC is complex and comprises many 
dimensions. However, for this study on the informal organization and the practice of 
circumventing the findings focus on the second-order codes pertinent to this 
discussion using three second-order codes: (1) structures, (2) conformity, and (3) 
strategy specification gap. Structures relates to the organizational design elements 
governing the core functions of the prevailing organizational context and conformity 
refers to the conjoining cultural environment that reinforces the formal processes, 
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procedures and expected behaviors. The third element, strategy specification gap, 
relates explicitly to JSC’s ambidexterity strategy and Center management’s 
promulgation of its strategic change plan to advance the dual pursuit of explorative 
(innovation) and exploitative (efficient) activities.   
 
Structures  
The data revealed that the cultural context at JSC is defined by formal rigid 
structures that permeate various aspects of the organization and define processes and 
procedures. These rigid structures condition and define expected behaviors and 
consequently define emergent informal practices that differ from the established 
norms, such as the practice of circumventing, viewing them as unconventional and in 
conflict to its formally sanctioned contextual norms, and as such can pose resistance 
to such informal behavior being exhibited.  Structures were identified as taking three 
different forms: (1) hierarchy chain of command, (2) power structures, and (3) tight 
controls. Firstly, the structure of rank and hierarchical position emerged from the data 
as being critical to JSC and its operational environment. Informants related that JSC’s 
architecture was highly hierarchical in design, and required that each employee know 
their position in relation to their superiors and adhere to their chain of command, 
which is reflected in expected behaviors:  
“It’s literally, you know your chain of command. You do not 
step out of your chain of command…There’s even some 
[division areas] that depending on how you email people can 
get people’s knickers in a twist... I’ve actually worked for 
people that didn’t even like if- if you’re writing like three 
Chiefs and a couple of Leads. You better name your Chief 
first, then the other Chiefs and then the Leads after them. 
Don’t write your Lead first because that’s considered rude. 
It’s a hierarchy.” (Team Lead) 
 
Informants explained that this design was rooted in the organization’s military 
background on which it was founded, and was expressed using militaristic terms in 
language. One informant exemplified this:  
“To this day our agency is really set up like the military. It is 
all about recognizing and “following your chain of 
command” or my favorite phrase is “don’t break your 
chain.” (Senior technical specialist) 
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The second structural form identified is the power structure that is determined 
by whether or not an employee has been assigned to work on a specific space 
program. For those assigned a role in one of the major space programs at JSC, this 
program-role association engenders a power structure that elevates those working on a 
program above those operating in business related functions or operational Center 
facility roles outside of a program:    
"You’re special if you're in a program…power structures can 
over-ride people, if you're in the "right-org" (Workshop 
participant).   
 
The data showed that space programs at JSC imbue a power not held by the 
business/institutional functions because of the financial standing they possess - 
“…the money goes to the programs, not the Center [institution]…and everything is 
about budget” (Senior technical specialist). At JSC the allocation of budget is central 
to all activities and denotes a dimension of power and influence: 
“…budget is usually the biggest driver for everything, and 
what our goal is, and what’s set for JSC in [space] 
exploration” (Contractor). 
 
Tight controls emerged as the third structures subtheme referring to the tight 
adherence to rules and procedures that create standards across and within divisions of 
the organization. The formal processes and procedures at JSC are designed around its 
fundamental mission – to advance human space exploration. For JSC, this mission 
involves being innovative in order to overcome a number of technological, 
engineering and physiological unknowns, which is an activity that holds the risk of 
endangering human life. (A reality known to the organization whose history includes 
four major flight disasters all resulting in the loss of human life). Informants explained 
that tight controls are essential given the risky nature of JSC endeavors. However, 
tight controls are also perceived to overextend into areas without cause, such as the 
innovation activities and collaboration endeavors – explorative innovation traits the 
‘Vision 2.0’ strategy seeks to enhance. This contextual feature was recognized 
organically by JSC actors who identified it by means of the informal organization. 
“…the business that we do. We have to be very structured, 
we have to have a lot of rules. But unfortunately, sometimes 
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that bleeds into things that really don’t need to be that 
structured and ruled based” (Engineering specialist) 
 
 
Conformity  
Data also shows that JSC’s prevailing organizational cultural environment is 
characterized by conformity in relation to two elements. Firstly, legislative decrees on 
processes and procedures restrict the activities permitted by JSC a publicly funded 
body. For example:  
“…procurement is seen as being very clearly defined because 
they follow procedure and guidelines and timelines that are 
written in the law, so they have to have lots of controls and 
structures” (Contractor). 
 And secondly, conformity in social behaviors within the formal organization that 
directs formal elements such as career progression:  
“There's like a mental socialization that occurs, so if you 
want to move up then you have to stick to the straight and 
narrow and not ruffle too many feathers…” (Technical 
specialist).  
 
Strategy specification gap 
From the data it became evident that the vision of ‘JSC 2.0’ strategy and its pursuit for 
innovation and efficiency was not perceived or understood homogeneously by actors.  
“If you ask ten different people just working at different 
levels what JSC 2.0 is, I would guess that you would 
probably get ten different answers. And someone would say, 
"I don't know" … This is more nebulous. More of a grey 
area…” (Deputy Lead).  
In devising the new strategy, senior management had not explicitly specified 
what being innovative, efficient or lean meant or how it would look operationally 
when implemented across the various organizational divisions and units. The lack of 
strategy specification left a translation gap, leaving it open for actors themselves to 
translate and interpret the strategy and its application within their own divisions using 
their own cultural references such as their experiential knowledge and perceptions. 
Consequently, data showed that there were different connotations of innovation and 
efficiency held by actors. For example, innovation was perceived by one informant to 
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be process orientated and equated to finding efficiencies: “I guess for me, 
innovation is the  process or the discovery of doing something better, more efficient, 
different, outside the box, no one has thought of it before” (Branch Chief). Another 
informant expressed that innovation within their division was seen in terms of 
diversity and inclusion of people, explaining that innovation is: 
“Essentially, that’s diversity, people call it diversity and 
inclusion, and I like to call it diversity… we link inclusion 
practices to innovative outcomes as a means of 
communicating with business imperative for diversity... 
being inclusive is linked to greater innovation, that by 
including and valuing everybody, you're going to get better 
results” (Deputy Division Lead)  
Whilst other participants perceived innovation and efficiency as one-in-the-
same. One informant gave an example of how their department looked at the 
mundane audit activities that took place and found ways to avoid overlaps and 
produce efficiency, and described it as being innovative – “that’s very much an 
innovation” (Division Head). 
 
The strategy specification gap and heterogeneity of understanding in relation 
to innovation and efficiency engendered a cultural environment where actors can 
employ informal means, such as the practice of circumventing, as a way of applying 
what they saw as innovation and/or efficiency within their particular division and 
tasks thereby bringing an element of (incremental) change, as highlighted by one 
participant who spoke of their applying JSC 2.0: 
"I’d gotten more traction you know doing my own 
[innovative] thing and going to a random class then going 
through the traditional chain"(Team Lead) 
 
Proactive behavior (seizing) 
Whilst the previous two core dimensions discussed above involve the formal 
organization (i.e. the strategic focus dimension spans across both the formal and 
informal organization, and the prevailing organizational context relating specifically to 
the formal organization); this third core dimension resides solely within the informal 
organization.  Divergent proactive behavior relates to enacted practices that emerge 
from the informal organization at JSC whereby actors, upon identifying micro-
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operational issues against the prevailing context and having developed individual 
perceptions of what innovation and efficiency mean operationally due to what is 
perceived as a lack of defined specificity in the strategy and in management’s 
promulgation of it, actors devise and enact the practice of circumventing to promote 
exploratory and exploitative activities in order to realize the ‘Vision 2.0’ strategic goals. 
Actors devise and execute an action in order to promote and realize the strategic goals 
of exploration and exploitation, a trait similar to that of Teece’s (2007) dynamic 
capabilities categorization of seizing.  
However, in utilizing the practice of circumventing their actions diverge from 
formal expected behaviors, and are deemed unconventional and divergent because the 
organization’s prevailing cultural context and the formal organization defines them to 
be so. These informal behaviors do not conform to the prescribed behaviors accepted 
by the formal organization but are in a state of conflicting tension with it. And it is 
within this dimension that we find the physical manifestation of the practice of 
circumventing. Yet in order for this informal behavior to be enacted it requires the 
conflict with elements of the formal organization to exist. Thus, this dimension is 
interrelated with and feeds off the previous core dimension discussed above. The 
divergent proactive behavior dimension is explained by two second-order codes: (1) 
non-conformist temperament, and (2) enacting practice: circumventing. The non-
conformist temperament is an actor’s disposition and is an antecedent to the actual 
enactment of the informal practice. Not all organizational actors exhibiting a non-
conformist temperament may necessarily engage in the enacting practice of 
circumventing, but for those that do this is a necessary condition. 
 
Non-conformist temperament  
Non-conformist temperament refers to organizational actors assuming a 
disposition that challenges the organization’s status quo – elements of the formal 
organization. This characteristic is the precursor to the physical enactment of the 
practice of circumventing. For those engaging in the practice of circumventing, they 
do so intentionally in an effort to challenge the prevailing organizational context, 
address a micro-operational issue identified in the formal organization and promote 
the positive pursuit of innovation and efficiency in their operations as they discern it is 
lacking due to a perceived gap in the strategy’s specification. Organizational actors 
recognize and are aware of the status quo but, having identified an obstacle within the 
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formal organization preventing a specific strategic goal from being realized, they are 
proactive and use their initiative in anticipation of engendering a change that 
reinforces the implementation of a particular strategic organizational goal. This trait is 
reflective of the concept positive deviance (Spreitzer and Sonenshein, 2003; 2004). 
The non-conformist temperament is exemplified by the following informant 
who having discerned and identified a micro-operational issue inhibiting the 
attainment of efficiency, the actor formulates and executes a course of action in an 
attempt to address it and promote exploitation and produce recourse in alignment to 
the organization’s strategic goals: 
 “This culture is very meeting based. So, what I did, I audited all 
my managers' calendars and I averaged them. I actually put a price 
tag too. So, I thought 'how can they say no to this?' They're 
averaging 27.8 hours of meetings a week that extrapolates to like 
1.8 million dollars a year. And I'm like how can this...so I gave 
them some ways to stop it. They just looked at me like I was nuts. 
I had a presentation showing the numbers and how I got to the 
numbers, and here, you can do this, and- It was more like ‘how 
dare you say that we’re doing something inefficient’. And I thought 
okay, maybe they don't want to hear it now but maybe later” 
(Team lead) 
 
 
Enacting practice: circumventing 
The physical manifestation of the practice of circumventing is rooted within 
the informal organization and its interaction with, and understanding of formal 
organizational elements. It can take different forms and can be engaged by individuals 
or groups at different levels of the hierarchy. The manifestation of the practice goes 
beyond identifying a micro-operational issue, being proactive and using one’s 
initiative. It goes one step further by intentionally jumping over, or sidestepping, an 
element of the formal organization – be it a step in a formal process or a 
position/layer of hierarchy. Therefore, the informal organization is not only capable 
of highlighting inhibitors to the strategic goals of innovation and efficiency within the 
formal organization but demonstrates what it perceives to be effective remedial action 
in an effort to promote and even realize the attain of strategic organizational goals. To 
illustrate the practice of circumventing being enacted the following present’s four 
vignettes of episodes of the practice of circumventing that occurred and in some 
cases, were observed by the researcher at JSC, along with the resulting outcomes.  
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Reconfiguring: Outcomes 
The data suggests that the outcomes to enacting the practice of circumventing 
produce mixed results. In drawing on Teece’s (2007) triadic categorization of sensing, 
seizing and reconfiguration capabilities the following looks at how the informal 
practice of circumventing harnesses these capabilities to promote explorative and/or 
exploitative activity to support the organization’s strategic change. However, the study 
found that the final outcomes from the practice of circumventing varied and were 
conditioned by two contextual moderators: (1) status held within the informal 
organization, and (2) formal authority as defined by the formal organization and its 
design. For those engaging in the practice, their degree of formal authority and 
informal status was found to have a combined effect on the resulting outcome. 
Combining data and observations from the study with Teece’s (2007) capabilities 
categorization I develop a classification framework (see figure 6) showing the varied 
outcomes to the practice of circumventing and suggest that the practice is itself an 
informal mechanism with the capacity, under certain conditions, to engender and 
behave as a dynamic capability. First I explain the two contextual moderators and then 
discuss the various outcomes to the practice of circumventing as conditioned by the 
two moderators. 
 
 
Figure 6: Outcomes to the practice of circumventing 
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Moderator of outcomes: informal status 
Status refers to the standing an individual or group has within the informal 
organization. At JSC informal status is imbued by two factors: (1) ‘who you know’ (a 
person’s informal network) - “it is about who you know. And a lot of people use that 
to their advantage” (Office Manager), and (2) tenure at the organization – “I 
personally would really like to see more respect for ideas no matter where it comes 
from. You shouldn’t judge my idea no better, no worse just for the fact that I haven’t 
worked here for 32 years” (Team Lead).  
 
Moderator of outcomes: Authority (formal) 
Authority refers to the formal standing and ranking position an individual or 
group possess. Formal authority is associated with both functional operations and 
official vertical social relations (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). At JSC formal 
authority comes through two factors: (1) positional rank given through its hierarchal 
structure, and (2) possessing an expert identity (specializing in a technical field or 
program) – “being a technical expert on something used to get you very far. Um, they 
would promote you to management” (Office Manager).  
 
Varying resulting outcomes: 
The research found that informal status and formal authority are contextual 
moderators and their combined effect impact the outcomes of the practice of 
circumventing (figure 6). For example, in vignette 1 (see appendix D) the Division 
Deputy Manager who attempted to circumvent steps in a formal process, the actions 
of the manager demonstrate sensing and seizing capabilities; in that through 
experiential knowledge of the internal environment the manager identified a discrete 
structural inhibitor reducing process efficiency which delayed the advancement of 
collaborative innovation – a JSC strategic goal. In identifying a process inhibitor in the 
organization’s formal element, the manager can be seen to have engaged in the 
practice of circumventing, seizing the opportunity to reduce inefficiency and promote 
innovation collaboration in this instance by making a distinction between the critical 
process steps from non-critical steps and engaged in what was perceived as the former 
in an effort to address the detected issue. In terms of the outcomes resulting from the 
manager’s action we see management pushback and no further action occurred to 
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inject a greater degree of efficiency into the process (outcome A in figure 6). Though 
the manager had tenure at JSC, having worked there for over 25 years, as a mid-level 
manager they did not possess a high enough degree of formal authority or positional 
power within the hierarchal structure, and their personal network was not able to 
influence the relevant people within senior management in order to promote process 
efficiency.    
 
The remaining outcomes of the practice of circumventing in reference to 
outcomes (B), (C) and (D) (in figure 6) are exemplified by the following three 
vignettes: 
In vignette 2 (see appendix D), we see a management team employing the 
practice of circumventing to jump over a layer of hierarchy who were preventing the 
implementation of a new training plan geared towards achieving efficiency as a routine 
system. The outcome of the practice resulted in the successful long-term 
reconfiguration of the formal training system and embedded new processes designed 
to enable learning and knowledge transfer, aligning to the strategic goal of efficiency. 
As senior managers, these actors were responsible for designing the new training plan 
and their position allowed them to monitor its rollout as a whole system. In so doing 
the managers were able to observe and identify threats and opportunities of 
implementation (i.e. middle managers). Armed with this knowledge the senior 
managers engaged the practice of circumventing as a mechanism to address obstacles 
to the initiative in order to promote improved learning and knowledge transfer 
competencies across the division. In this instance, the outcome of the practice of 
circumventing promoted and help support the long-term transformation of the 
division’s knowledge management process (outcome D). It can be seen that the actors 
engaged in the practice of circumventing were highly ranked positionally and were 
technically knowledgeable as leaders of their unit, hence the management team 
possessed a high degree of formal authority. In addition, the senior team also 
possessed a high degree of informal status given that individuals in this position had 
worked at JSC for an extensive length of time, which is considered a prerequisite to 
being in management at JSC: “to get into…senior management grades at JSC you have 
to be lucky, good, and patient. Or some combination of those three” (Senior Office 
Manager), and had cultivated an informal network amongst themselves at senior 
management level, as well as with those lower-down within their division.  Hence, the 
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combined high degree of both formal and informal contextual elements engendered 
an outcome that reconfigured the division’s knowledge management competency, and 
the practice of circumventing was an informal mechanism utilized to promote 
efficiency to help achieve this outcome.  
 
In the case of vignette 3 (see appendix D), the practice of circumventing is a 
mechanism enacted by mid-level managers to overcome structural impediments 
causing dissonance between upper and lower levels of the organization, and the 
program’s strategy and its implementation. In enacting the practice, the middle 
managers could explore and devise a change strategy free from restrictions bound 
within formal structural elements of the program. In so doing, the practice of 
circumventing not only facilitated the mid-level managers’ exploration activities in 
developing a strategy but also mediates efficiency by allowing the change team to 
devise the strategy without being subjected to inhibiters in formal structural elements. 
In terms of the outcomes of the practice of circumventing in this particular case we 
see it produces two effects. Firstly, as middle managers, the change team did not 
possess a high degree of formal authority however in receiving direct support from 
the program executive, their enacted practice of circumventing became vested with 
high degree of formal authority and sanctioned their change planning efforts. 
Furthermore, as mid-level managers they possessed a moderate degree of informal 
status when they initiated the change strategy and so in enacting the practice of 
circumventing it facilitated the managers in their initial exploration (sensing) of 
opportunities and obstacles affecting the program’s ambidextrous strategy, and was a 
mechanism that was repeatedly used to support the middle managers in strategizing 
system and cultural changes across the program (i.e. seizing activities). Subsequently, 
the practice of circumventing facilitated a transient structural change to the program 
by placing the middle managers outside the program’s traditional hierarchy chain of 
command and in doing so assisted in initiating change, which is an example of 
outcome (C) in figure 6. Additionally, the long-term effects of the change initiative 
developed by the team of middle managers, having enacted the practice of 
circumventing, promoted long-term permanent changes to formal systems and 
processes in the program. The repetitive engagement of the practice of circumventing 
endorsed by the program executive along with the team lead’s integration in 
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management engendered the long-term reconfiguration of the program’s resources, 
illustrative of outcome (D) in figure 6. 
  
Vignette 4 (see appendix D), demonstrates the practice of circumventing from 
the ground up, and is an example of outcome (B) in figure 6. In this case the practice 
of circumventing is the mechanism that facilitates junior employees to voluntarily step 
out of their daily routines and roles and promotes them to identify and voice 
opportunities for innovation and efficiency within their work areas, and in some cases, 
it facilitated junior employees in implementing incremental task specific changes 
relating to their particular roles and interests. The junior employees enacting the 
practice of circumventing possess low formal authority but their informal status, by 
virtue of their network and connection with senior management, who are themselves 
involved in the practice, meant that these junior level employees were supported by 
those who possessed a high degree of authority (i.e. management) to exercise the 
practice of circumventing leading to some positive incremental outcomes promoting 
exploration and exploitation activities beyond the normal routines of organizational 
actors.  This finding extends Penny’s (1967) concept of “substitute locomotion” which 
argues “that informal communication to a higher status person may be used as a 
substitute for an actual increase in status” (p. 271). For in having access to and 
support from senior ranked managers, this served as a proxy endowing junior ranked 
employees with high informal authority. It also demonstrates the interaction between 
formal social structures and unofficial informal relations between employees and 
senior managers, where the former is drawn into enacting, and in some cases 
legitimatizing, informal practices.   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This paper set out to explore how the formal and informal 
organization interact in practice, what arises from this interplay and how it influences 
the organization in operationalizing a dual strategy of exploration and exploitation. 
The study takes a practice orientation to dynamic capabilities and adds to work in the 
field. This approach provides the prospect of greater granularity in understanding real-
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world interaction of the formal and informal organization, and the actors situated 
within them. The research focuses on the enacted behaviours of employees from 
multiple levels of an organization under the condition of strategic change. Through an 
ethnographic examination conducted at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) during 
its implementation of ambidextrous strategy, the study demonstrates how the 
interaction between the formal and informal organization engenders the emergence of 
an informal enacted practice, where elements of the formal and informal organization 
are engaged and overlap. This emergent informal practice is a mechanism exercised to 
promote exploration and exploitation activities by motivating change in functional 
features of the formal organization perceived to hinder the manifestation of the 
organization’s strategic goals for efficiency and innovation. I term this enacted practice 
as “the practice of circumventing (POC)” - the deliberate side-step or jump-over either a 
formal process, elements within a process, or layers of hierarchy with the intention of 
achieving change in support of the strategic ambidextrous objective. The findings 
show that the method in which informal elements interact with the formal 
organization is revealed through the enacted practices of organizational members; a 
view which is consistent with activity theory and demonstrates a complex 
interrelationship involving structural and social elements (Marx and Lechner, 2005) as 
influencers upon the implementation of strategic goals within operational activities.  
The term ‘circumventing’ is referred to as a negative dissenting pattern of 
behavior in organization communication literature (Croucher, Kassing and Diers-
Lawson, 2013; Kassing, 2007). However, this study provides another perspective of 
circumventing, demonstrating it as an advantageous embodied practice which, under 
certain conditions, has the capacity to promote exploration and exploitation and can 
contribute to supporting organizational change.  The analysis reveals that POC goes 
beyond being an upward verbalized expression performed by an employee against 
their immediate supervisor (Kassing, 2002). Rather, it extends beyond side-stepping an 
organization’s official communication structures to include the deliberate sidestepping 
of a process, steps in a process or layers of hierarchy to achieve change in alignment 
with the organization’s strategic intent for exploration and exploitation. The findings 
show POC is not restricted to the supervisor-subordinate dyad as conceived in dissent 
literature (Kassing, 2002; 2007) but has broader application to formal structural 
features (i.e. processes, systems, procedures), and can be exercised by upper-, middle-
managers, ground-level employees and teams.  Furthermore, the study shows that 
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POC is not unidirectional, occurring in an upward dissenting direction (from the 
bottom-up), but also occurs bi-directionally enacted downwards (top-down) by 
management. This fluid multi-directional movement is reflective of Krackhardt and 
Hanson’s (1993) proposition that the informal is capable of moving diagonally and 
elliptically, skipping entire functions and furthers our understanding by providing 
empirical evidence of how such movements are manifested.  
Figure 7, presents an empirically-grounded model of the practice of 
circumventing and shows the central organizational and behavioral dimensions that 
interact to enable the practice, the location in the formal or informal organization, and 
the direction of influence. The model shows the two constituent elements of the 
organization’s context, and that formal and informal organizational elements not only 
coexist but that degrees of consistency (overlap) and inconsistency (no-overlap) (Soda 
and Zaheer, 2012; Gulati and Puranam, 2009) occur simultaneously between these 
elements, highlighting complexity in its interaction.  
 
 
POC: Dynamic capability microfoundations 
Dynamic capabilities research centres on understanding how organizations 
achieve long-term change for competitive advantage. Teece (2007) conceptual 
disaggregation of dynamic capabilities defines three core underpinning processes: the 
capacity to sense opportunities and threats, seize opportunities and execute, and 
reconfigure and enhance resources for long-term sustainability. The representation of 
POC in figure 7 explicitly demonstrates that each of these three core processes are 
present and active in POC through the interactive engagement of formal and informal 
organizational elements.  
161 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Framework of the practice of circumventing and the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities 
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The data indicates that POC is triggered by the actors’ attachment to the 
strategic goals established by the organization’s senior management, and this 
dimension was found to be present across the formal organization, where strategic 
objectives are established by senior management, and the informal organization. The 
trigger dimension is an indication of the presence of strategic consensus within both 
the formal and informal organization. Strategic consensus refers to a shared 
understanding and agreement of the organization’s strategic priorities, thus allowing 
the coordination and implementation of strategy (Walter, Kellermanns, Floyd, Veiga 
and Matherne, 2013). It has been hypothesized that congruence between individual 
actors and organizational goals are greater at higher levels of hierarchy, under the 
premise that the salient goals within the formal organization are those of senior 
management, whilst those of the informal organization are that of individual actors 
and employees (Farris, 1979). However, POC reflects a divergent view with actors’ 
showing strategic consensus resident within the informal organization, suggesting the 
goals held within the informal organization, including lower level employees, can be in 
alignment with the strategic goals of the organization. This concurs with Garner’s 
(2015) empirical study that demonstrates that behaviors exhibited by the informal 
organization can arise from an individual-level attachment to the organization’s formal 
mission and goals. 
Within the informal organization, the goal attachment dimension is a direct 
antecedent to the sensing process, the first component of dynamic capabilities, sensing 
(Teece, 2007). As figure 7 illustrates, within the informal organization, sensing reflects 
the actors scanning the internal and external context, and identifying the issues and 
operational inhibitors hampering the organization’s strategic objective. This sensing 
process occurs as a result of a dynamic analytical system, whereby the actor 
interactively engages with the operational context (i.e. structures and systems) 
determined and shaped by the formal organization. The data suggests that the 
analytical system at play during sensing is an implicit one with actors assessing the 
organization’s prevailing organizational environment not by means of a formalized 
procedure directed by senior management but voluntarily through informal channels.  
Having detected lags and impediments within the organization’s operational 
context and formal systems hampering the effective implementation of exploration 
and exploitation, the second stage of dynamic capabilities, seizing (Teece, 2007), 
becomes active. With POC, the seizing capability relates to the enactment of divergent 
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proactive behavior, the performance of POC. POC is characterized as divergent 
because, for the actors who engage the practice, it is an unconventional way of 
performing that sits outside the organization’s operational and cultural norms. The 
data therefore suggests that POC is an empirical example of positive deviance in 
practice for it is “a departure from organizational norms prescribed by formal and 
informal organizational polices, rules and procedures”, and “institutionalized 
expectations” (Spreitzer and Sonenshein, 2003: 208). A defining feature of positive 
deviance is understanding the norms and expectations shared within a unit or 
organization because it establishes the referent group and dictates whether a behavior 
is deemed divergent and deviant or acceptable (Spreitzer and Sonenshein, 2004). For 
JSC, the data shows that the cultural context is characterized by rigid structures and 
conformity in behaviors and formal regulated processes and procedures. Actors who 
enacted POC exhibited non-conformity to the prevailing context and were therefore 
in conflict with it. Those enacting the POC do so with the knowledge that their 
behavior is unconventional, is in conflict with the prevailing culture and may be 
perceived by others negatively.  
Another key feature of POC is the relationship between the sensing process 
(i.e. strategic focus and identifying issues) and the seizing process (i.e. the enactment 
of POC). The data suggests that this relationship is conditioned by the construct of 
intentionality - “the pursuit of particular “ends” i.e. desired outcomes of the action, 
through the employment of available “means” i.e., anything material or immaterial that 
is instrumentally used in an attempt to achieve these outcomes (Whitford, 2002)” 
(Dittrich and Seidl, forthcoming, p.7) (see figure 7). Spreitzer and Sonenshein (2004) 
explain that intentions behind deviant behavior is a central criterion for positive 
deviance and should be motivated by an honorable purpose, although the authors 
note that ‘honorable’ is an open term. Drawing on MacLean, MacIntoch and Seidl’s 
(2015) brief on the distinction between the teleological and non-teleological notion of 
intentionality, POC appears to be an example of the former for the actors who engage 
in the practice “are guided in their activities by the preconceived ends that they try to 
realize through a process of mobilizing the means that the situation offers” (p, 345). 
Hence, the actions of POC are steered by the formal predefined strategic goal to 
enable and further exploration and exploitation activities at ground level and this 
directs their efforts. Nevertheless, they proceed to enact POC because they are 
motivated by goal attachment to the organization’s strategic focus, and perceive the 
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successful attainment of the end goal has a value that extends beyond themselves and 
benefits the organization as a whole. The traditionally held assumption considers those 
who deviate from norms and standard behaviors through the informal organization 
are disloyal or resistant to positive organizational change (Kranckhardt and Hanson, 
1993). However, the findings of this study indicates that this assertion is not wholly 
accurate. POC shows evidence of actors engaging in the practice deviating from 
formal norms intentionally not as a means of resistance, but in an effort to effectively 
implement strategic goals of the organization and provoke a degree of change. As 
such, it could be argued that POC combines both constructive and destructive 
behaviors as defined in the new meta-theory for deviance (Warren, 2003). Those 
enacting the practice view their behavior as constructive, whereas those either being 
circumvented or observing POC in action may perceive it as destructive to both the 
status quo, formal systems and ways of operating. This line of investigation – the 
perception and reaction of those being side stepped - was not something considered in 
this study and presents an avenue of further inquiry. 
Furthermore, in utilizing the informal organization and informal practices as 
means to overcome the inefficiencies and impediments contained within formal 
organizational systems and structures preventing the desired outcomes, actors 
engaging in POC perceive and utilize POC as a practical solution. In this regard, POC 
takes on a situational dimension because actors having interpreted the prevailing 
organizational context in which they are situated, and its misalignment to the desired 
end goal, are then provoked to respond and deal with the situation (MacLean et al, 
2015), within the sphere of their role. Interestingly, a feature of POC stems from the 
individuals interpretation of the strategy and their perception of the organization. The 
data shows that POC occurred in a context where the definition of innovation and 
lean efficiency was not universally understood by actors within the organization 
(strategy specification gap). It highlights the significance of not having a clearly 
articulated and universally understood meaning of innovation and efficiency, and what 
its corresponding behaviors look like. A finding that concurs with Markides et al 
(2017) who report similar outcomes in their study of organizational agility.  
 
Reconfiguring: POC outcomes  
 The last phase of POC relates to the third process underpinning dynamic 
capabilities – reconfiguring (Teece, 2007). Within dynamic capabilities theory, this third 
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process relates to realigning/enhancing resources to transform the organization’s 
capabilities and resources for long-term sustainability (Teece, 2007). For POC, this 
feature equates to the outcomes of the practice and its long-term effect. Actors who 
engaged POC were motivated by a strategic affiliation to JSC’s ambidextrous strategy 
and utilized POC in an effort to promote and better enable exploration (innovation) 
and exploitation (efficiency) and affect change by overcoming threats and 
impediments within the formal organization. However, the findings indicate that the 
outcomes of POC are mixed, ranging from inaction to facilitating long-term change in 
organizational resources in support of exploration and exploitation activities. The data 
indicates that the outcomes of POC are moderated by two endogenous contextual 
factors rooted in the formal and informal organization – formal authority and 
informal status (refer to figure 6).  
The vignettes from the case analysis (appendix D) illustrates how POC in 
action may begin with a strategic intention to make adjusts and/or change in the 
formal organization processes, structures or systems, but this does not necessarily 
materialize in long-term change due to reasons rooted in an actor’s informal status, 
vis-à-vis social capital (Helfat and Martin, 2015); and their authority, as defined by 
their role and hierarchical position. The findings show that formal authority and 
informal status are important contextual moderators whose combined effect, 
depending on the degree to which they exist, affects the various outcomes of the 
practice. When actor(s) possess a high degree of formal authority and informal status 
POC becomes a mechanism with the capacity to promote explorative and exploitative 
activities by engendering change in features within the formal organization that are 
inhibiting the successful implementation of explorative and exploitative activities. This 
demonstrates a dynamic mode of interaction characteristic of strategic change. This 
finding implies that existing conceptualizations of the modes of interaction between 
the formal and informal organization are insufficient and suggests that other 
interactive modes previously unconsidered may also be in existence.  Some 
organizational actors utilized POC as a way of enacting new ways to do day-to-day 
routines more efficiently, and others engaged POC as a tool to induce innovation.  
In outlining the key features of dynamic capabilities Ambrosini, Bowman and 
Collier (2009) note that they become “embedded in the firm”, and can take the form 
of ‘routines’ or ‘organizational processes’ purposefully utilized to “reconfigure the 
firm’s resource base by deleting decaying resources or recombining old resources’ in 
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new ways” (p. S11). The informal and formal organization are embedded features of 
an organization, and the former has idiosyncratic tendencies. The findings indicate 
that the employment of POC within the context of this study resembles Ambrosini et 
al’s (2009) concept of dynamic capability, in being a practice, though emergent and 
informal, is motivated to bring change in the organization’s resources.  
Teece (2012) explains that “unlike ordinary capabilities, certain dynamic 
capabilities may be based on the skills and knowledge of one or a few executives 
rather than organizational routines” (p. 1395). However, the data extends our 
understanding of dynamic capabilities by showing that the capacity to perform sensing 
and seizing processes constituting dynamic capabilities is not limited by seniority in 
hierarchy, but that actors at all levels of the organization have the potential and some 
do so using experiential knowledge and some form of informal, unofficial means to 
assess existing formal context against explorative and exploitative goals. In being 
enacted at multiple levels – the single individual, a group of individuals, and a level of 
hierarchy (i.e. senior management) – POC is consistent with activity theory’s 
conceptualization of organizational actors as those who interact decisively and 
intentionally with their contexts (Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009) contribute to 
understanding that organizational members at all levels engage with both the formal 
and informal context in their daily activities and that these domains are interwoven at 
all levels of organizational hierarchy. 
Furthermore, the study shows the enactment of informal practices such as 
POC is a distinct knowledge orientated capability based on the experiential skills and 
comprehension of actors concerning organizational routines and operations, and this 
assists their identification of internal obstacles, and formulation of remedial plans to 
bring about an adjustment or change in the internal context that is conducive to the 
strategic goals. In essence, POC corresponds with Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007) 
view of dynamic capabilities as ‘distinct behavioral patterns’ involving both formal and 
informal elements and activities, which provide a means of overcoming barriers and 
rigidities existing within an organization’s routine operational capabilities (p. 914).  
 
Interaction of the formal and informal organization 
The study identifies POC as an interactive mechanism through which 
employees simultaneously engage formal and informal organizational elements in an 
attempt to overcome perceived structural rigidities, a behavior which parallels 
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Diefenbach and Sillince (2011) participatory organization. POC provides an empirical 
demonstration of how the interaction between formal and informal elements has a 
joint effect (McEvily et al, 2014) through actors’ enacted practices, and gives rise to 
unconventional behaviors that are not assembled but emerge organically, contingent 
on the environment in which it exists.  The theoretical framework presented in this 
paper draws upon organizational design and behavioral perspectives to suggest that 
the modes of interaction between the formal and informal organization are diverse 
and dynamic. POC demonstrates that in actuality the interaction between the formal 
and informal organizational elements is an integration of behavioral and organizational 
design perspectives. In the study, organizational actors enacting POC perceive an 
inconsistency between the strategic goals the organization aims to realize (exploration 
and exploitation), and its formal prevailing systems and environment. In reaction to 
identifying inhibiting issues the informal practice of POC is enacted as an autonomous 
act outside the established norms and routine activities of individuals (Burgelman, 
1983), pushing in a direction different to the formal organization. Yet with POC, the 
study found that the interaction goes beyond the informal organization offsetting or 
compensating for the weaknesses in the formal (Gulati and Puranam, 2009), but under 
certain conditions can provoke changes in formal systems.  
Whilst research (Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Zenger, Lazzarini and Poppo, 
2002; Kang, Kang and Kim, 2017) suggests that the formal organization (normative 
social systems) can be changed relatively quickly, whereas the informal organization 
(emergent social interactions) is subject to limits and lags in adjusting to the new 
formal organization and may be slow to change (i.e. inertia within informal institutions 
slows the pace of change). However, POC provides a challenge to this view, and 
suggests that informal emergent mechanisms can be enacted by actors and contribute 
to the change process. Furthermore, the study implies that in practice elements of the 
formal organization can sometimes lag behind and struggle to change, and in such 
cases informal practices such as POC provide a transient rectification mechanism, a 
view reflective of Gulati and Puranam’s (2009) concept of compensatory fit. This 
reflects Friedrichs (2015) view of the influence the informal organization has on firm 
functioning in promoting individuals to ‘behave innovatively and spontaneously’ 
(p.174) by identifying flaws, areas for improvement, and ways to contribute to the 
organization’s innovativeness.  Furthermore, POC contributes to literature by 
providing empirical support to the proposition that the informal organization, and by 
168 
 
extension informal practices, are influenced by and also have the potential to influence 
features in the formal organization (Mintzberg, 1979). 
For practitioners, this inconsistency suggests the formal structural context 
designed by management cannot guarantee optimal implementation of strategic goals 
and that employees from the ground up have the capability to identify operational 
weaknesses and engage in remedial informal practice to implement strategic goals 
more effectively. This finding implies that the informal organization and its interaction 
with the formal organization should not be disregarded even when the informal 
appears to be divergent from formal systems, norms and expected behaviors (Gino, 
2016). The practice of circumventing demonstrates that informal practices emerging in 
conflict with the formal organization can be a mechanism for supporting the 
implementation of strategic goals and promoting change.  
 
Directions for future studies and practical implications  
Firstly, with respect to the interaction between the formal and informal 
organization, it would be useful to expand this investigation of the informal 
organization to other organizations whose organizational context may differ to that of 
this case study. Such an exploration will provide greater depth and insight into 
whether the practice of circumventing manifests differently in other organizational 
contexts, and could shed light on other possible contextual moderators affecting 
outcomes which may lead to the discovery of other uncovered results. Secondly, this 
study focused on the internal environment of the organization, however our 
understanding of the informal organization, how it interacts with formal elements and 
the flow and nature of influence between these elements could be furthered with 
research exploring the strategic context external to the organization and its effects. We 
note the significance of legislation in the case of JSC and its shaping role, but the 
effect of broader external context including professional communities, customers and 
partners could be further explored in recognition that autonomous initiatives are not 
singularly directed by the internal context (Bower, Doz and Gilbert, 2005). And 
thirdly, the study highlights the role the interplay between the formal and informal 
organization has as a dynamic capability, and notes the contribution informal practices 
such as POC have as a supporting mechanism of change. Future studies could expand 
upon the informal organization from a dynamic capabilities perspective and explore 
what other mechanisms manifest as part of this process.    
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In terms of practical implications, this study’s exposition of the interaction 
between the formal and informal organizational elements may give managers and 
employees deeper insights into the role and significance of informal behavior during 
transitions in which a new strategy is being implemented and can help them to better 
understand and frame their actions in light of the possible outcomes that may result. 
The study also confronts the notion that organizational problems should be funneled 
by managers through formally designed structures and procedures to designated 
decision makers (Galbrith, 1977) because effective identification of threat, obstacles 
and inefficiencies and the formulation of appropriate remedial actions can also take 
place by and through the informal organization and informal practices enacted by 
those in non-managerial as well as managerial positions. The implementation of 
strategic organizational goals is renowned for being difficult. This study and the 
identification of POC challenges current theoretical perceptions of circumventing, 
suggesting that our view of the action should not be limited to dissent strategies or 
negative behavior. In certain contextual environments and strategic situations the 
practice of circumventing represents an unconventional combination and series of 
interactions between formal and informal organizational elements with the potential to 
promote explorative and exploitative activities acting as a supportive mechanism to 
implement strategies geared towards ambidexterity. Hence, solutions to issues of 
strategy implementation and contextual alignment to strategic goals may not lie purely 
in the formal organizational elements but can emerge organically from innovative 
unconventional informal practices to the benefit of the organization and aid in 
developing capabilities. 
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Chapter Four  
 
 
 
Historical embeddedness, crises and its 
influence on the pursuit of organizational 
ambidexterity 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The adage, “history matters”, has verisimilitude in organizational theory and 
strategic management research. Scholars acknowledge that an organization and its 
functional context are shaped by its historical embeddedness, defined herein as the 
way in which sociohistorical environments characterize an organization’s strategic 
processes, practices, way of behaving and our perceptions of them (Vaara and 
Lamberg, 2016). Vaara and Lamberg (2016) go on to explain that in emphasizing 
historical embeddedness “one should not merely place processes and practices in 
context but also understand their inherent historical nature and construction” (p. 634). 
While history is recognized to be of importance, there is growing debate as to the role 
history plays in organizational management. Scholars increasingly voice the need for 
research to give more theoretical and empirical attention to history and its influence 
(Kipping and Üsdiken, 2014). The contention that history influences an organization’s 
present utility suggests that if we are to gain a deeper understanding of an 
organization’s transition and approach to ambidexterity one must also account for the 
organization’s history. Hence, understanding how history influences an organization’s 
current strategic context has value in furthering theoretical development and practical 
application (Jones and Khanna, 2006).  
To date theories and studies examining how an organization simultaneously 
pursues exploration and exploitation, its antecedents and contributing factors, are 
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largely ahistorical. Organizational journals have increasingly sought to engage 
historical evidence in examining contemporary phenomena and outcomes, such as 
organizational processes (Pettigrew et al, 2001), organizational identity formation and 
transition (Meyer, Bartunek and Lacey, 2002; Tripsas, 2009) and the strategic change 
process (Agarwal and Helfat, 2009). Reviews of extant management literature show 
history has, for the most part, received either little attention (Clark and Rowlinson, 
2004; Kipping and Üsdiken, 2014), or been treated as ‘supplementarist’ (Üsdiken and 
Kieser, 2004; Üsdiken, Kipping and Engwall, 2011). In the context of organizational 
change, Suddaby and Foster (2017) observe that existing theories generally contain 
implicit assumptions of history. However, in analyzing organizational change some 
studies have sought to explain the role of history explicitly by examining founding 
conditions and the concept of imprinting (Boeker, 1989; van Driel and Dolfsma, 
2010), the role and influence of founding entrepreneurs (Bryant, 2012; Ellis, 
Aharonson, Drori and Shapira, 2017), and the influence of path dependence on 
strategic choice and change (Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch, 2009; Schreyögg and 
Sydow, 2011).  
One area of interest pertinent to organizational history, and a core feature of 
this paper, is the frequently observed phenomenon organizational crisis. 
Organizations, irrespective of their industries, are not immune to crisis events and 
must deal with exogenous threats (i.e. regulatory changes, technological advances and 
innovation) as well as internally provoked incidences. Crises are viewed as defining 
moments in an organization’s history, for they have a significant effect on long-term 
strategic efforts, innovation and structure (Seeger, Ulmer, Novak and Sellnow, 2005). 
Maitlis and Christianson (2014) note that crisis events represent influential 
sensemaking triggers and play a central role in shaping an organization’s 
developmental trajectory. Yet, to date crisis as a concept has been undertheorized 
(Sarkar and Osiyevsky, 2017), and less attention has been given to looking at how 
historical crisis events in an organization’s past influence its contemporary setting for 
strategic change towards ambidexterity. Thus, in order to understand an organization’s 
present approach to strategic change in pursuit of exploration and exploitation, one 
needs to consider how crises embedded in an organization’s history affect and shape 
the organization. This study, therefore, is motivated to address the research question: 
how do historical events in an organization’s past influence its contemporary approach to strategic 
change, and what role do historical crises play in its joint pursuit of exploration and exploitation? 
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To address this research question a longitudinal case analysis was conducted of 
the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), an established organization in the process of 
transitioning to an ambidextrous strategy and the joint pursuit of exploration and 
exploitation. Founded in the early 1960’s, the study examines JSC’s 50 year history 
which is marked by significant technological achievements, periods of organizational 
change and a series of major crisis events. This organization, therefore, provides an 
opportune setting in which to examine the influence history, and in particular crisis 
events, has upon an organization’s modern transition and approach to ambidexterity. 
The study found that organizational history has a multidimensional influence on an 
organization’s strategic transition towards ambidexterity by stimulating adaptive 
change and inertial tendencies simultaneously. Case analysis identified two historically 
embedded concurrent processes which shaped the organization’s ongoing 
ambidexterity strategy. The first process identified has been labeled sustained imprinting, 
and refers to the perpetuation of founding characteristics as a result of an 
organization’s historical achievements. Sustained imprinting incited friction with the 
new ambidextrous strategy by engendering competency traps and inertial tendencies in 
an effort to preserve its historical achievements. The second process refers to reprinting 
and occurs as a result of historical crises and the organizational trauma experienced as 
a consequence. The study found that crisis events characterized by trauma within an 
organization’s history provoked the organization to adapt and develop new 
characteristics and modes of operating to enhance improvements to benefit its future 
endeavors and prevent future trauma events. At the same time, reprinting stimulates 
rigidities and constraints which redefine the parameters of future exploration and 
exploitation activities. Consequently, the study contributes to our understanding of 
history as an ongoing present (Schultz and Hernes, 2013), whereby past achievements 
and previous crises experiences continually influence an organization’s present 
strategic activity and shapes its future conditions relating to strategic change. It also 
shows how the parameters circumscribing an organization’s joint pursuit of 
exploration and exploitation are progressively redefined by historical crisis and trauma 
events.  
I begin by reviewing literature on organizational history, focusing on 
theoretical concepts that apply to the context of organizational change. For an 
established organization, the transition to a strategy targeted towards the joint pursuit 
of exploration and exploitation constitutes a planned change process and evokes 
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organizational adjustments, be it in structure, cultural context, and operational 
activities. Exploration activities involve innovation, risk taking and openness to new 
knowledge, whereas exploitation refers to efficiency, strict controls and variance 
reduction (March, 1991). Hence, organizational change towards ambidexterity would 
seek to accommodate the requirements of both activities.  
Given the application of organizational change relevant to this paper, the 
literature review in the next section discusses theoretical concepts pertinent to 
organizational history, change and crises. I subsequently introduce the empirical case 
study, explicating the various data sources, and then discusses the findings emerging 
from the research, its theoretical contribution and practice implications.  
 
 
LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
Organizational history and change 
Within management literature, conceptualizations of organizational change 
hold implicit assumptions of history and its influence on change (Suddaby and Foster, 
2017). Existing management and organization literature approach to history is latent in 
nature, with few studies explicitly engaging with history empirically or theoretically 
(Kipping and Üsdiken, 2014). Kipping and Üsdiken (2014) argue that a crucial issue 
for management research when engaging with history surrounds being explicit in how 
it relates to theory. In theorizing history, the authors make a distinction between 
“history to theory” and “history in theory” (p. 535); whereby the former uses history as 
evidence to develop, modify or test theories, whilst the latter integrates history within 
theory and pays attention to nuances specific to the historical context whilst 
considering how this may influence subsequent developments. Suddaby and Foster 
(2017) call for research to demonstrate ‘historical consciousness’ by giving explicit 
attention to history and how it frames our understanding: “rather than adopting an 
essentialist view of history as a set of immutable facts that must be overcome by 
constructing an artificial break or rupture with the past, our core insight is that 
successful change can occur by reframing our attitudes and preconceived notions 
about the past” (p. 34). Within the field of management, gaps remain in our 
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understanding of how history influences strategic processes and its resulting effects, 
and how the sociohistorical context links to and shapes strategic practices (Vaara and 
Lamberg, 2016). The intention of this paper, therefore, is to address the 
aforementioned gap and explore how an organization’s sociohistorical environment 
influences its transition towards organizational ambidexterity, and the consequences 
historical embeddedness has on how the dual pursuit of exploration and exploitation 
is approached by an organization and its employees.  
 For an established organization operating a single or dominant strategy 
(Porter, 1980), the adoption and transition to an ambidextrous strategy, driven by the 
simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation, constitutes an organizational 
change process. In reference to this study, exploration relates to openness, risk taking, 
innovation and new learning, whilst exploitation refers to variance reduction, strict 
procedural controls, and efficiency and performance stability (March, 1991). Both 
activities necessitate different requirements and require changes in the organization’s 
operations and perceptual framing and logic if it is to achieve ambidexterity. Yet, 
organizational change is recognized by managers and scholars to be a challenging and 
difficult endeavor, and academics and practitioners have sought to understand the 
issues underlying organizational change (e.g. McKinsey & Company, 2014; Sastry, 
1997; Todem By, 2005). This exercise that has culminated in an abundance of change 
strategies and models designed to instruct managers in effectively managing their 
organizations during discontinuous change (Kotter, 1996, 1997; Lewin, 1951 cited in 
Burnes, 2004). Van de Ven and Poole (1995) contend that organizational change 
encompasses perceiving a visible difference in an organization’s form or state of being 
(e.g. services or product offerings, strategy, role and tasks of individuals or teams). 
Change consequently alters specific key variables that influence employees and their 
work-related behaviors.  
In recent years, research has increasingly begun to take a historically informed 
approach to examining organizational change in various practices and structural 
arrangements (Üsdiken et al, 2011). To date, change models hold implicit assumptions 
of history and its influence on the change process. Scholarly examination of history 
tends to perceive it as an obstructive influence with studies drawing on concepts such 
as founding imprints, path dependency, and inertial forces; and are constructs within 
Suddaby and Foster (2017) epistemological assumption of ‘history-as-fact’. Üsdiken et 
al (2011) refer to the ecology perspective of organizational change as a difficult 
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endeavor owing to the view that organizations become characteristically rigid with age 
and size over time and, therefore, seek to preserve stability and continuity rather than 
adapt and change. In this context, history is deemed an internal inertial force 
constraining organizational change. Therefore, it is to be expected that an established 
organization accustomed to operating a dominant strategy to which it has committed 
resources over time, would contend with resisting and constraining inertial forces, 
imprinted characteristics and processes when attempting to change its strategic course 
of action. However, Suddaby and Foster (2017) posit an alternative view noting that 
“history actually offers a valuable but underexploited organizational resource that can 
be used to motivate and successfully manage change” (p. 34). The following focuses 
specifically on one history related concept pertinent to this paper’s discussion and 
theoretical development – imprinting.  
 
Imprinting: Originating from the field of biology and the work of Stinchcombe 
(1965), imprinting refers to the enduring effect founding environmental conditions 
have on shaping elements or characteristics of an organization despite subsequent 
changes (Simsek, Fox and Heavey, 2015). As a distinct concept, imprinting remains 
undefined within extant literature. Simsek et al (2015) develop a conceptual multi-
process framework of imprinting suggesting that imprinting is not a one-off 
occurrence in which environmental factors are branded upon an object but rather 
consists of three processes “in which an imprint is formed (genesis), evolves and 
morphs (metamorphosis), and eventually becomes manifest in outcomes (manifestations)” 
(p. 289. Italics copied from original). Hence, Simsek et al’s (2015) framework implies 
imprints may not necessarily remain static or fixed but can over time assume a 
dynamic evolving quality.   
In conceptualizing the imprinting concept scholars identify three defining 
features (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). Firstly, imprinting requires the existence of a 
transient sensitive period during which time the organization is susceptible to and 
shaped by the environmental conditions existing at the time. This focus on sensitive 
periods aligns with Simsek et al’s (2015) genesis process and represents the initial 
process when imprints are formed by internalizing ‘imprinter’ (Simsek et al, 2015: 293) 
features to become traits, routines, and structures. A number of organizational studies 
from an array of fields have focused on an organization’s founding and formation as 
the key sensitive period in its development (e.g. Boeker, 1989; Hannan, Baron, Hsu 
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and Koçak, 2006; Johnson, 2007; Perkmann and Spicer, 2014).  However, this focus 
on the founding sensitive period raises questions as to whether organizations 
experience multiple sensitive periods post founding, the causes of these episodes and 
the longstanding effects of such sensitive periods (Johnson, 2007). Van Driel and 
Dolfsma (2010) theorize that imprinting “is unlikely to be a ‘one-shot’ phenomenon”, 
but rather a repeated process that conditions and locks-in the organization, “where 
lock-in is a dynamic phenomenon, representing continuity and not rigidity” (p. 38). In 
addressing sensitive periods, Simsek et al (2015) review imprinting literature and note 
that some studies acknowledge the occurrence of sensitive periods post an 
organization’s founding which influence the formation of new imprints (e.g. 
discontinuous change, new market and/or product entry, leadership transitions and 
succession, shock and/or crisis events). However, the authors assert that “imprinting 
scholars have developed only a cursory understanding of the notion of sensitive 
periods” (Simsek et al, 2015: 307), and calls for research to bring more specification to 
the nature or boundaries of such sensitive periods both at founding and post-
founding. In looking at the evolution of strategy in semiconductor companies 
Boeker’s (1989) findings extend the imprinting concept beyond the significance of 
founding conditions. Boeker (1989) finds that events subsequent to the organization’s 
founding also play a significant role in “either limiting or encouraging change in 
strategy” (p. 509); and that the degree to which a founding strategy is perpetuated 
throughout the course of an organization’s history is influenced by conditions and 
events after its founding. Although the findings highlight the shaping influence of 
post-founding events Boeker (1989) does not explicitly specify what type or form 
these subsequent events take or their effects. Furthermore, studies in the field of 
strategy pay little attention to the actual mechanisms and processes by which 
imprinting (at founding or post-founding) actually occurs. Hence, there is a need for a 
clearer understanding of the processes involved in imprinting, its creation and its 
performative outcomes (Johnson, 2007); and further suggests the need for greater 
exploration into post-founding sensitive periods.  
Secondly, conceptualizations of imprinting generally emphasize the main 
factors shaping and determining the organization’s characteristics and structures 
(Simsek et al, 2015). The external environment was the initial concept purported to 
influence and impress attributes upon the organization that reflect the time period. 
Studies have identified a number of environmental factors such as founding economic 
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and political conditions (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006) and exogenous shocks and 
cultural context (Dieleman, 2010). Interestingly, Kriauciunas and Kale’s (2006) 
examination of transition economies in the early 1990s shows how firms underwent 
strategic change from a socialist-orientation to a market-orientation, and that changes 
in the external environment necessitate changes in the organization’s internal 
structure. The authors conclude that the sudden change in the market environment 
pressured firms to adapt their performance and that socialist imprinting negatively 
influenced the firm’s ability to change its knowledge sets, and search process for new 
knowledge within the new market context.  
Studies have also cast individuals as a conditioning shaping force on 
imprinting by virtue of their personality and cognition, background, social networks 
and identity (Simsek et al, 2015) referring to founders, entrepreneurs or founding 
teams (Boeker, 1987; Bryant, 2012; Zheng, 2012). Founders are a product of their 
environment and as such transfer and imprint characteristics of their time and place 
onto the organization through their experiences and knowledge of the environment 
(Simsek et al, 2015; Ellis, Aharonson, Drori and Shapira, 2017). For example, 
Johnson’s (2007) historical study on the founding of the Paris Opera and ‘cultural 
entrepreneurship’ reveals the significant role played by managers and entrepreneurs in 
selecting contextual attributes specific to the time in an effort to achieve fit with the 
external environment, and these attributes become longstanding characteristics 
impressed on the organization. Other studies show that individual characteristics of 
the founding individuals, such as vision, can influence imprints on strategy, processes, 
structures and organizational forms (Johnson, 2007). Employing a genealogical 
approach, Ellis, Aharonson, Drori and Shapira (2017) study on the longevity of 
imprinting on entrepreneurial proclivity concludes that the persistence of imprinting is 
a consequence of heredity processes. The authors find that lineage inheritance 
processes shape and enable the transmission of imprinted entrepreneurial knowledge 
from one generation of founders to the next, hence “single founders might have a 
‘ripple effect’ through which their knowledge and values are perpetuated and influence 
an entire industrial sector” (p. 501). Interestingly, Simsek et al (2015) note the 
imprinting influence of individuals and founders is not limited to the founding period 
but this influence can be experienced at later periods in the organization’s 
development.  
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Van Driel and Dolfsma (2010) present a slightly different framing of the 
conditions influencing imprinting and emphasize ‘values and philosophies’ which they 
conceptualize as an abstract routine. The authors claim “higher-order routines are of 
special interest since they both modify existing routines and guide the search for and 
selection of new routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 18) …thus, open up the 
possibility of explaining dynamics and change” (van Driel and Dolfsma, 2010: 37). 
The authors are of the view that high-order routines represent meta-routines which 
need not be recognized or formalized implicitly or explicitly in organizations. 
The third key feature of the imprinting concept relates to the persistence or 
“stickiness” of imprints over time despite major changes in the organization’s 
environment (Simsek et al, 2015). Johnson (2007) refers to this as a reproduction 
whereby founding structures and practices continue to be exhibited in the 
organization’s subsequent history. Stinchcombe (as cited in Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013) 
suggests the persistence of structures and practices may be due to efficiency, inertial 
forces and interests preserving the structure, and the lack of a competitive 
environment challenging the organization’s survival, thereby necessitating the need for 
change. In referring to the nature of imprints and their persistence over time Marquis 
and Tilcsik (2013) and Wollin (1999) posit that imprints within an organization may be 
layered over time, but note questions remain as to whether older imprints decay or 
continue to persist, and what influence do older imprints have on subsequent ones. 
However, Simsek et al (2015) develop the concept of persistence further and refer to 
imprints becoming progressively ingrained and amplified in an organization; noting 
that concepts such as path dependency (Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch, 2009) and self-
reinforcement by means of an escalation of commitment (Schreyögg and Sydow, 
2011) provide examples of mechanisms explaining the amplification and 
reinforcement of imprints. In a similar vein Blombäck, Brunninge and Melander 
(2013) study draws on the work of Schein (1983) to emphasize the retention and 
reinforcement of imprints. The authors highlight the role of corporate values and 
value statements in imprinting values on an organization by its founder as a self-
reinforcing process (Sydow and Schreyögg, 2013). Whilst acknowledging that some 
imprints are perpetuated and remain unchanged over time, Simsek et al (2015) 
contend that the “effects and surface characteristics can vary over time” and therefore 
“imprints are subject to change, evolution, and transformation” (p. 299), a process the 
authors refer to as metamorphosis.  
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Conversely, a contrary view to the persistence of imprints exists purporting 
that imprints can also decay over time, with studies referring to mechanisms such as 
organizational change and inertia (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013) as contributing to the 
imprint decay. Simsek et al (2015) propose that other than persisting, decaying, and 
becoming ingrained, imprints may also assume a fourth state – transformation – 
whereby an imprint is “subject to abrupt destruction or transformation” (p. 301), be it 
through, for example, incremental or radical transformations, or punctuated 
equilibrium (Wollin, 1999). However, gaps remain in our understanding of the 
mechanisms underpinning the creation, and retention of imprints (Blombäck et al, 
2013; Johnson, 2007). Furthermore, imprinting studies have generally paid little 
attention to the interaction and interplay between the mechanisms and forces that 
produce the persistence, amplification, transformation and decay of imprints (Simsek 
et al, 2015).  
 
 
Strategic change and the role of crises  
In extending the imprinting hypothesis, this paper follows in the same suit of 
studies acknowledging that the occurrence of crises events represent sensitive periods 
in an organization’s development (Dieleman, 2010; Narayanan, Colwell and Douglas, 
2009).  
Management literature is rife with studies examining corporate scandals, 
disaster events, and the strategies with which to manage and respond to these crisis 
events (e.g. James, Wooten and Dushek, 2011). Prevailing discourse on organizational 
change posits that crisis events provide an apt platform upon which to instigate 
organizational change, and this thinking has become a key component of planned 
change models in management and strategy research. For example, Lewin’s (1951) 
seminal work develops the three-step model of planned change – unfreezing, ‘moving’ 
(change), and refreezing. The model contends that for change to occur, the 
organization must be shaken-up and its stability disrupted. Similarly, Schein (1996) 
recognizes the importance of destabilizing an organization from its status quo in order 
to produce change. Common across these change strategies is the notion of creating a 
sense of urgency, ‘a burning platform’ or crisis as a trigger to initiate change. However, 
what form the crisis or burning platform should take is not explicated, nor does 
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literature provide insights into the unplanned and unintended effects that may arise as 
a result of creating a sense of crisis; and importantly, how does an organization’s 
historical experience of crisis and urgency influence future change initiatives? 
Moreover, Seeger, Ulmer, Novak and Sellnow’s (2005) case analysis of bond-trading 
firm Cantor Fitzgerald and their discourse around change and renewal post the USA 
9/11 terrorist attack found evidence supporting the view that crisis is a change-
inducing platform “with the potential to fundamentally alter the form, structure, and 
direction of an organization” (p. 78). However, the authors recognize a dichotomy 
that exists with crisis events for they can induce severe harm in addition to change.  
As a field, crisis management literature is fragmented and interdisciplinary 
(Sarkar and Osiyevskyy, 2017). Debate surrounding crises and organizational change 
orientate around two perspectives. One perspective shares the view of planned change 
models and contends that crises are change-inducing platforms promoting 
organizational adaptation or renewal (Seeger, et al, 2005). The second perspective 
frames crises negatively, maintaining that threatened organizations are defiant, resist 
change, exhibit risk-averse behaviors and hold to pre-existing established ways (Sarkar 
and Osiyevskyy, 2017). Much of the existing crisis management research assumes this 
second view and frames the phenomena negatively, viewing it as a disruptive threat or 
problem to be overcome (James et al, 2011).  
Organizational crises have been depicted in extant literature along various 
lines. A phrase commonly used in literature to define crisis describes it as a ‘low-
probability, high impact situation’ (e.g. Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2008: 177; Yu, 
Sengul and Lester; 2008: 452). Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998) focus on uncertainty 
and the unpredictable nature of crises, describing it as “specific, unexpected and non-
routine, organizationally-based event or series of events which create high levels of 
uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (p. 
233). James and Wooten (2010) emphasize the public, sporadic and undesirable quality 
of crises which “requires immediate corrective action by firm leaders” (p. 17). Dutton 
(1986) also considers the need for corrective action as a defining feature of crises 
describing it as “a perception that an individual or set of individuals face a potentially 
negative outcome unless some type of corrective action is taken” (p. 502). In defining 
the term ‘crisis’, Fink, Beak and Taddeo (1971) regard it as a specific event which 
induces change: “Most often a crisis is precipitated by an identifiable event, either 
within or outside the system, and the processes of coping and resolution are relatively 
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long-term in nature. The extent or intensity of the crisis depends primarily upon the 
degree of change required of the system in order for it to adapt successfully” (p. 17).  
Literature recognizes that crisis events are not all the same and differ in their origin, 
magnitude, and resulting impact. Nevertheless, studies to date are dominated by the 
view of crisis as an extreme event triggered by exogenous environmental shocks (i.e. 
national or global economic downturns, political instability, and terrorist activity 
(Mainiero and Gibson, 2003; Schmitt, Probst and Tushman, 2010).  
Some studies have shown crises can result from endogenous factors 
unattended to by managers (Roux-Dufont, 2009), or vulnerabilities at different levels 
of the organization (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992). Roux-Dufont (2009) processual 
exposition of crises provides an alternative conceptual perspective. Roux-Dufont 
(2009) views crises not as sudden unusual occurrences independent of managerial 
competence, but the product of two parallel cumulative processes internal to an 
organization which cultivates organizational vulnerabilities revealed by a precipitating 
event. The author contends that these processes represent pre-existing conditions that 
make the organization susceptible and prone to crises. The first process relates to 
deficiencies that build up within an organization and form the basis upon which crises 
occur. The other process is associated with the lack of knowledge managers have of 
these organizational deficiencies and as a consequence of managerial ignorance, 
defects accumulate making the organization vulnerable. In another vein, Fink, Beak 
and Taddeo (1971) conceptual framework disaggregates the four phases of crisis as it 
pertains to individuals and is extrapolated to organization’s  – 1) shock, 2) defensive 
retreat and resistance to change, 3) acknowledgment, and 4) process of adaptation and 
change. Fink et al’s (1971) four stage model assumes all crisis events follow an 
organized discernable pattern and move through each of the four stages sequentially 
through time. The authors propose that present within every human system is two 
counterbalancing shifting forces, one which strives to maintain the status quo whilst 
the other presses for growth and change. They contend that the force to maintain the 
status quo is dominant during the initial stages of a crisis and manifests in resistance to 
change, but this shifts towards growth in the latter phases as the impetus for change 
and adaptation develops. And as the organization begins to make structural changes 
and adapt, “the systems become less and less dependent upon its past history and 
more and more in touch with current developments” (Fink et al, 1971: 25). Hence, 
this view suggests that in a crisis situation organizational imprints embedded in an 
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organization’s history may undergo a transformation or even decay as part of enabling 
the manifestation of current change.  
This paper acknowledges the view of crises as an unforeseen event at a 
particular time that can be caused by either exogenous or endogenous factors which 
disrupts the organization, triggers uncertainty and necessitates a change response by 
the affected organization (James and Wooten, 2010; Sarkar and Osiyevskyy, 2017).  
 
 
Organizational trauma 
Although research attention has been given to the concept of organizational 
crises, change management models give little attention to the related concept of 
organizational trauma. The term crisis is broad and captures various characteristics. 
Simsek et al (2015) contend that imprinting scholars have tended to treat crisis as 
open-ended phase with little specification as to the nature of the crisis, and note there 
is a lack of clarity over the “detailed temporal sensitivities and sequences of 
imprinting” (p. 307). This study emphasizes crisis in relation to organizational trauma.  
Organizations experience trauma in a form parallel to individuals (Horman 
and Vivan, 2005). For organizations, trauma events can involve mergers and 
acquisitions, down-sizing, restructuring and lay-offs, an economic crisis, or can be a 
symptom of a crisis or disastrous event (Amabile and Conti, 1999; Simuth, 2017; 
Stuart, 1996). What is significant is that not all crisis events result in trauma but those 
that do are defined by this trait. 
In defining trauma, Stuart (1996) distinguishes it from abuse and catastrophe, 
and provides a psychology orientated description of its nature viewing it as “a 
psychological emergency, a reaction to events that we have intimately and forcefully 
experienced as overwhelming and which we have little or no control over, no matter 
how hard we try. Traumatic events bring disruption and uncertainty … The more 
intense our perception and experience of the event, the greater may be our trauma. 
Although there are degrees of trauma, varying from mild to severe, all by definition 
are traumatic” (p. 12). Simuth (2017) takes a broader view in defining organizational 
trauma as “a consequence of a situation which causes traumatic experiences to 
individuals within the organization” (p. 120).  
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Stuart (1996) purports that trauma is an emotional response to major 
organizational change and is equivalent to “emotional hiccups” (p. 11), and this 
assertion is gaining traction in organizational management and behavior literature 
(Szymanski and Schindler, 2017). Prevailing assumptions of organizational trauma 
associate it as having a negative influence on an organization’s performance and 
behavior. However, Szymanski and Schindler (2017) illustrate that organizational 
trauma can also have a positive long-term effect on culture “when consciously 
reflected upon” and can be turned “into positive reinforcements of organizational 
culture and an impetus for change” when directed by highly skilled managers (p. 
1536). Hence, one could argue that crisis-trauma events are paradoxical for they 
provide a fitting springboard from which to launch radical planned organizational 
change in an effort to produce positive performance outcomes; but simultaneously it 
can also be the source of internal injury to an organization and its employees, and 
interfere with performance. Organizational trauma represents a significant 
phenomenon borne out of negative circumstances whose effects reverberate across an 
organization’s culture, performance and behavior over time (Szymanski and Schindler, 
2017). Horman and Vivan (2005) and Kahn (2003) both highlight that organizational 
trauma arises from internal or external acts, can be direct or indirect, and assume 
many forms. Drawing on Lewin and Schein’s change models, Szymanski and 
Schindler (2017) propose that sudden traumatic events produce “a significant 
emotional loading” effect on the organization, creating a platform to disrupt the status 
quo and provides managers an opportunity to introduce new positive changes.  
In characterizing trauma events, Mias deKlerk (2007) notes its compounded 
effect, given that traumatic crisis events can occur periodically throughout an 
organization’s lifecycle. Mias deKlerk (2007) explains that “traumatic events also do 
not stand alone, but rather have a cumulative effect where the trauma of an incident 
adds to and builds upon previous trauma” (p: 50). This assertion suggests that in order 
to understand, crisis and trauma events and their effects, research should not focus on 
a solo crisis-trauma event, as is traditionally done in articles, but rather look at the 
cumulative experience of trauma events an organization undergoes to understand how 
they link and build upon each other, and the impact this has on the organization. 
Keidl (1994) views trauma as a psychiatric condition which produces a distressing 
emotional experience with long-lasting effects and, in a similar vein to Mias deKlerk 
(2007), questions whether trauma could in the long-run negate any perceived successes 
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gained from restructuring. Keidl (1994) queries the long-term effects of trauma 
suggesting a forward-looking perspective is required to understand how trauma 
experienced by organizations today could affect them in the future. Whereas Keidl 
(1994) advocates for a forward-looking approach to analyzing current trauma events 
to ascertain the future, this paper takes a converse position and asks how an 
organization’s contemporary strategic orientation and change initiative is affected by 
historical crisis-trauma events in its past. As such, the study sets out to analyze the 
organization’s present strategic change towards exploration and exploitation by 
understanding its history looking at the present phenomenon using a retrospective 
frame of history (Garland, 2014). Thus, in exploring markedly pertinent aspects of an 
organization’s past set in a distinctive time-period (i.e. historical crisis-trauma events), 
the study looks to understand the imprints created by such episodes upon an 
organization and how they are embodied and manifest in its current strategic process. 
In summary, literature highlights that an organization and its functional 
context is shaped but its history. In seeking to understand how organizational history 
influences an organization’s contemporary transition to a new ambidextrous strategy 
(the dual pursuit of exploration and exploitation) this study draws on the imprinting 
concept. Imprinting literature explains defining organizational characteristics are 
established during sensitive periods in an organization’s history, with studies giving 
primacy to an organization’s founding. Furthermore, post-founding sensitive periods 
have gained recognition as periods during which the imprinting process occurs and 
imprints are (re)established. This study gives particular attention to historical crisis 
events post an organization’s founding, as a sensitive period during which 
organizational imprints may be created or transformed. The study does not take a 
broad view of crises but gives particular attention to endogenous events where the 
nature of crisis is characterized by organizational trauma and induces significant 
emotional response. Studies reflect that organizational history can enable change as 
well as be a constraining force, and in the same vein researchers contend that 
organizational crisis and trauma events can provide a platform for change whilst other 
researchers frame it as having a negative effect on an organization. Thus, in engaging 
with the concepts of organizational history, imprinting, crisis and trauma this study 
investigates what influence these historically embedded concepts have on an 
organizations contemporary strategic change effort for ambidexterity. Figure 8 
represents a conceptual framing of the related key concepts pertinent to this study. 
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Figure 8: Conceptual framing of key concepts 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Research design 
This study is based on an in-depth single case analysis utilizing longitudinal 
data of the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and critical events in its history from 
its founding in 1958 to 2015. The research approach follows in the footsteps of 
qualitative longitudinal single-case studies underpinned by the intention to develop 
theory of strategy as a practice (e.g. Carter and McKinlay, 2013; Paroutis, Mckeown 
and Collinson, 2013).  
 
Research context – The NASA Johnson Space Center  
The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) was selected because as an established 
organization it has a well-documented, long history that is characterized by highly 
publicized historical achievements and crisis-trauma events. An important 
distinguishing feature of NASA and JSC is its organizational history (see appendix E 
for further details of JSC founding history). As a Center, JSC is historically 
accustomed to undergoing change, from changing government Administrations and 
Center Directors to space mission programs. JSC’s history is distinguished by a 
number of significant exogenous and internally provoked events, including crises and 
fatal disasters - the Apollo 1 fire, Space Shuttle Challenger and Space Shuttle 
Columbia disasters (see table 10). The fatal crisis events led to Congressional hearings 
and attracted mass media news reporting and public reactions. More recently, in 2010, 
under what was a new government Administration, the relatively new Constellation 
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space program directed out of JSC, was cancelled for being untenable due to escalating 
budget costs and delays in its schedule, ending five years of federal investment 
amounting to $9 billion and one of the Center’s largest programs.  The following year, 
2011, marked another defining moment for JSC with the retirement of the Space 
Shuttle vehicles, ending the 39 years program operated out of JSC.  It was the last time 
JSC would control and be responsible for the launch of a human space vehicle.  The 
cancellation of the Constellation program and the end of the Shuttle program had a 
massive impact on JSC who saw the end of two space missions within the space of 
two years, the loss of more than 5000 jobs (contractor employees) and a decline in 
morale; "to people who are working on these programs, this is like a death in the 
family" (NASA Administrator, Charlie Bolden). As of 2017, the Space Station is now 
the only operational human space vehicle with JSC mission control handling most of 
the day-to-day operations on board the ISS.  
Furthermore, since 2012/2013, JSC’s senior management developed a new 
internal strategy designed to reposition the Center and better align it with its changing 
context. For JSC, organizational performance and environmental variation (Boeker, 
1989) are the relevant factors provoking the organization to change and adopt a new 
strategic direction geared towards ambidexterity. Changes to its space programs, 
radical variation in its external environment and decreasing budget appropriations 
(appendix F), means the organization finds itself in a new environment characterized 
by an unprecedented degree of change. In redesigning how the organization operated 
internally, Center management devised and set about pursuing a Center wide 
ambidextrous strategy. The new strategy was labelled ‘JSC 2.0’ and aimed to foster 
exploration capabilities by furthering innovation in human space exploration research 
and engage in collaborative partnerships with commercial organizations in non-
aerospace industries (i.e. Oil and Gas, Medical); whilst at the same time ensuring the 
Center continued to exploit its expertise and executed its main tasks effectively27. JSC 
sought to utilize its existing knowledge and expertise and develop new knowledge, 
technologies and capabilities from their commercial collaborators. However, the new 
strategy challenged JSC for it signified a degree of contrast to its historical way of 
                                                          
27 Since its inception, JSC has had four primary manned spaceflight tasks: space development; 
mission control; research and development; and astronaut selection and training. (Source: JSC 
Historical Narrative; “Gilruth Cites MSC Progress Despite Difficult Relocation.” Space News 
Roundup (1, 19), July 11, 1962, 1). 
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operating. Hence, JSC is a suitable case organization to explore the role of history, 
past-crisis events and their manifested effect on an organization’s strategic pursuit for 
ambidexterity.  
 
Data collection 
The initial intention for this research study was to understand how JSC and its 
members comprehended the Center’s new strategic orientation towards ambidexterity 
and the approach it enacts to achieve this. In the course of conducting the research it 
became increasingly apparent, through data analysis, that the organization’s history 
significantly influences its strategic approach and required further investigating. The 
research drew upon multiple primary and secondary sources of data including 
interviews with organizational actors, onsite-observations of internal meetings and 
Center-wide events, the organization’s intranet, publicly available resources published 
by NASA and mainstream news media (i.e. books, reports, weblogs, and video 
documentaries), and written documents accessed from the JSC archives. This 
multimethod approach provided the opportunity to engage with various resources, 
thus allowing me to observe and capture organizational dynamics, tensions and 
features influencing the organization and its approach to achieving organizational 
ambidexterity.  
The primary data collection portion of the study began in August 2014, 
approximately a year after JSC Center director announced the new strategic vision for 
the Center, ‘JC 2.0’, and was completed in September 2015. In total four onsite 
research visits were made during the study and on each occasion the researcher was 
immersed in the culture of the organization and learnt the technical vernacular 
commonly used by its members28. This relatively extensive time period meant I was 
able to capture data on the organization’s strategic change process and its 
implementation as it was occurring. Visits onsite at JSC lasted approximately four 
weeks and occurred at roughly trimonthly intervals. Observations were conducted 
during on-site visits where copious notes were taken of everyday activities and 
interactions, meetings, workshops, and corporate events. A total of 82 in-depth semi-
structured interviews were conducted with a diverse array of employees and former 
employees. Interviews with JSC employees started with informants who had attended 
                                                          
28 Refer to ‘Methodological Overview’ in chapter one for details of the four phases of data collection 
during this research project.  
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an internal JSC cultural workshop in August 2014. Interviews were initially broad in 
terms of questions to provide a wide scope in understanding the Center’s internal 
context and perceived dynamics as experienced by organizational actors. In 
conducting first hand interviews with actors I was able to capture personal experiences 
and histories of working at JSC, both past and present, as well as their views of the 
changes being experienced at the organization, which helped to emphasis and deepen 
my grasp of everyday life and operations at the organization. As interviews progressed 
and trends were identified the questions became more tailored in their focus, 
particularly in the case of certain individuals who by virtue of their hierarchical 
position in the organization could provide a unique point of view, and so followed a 
purposive sampling approach (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
 
Throughout the study follow-up interviews, conversations and email 
correspondence occurred with informants. The semi structured interview approach 
allowed for cross comparison across interview responses and helped strengthen my 
understanding of actor perceptions and experiences of the strategic change, the 
influencing forces and systems involved as well as the challenges to the change.  
Secondary data collection occurred before, during and after the onsite field 
visits to further my understanding of JSC, NASA as an Agency and its development 
over time.  Secondary data included press releases, case studies focused on 
NASA/JSC, media articles, published books, industry reports, news videos and 
relevant documentaries all concentrated on NASA/JSC and the evolving space 
program. During the second, third and fourth field visits to JSC one week was spent 
examining JSC specific archival resources located at the University of Houston. This 
involved gathering digital and printed archival data from the JSC archives including 
historical program plans, strategy documents, interview transcripts of former 
employees, third party contracts and contractor reports, communication documents, 
and news articles dating back to JSC’s early founding years. Initially, the search criteria 
for archival sources was broad and mainly focused primarily on the major space 
programs in JSC’s history, understanding how they operated and managerial 
communications at the time. However, during the course of data collection and early 
data analysis it became apparent that the organization’s history, particularly certain 
historical crisis events, were critical influencers shaping JSC’s existing operating 
mindset and approach to change, and therefore would requisite further investigating. 
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Table 10: Timeline of Significant Events in JSC History 
 
Historical crisis events in JSC’s history subsequently became a line of 
questioning during primary interviews and directed the search criteria during 
secondary data collection at the JSC archives and in sourcing publically available 
documents and media. Subsequent archived items were selected based on whether 
Timeline of JSC Key Historical Events
1958 Founding of U.S. National Aeronautics Space Agency (NASA)
1961 President John F. Kennedy announces U.S. to land man on the moon
1962 Mercury project - Astronaut John Glenn first American to orbit Earth 
1964 First American Gemini flight (unpiloted test)
1965
** 1967
1968 Apollo program returns to flight. Apollo 8 first manned space mission
1969 Apollo 11, first lunar landing mission. Neil Armstrong walks on moon
1970 Apollo 13 near disaster "NASA's finest hour"
1973
1975
1977 First Space Shuttle orbiter, Enterprise, flight tests
1981 First Space Shuttle (STS) launch, Columbia
** 1986 Space Shuttle (STS) Challenger disaster (7-man crew killed)
1988 First multinational space station agreement signed
** 2003 STS Columbia Shuttle disaster (7-man crew killed)
2004 New Constellation Program proposed
2010 Cancellation of Constellation Program
2010 Commercial Crew Development program
2011 Completion of ISS assembly
2011 Retirement of Shuttle program
** Major crisis events in JSC history (platforms for organizational change)
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson 
Space Center (JSC)
STG transformed into Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) established in 
Houston (Texas) 
Founding of the Space Task Group (STG), the U.S. manned spaceflight 
unit at Langley, Virginia. (STG predecessor to Manned Spaceflight 
Center (MSC))
Apollo program commences: Astronaut Alan Shepherd first American 
in space
Skylab vehicle launched: U.S. first orbiting space station
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (first international human space flight, 
American Apollo-Soviet Soyuz)
First operational Gemini mission-Gemini III. Commanded by astronaut 
Gus Grissom
Apollo 1 fire. Astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee 
died. (First deaths directly attributable to the U.S. space program).
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they contained evidence of how strategy was implemented at that time period; spoke 
of historical operational issues and whether they were overcome; conveyed the 
organization’s cultural expectations and perceptions or demonstrated formal operating 
processes and procedures. In all, approximately 132 archived items was gathered. In 
sourcing historical and archival data the origin of the source, its authorship, time of 
production, purpose and context in which it was created was verified which helped to 
validate reliability and trustworthiness of the sources (Kipping, Wadhawani, and 
Bucheli , 2014b). These archives helped to provide insights into the organization’s 
inner context and its evolution over time (Pettigrew, 1990). 
 
Data analysis 
In analyzing and coding the data I followed an inductive, qualitative approach 
which allowed me to derive insights from the multivariate sources gathered during 
data collection. By continually comparing and contrasting the data during each of the 
four phases of data collection, insights emerging from the findings during each phase 
fed into subsequent phases of data collection and analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Analysis of the data evolved through two parallel processes in a vein similar to the 
work of Kreiner, Hollensbe, Sheep, Smith, and Kataria (2015). In one stream, analysis 
focused on secondary data sources from publically available media (text, audio and 
videos), reports, books and historical archival sources. Analysis of these data sources 
involved writing research notes and memos, logging statements and quotes from video 
and audio files and categorizing these into broad themes. Focus was given to data 
relating to historical events and incidences in JSC’s past and their associated effect on 
the organization’s ways of working, organizational changes and the documented 
perceptions of members who lived   and directly experienced the events at the time 
(i.e. oral histories). As the study progressed these themes and categories would be 
adjusted and refined to help develop theoretical constructs and key findings. I 
employed event history analysis to build a longitudinal, qualitative understanding of 
significant events in JSC’s history, giving particular attention to major crisis events in 
the organization’s past (see table 9). In the context of this study, historical texts and 
sources were viewed with a broader understanding (Kipping, Wadhawani and Bucheli, 
2014). That is to say that the criteria for what constitutes an historical source was 
broad in terms of time period and scope, covering the period from the organization’s 
founding (in 1958) through to recent times, up until 2015. I also employed a 
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hermeneutic interpretation when analyzing the historical sources which served to 
assess historical bias (Kipping, et al, 2014). 
The parallel process focused chiefly on analyzing primary data sources and 
involved coding interview transcripts, internal documents and memos. Employing 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) approach to analyzing data, firstly, interview transcripts 
(both primary data and secondary data transcripts) and associated notes were coded, 
with lines of text being assigned a particular code. Codes were inductively derived 
from interviews and included in-vivo coding using informants own vernacular (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). The codes were continuously probed, compared and adjusted as 
data collection developed and initial themes and ideas emerging from the data was 
noted by the researcher in a journal. Following this, codes were sorted into categories 
and subthemes based on related properties (Walker and Myrick, 2006). These were 
mapped to field notes, memos and statements logged from analysis of secondary data 
sources. This allowed me to develop a more holistic understanding of the organization 
and informant accounts. I also engaged with existing literature which provided a 
theoretical lens helping to interpret and abstract the data from codes to higher-level 
constructs. Data management and analysis was managed using NVivo 10 qualitative 
data software program.  
In the case of this research project, the two parallel processes employed for 
analysis were not treated independently but used integratively as part of an iterative 
process where the codes and insights from one process fed into the analytical process 
of the other. Triangulation of primary and secondary sources and historical sources 
aided in supporting trustworthiness of the data (Kipping et al, 2014).  
As data collection and analysis progressed recurring themes and categories 
emerged of the organization’s history, its influence on the strategic change to 
ambidexterity and the operating tensions this bore. To check the accuracy and validity 
of the emerging themes and constructs, the findings were presented to informants and 
managers at JSC who were interested in research outcomes intermittently throughout 
data collection, and also at the end of the research study (i.e. in June 2017 during a 
final presentation where all key findings from the completed research project was fed 
back to organizational members). Furthermore, immersing myself into the 
organization’s culture and style of speaking helped to reinforce my depth of 
understanding of organization and served to strengthen trustworthiness of the codes, 
emerging themes and interpretation of the data. Table 11 depicts the themes and 
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illustrative quotes from interview informants (which includes time tags indicating the 
data collection phase it occurred) and secondary sources. Figure 9 summarizes the 
emergent data structure (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2012) upon which analytic 
discussion of the findings is based.   
 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
The findings show that an organization’s history and its influence on an 
organization’s contemporary strategic activity is multidimensional.  The paper 
identifies three main dimensions, each of which are historically embedded – (1) 
sustained founding imprints, (2) sensitive periods of crises, and (3) reprinting 
organizational characteristics. Analytically, each of these dimensions represents a 
distinct process or period but are also interrelated. The study identifies the occurrence 
of the reprinting process as a consequence of post-founding sensitive periods of crisis 
trauma events, and finds this process simultaneously enables and constrains future 
change.  
Furthermore, the study finds that sustained imprinting and the reprinting 
process manifest as dual processes that occur independently but have an interactive 
influence and contribute to defining the organization’s contemporary perception and 
approach to ambidextrous activities of exploration and exploitation. The following 
firstly discusses the three core historically embedded dimensions central to 
understanding the influence of organizational history on contemporary strategic 
activities. It then examines how the combined influence of these dimensions impacts 
the organization’s implementation of an exploration-exploitation strategy.  
 
1. Sustained founding imprints 
The term sustained founding imprints represents persistent imprinted 
characteristics – structural systems and method of behaving - that remained stable and 
are perpetuated throughout the organization’s development despite internal (or 
external) changes experienced by JSC (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). As such, this 
concept reflects the imprinting concept reported in literature, but it goes beyond the 
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mere persistence of imprinted characteristics and speaks of imprints becoming deeply 
ingrained and increasingly ‘amplified’ within the organization (Simsek et al, 2015: 300). 
The study finds that what sustains and amplifies these imprints is a strong association 
to historical achievements and its historical expert identity.  
 
Analysis found that structural elements established at NASA’s founding in the 
1950s continued to persist and have a determining effect on the organization’s 
contemporary environment and manner of behaving.  The founding period is a 
defining time in the organization’s development during which time certain 
characteristics, influenced by external conditions at the time, are formed (Johnson, 
2007) and continue to influence the organization’s contemporary behavior and 
structure. The study found certain imprints originating at NASA founding in 1958 and 
JSC’s establishment in 1961 remained relatively stable until the contemporary period 
(2014-2015), post JSC’s announcement to implement a new strategic vision aimed at 
pursuing efficiency and innovation, collaborating with entities in commercial space.  
 
Two organizational features in particular, originating from the organization’s 
founding, were found to have persisted in influencing JSC in its present context. (1) 
Militaristic method of operating, (2) Stovepipe structural systems. The data found that 
these features were perpetuated by a third factor, historical achievements.   
 
a) Method of operating 
 
Cold war context and a militaristic method of operating 
Founding: JSC was established in 1961, during the height of the Cold War when 
geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A saw both blocs compete 
for space leadership. For NASA and the human space flight program, the Cold War 
context of the 1950s-1960s was a key feature shaping the Agency’s founding and 
defined the purpose of NASA, its structures and culture. NASA and JSC was birthed 
in trepid but competitive reaction to the launch of Russia’s Sputnik, the first artificial 
satellite in space.  
“The Soviet satellite supplied an opportunity for the 
USSR to claim that it has opened a new era, marked by a 
spectacular overtaking of the U.S. in a vital field where we 
have been accustomed to count on superiority, and now 
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compete with the U.S. as an equal” (White House Office, 
1957)29 
Research found the launch of Soviet satellites (Sputnik I and Sputnik II) and 
the competitive geopolitical environment at the time is critical to understanding the 
motivation for NASA and JSC, its set up and way of operating. Before NASA’s 
founding, the US military was the major player in space activities, establishing 
priorities and initial operating standards for space: “Prior to NASA the military had 
had the upper hand in determining all space priorities, and civilian interests when 
considered at all, were clearly secondary. There were also multiple military space actors 
- primarily the Air Force and the Army” (Day, 1996). The creation of NASA in 1958 
shifted the control of the space science from the military to a civilian workforce, 
however the militaristic foundations of the space program and the cold war climate 
were absorbed into the new organization. Hence, the operations, processes and ways 
of behaving characterizing the then new NASA Agency was imprinted by the 
environment of the time:   
“The birth of NASA must be placed in the context of its 
times […] NASA’s birth was directly related to the launch 
of the Sputniks and the ensuing race to demonstrate 
technological superiority in space. NASA’s birth was 
directly related to the launch of the Sputniks and the 
ensuing race to demonstrate technological superiority in 
space. Driven by the competition of the Cold War 
[…]NASA began by absorbing the earlier National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), including 
its 8,000 employees, an annual budget of $100 million, 
three major research laboratories … It quickly 
incorporated other organizations (or parts of them), 
notably the space science group of the Naval Research 
Laboratory that formed the core of the new Goddard 
Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md., the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory managed by the California Institute of 
Technology for the Army, and the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency in Huntsville, Ala., where Wernher von Braun’s 
team of engineers was developing large rockets.” (NASA 
Chief Historian, 2008).  
                                                          
29 Reaction to the Soviet Satellite - A Preliminary Evaluation. October 16, 1957 [White House 
Office of the Staff Research Group, Box 35, Special Projects: Sputnik, Missiles and Related 
Matters; NAID #12082706] 
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Figure 9: Data Structure 
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Behavioral traits 
Historical: “when I first started here [in the 1970s], I would say that the mindset-- because there were number of the people that were the leaders of the organization 
were all ex-military - the mindset was very - I never say it – militaristic… it was very regimented, protocol, chain of command” (Interviewee, Division Head) 
Contemporary: “we at NASA, we're like the military. It started out more of a salute [mentality], and do what as you're told, and salute as before... And I think we’ve 
come a long way and part of it is a lot of those folks have retired [chuckles]. No offense to them, but they have retired. And I'd say that the other challenge that we 
have is not necessarily generational, but just with what's happened with NASA is-- again we had the space race, everybody was behind you, the money was the 
budget and everything and as time went on” (Interviewee, Senior office manager) 
Structures 
Historical: as I moved over and was responsible for the directorate effort on Apollo, it became pretty obvious to me that one of the areas of key weakness in the 
whole program was that nobody really knew what the other guy was doing in the program. There was an awful lot of specialist groupings going off in their own 
specialist area, and the program office was trying to keep them coordinated from a program office point of view - - [primarily hardware]” (Archive transcript, Deputy 
Director, 1966 )  
Contemporary: “we began finding out that we didn't know what other people were doing in the agency. Incredible work. Pockets of people who were absolutely world-
class in what they were doing, but not integrated with anything anybody else was doing… Imagine being in a meeting and saying, "Well, we need this critical piece of 
hardware, technology, and we'll have to go out and do a technology research program, or go out and canvass and see who can do this." And you don't know it, but 
the guy in the building next to you is actually doing that or something very close to it. That happened more often than I would have believed…” (Interviewee, 
former JSC employee)  
Historical Achievements 
“if you look at the '50s and '60s, NASA was really pushing the technology in a lot of areas, and if NASA didn't push the technologies that we needed to get into 
space, not just with humans, but with telecom and other things, it wouldn't have been there for other companies to come in and build the GPS satellites that now 
make yourself cellphone and credit cards work. But I question whether in all areas NASA's really leading the technology today” (Interviewee, office manager)  
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Internally provoked crisis events 
The cause of the Columbia accident was twofold. The physical cause resulted from the loss of insulating foam from the External Tank...NASA’s flawed culture of 
complacency also bore  responsibility for the loss of the vehicle and its astronauts (NASA Historian, Historical legacy, 2010) 
"The middle of winter is a somber time of year for the spaceflight community. The three worst tragedies of NASA's manned space program fall within just six days 
on the calendar, from January 27 to February 1: Apollo 1, less than three years before Armstrong and Aldrin walked on the Moon; Challenger, watched live by 
millions around the world; Columbia—like Challenger before it, an avoidable accident rooted in NASA's internal culture" (Science, press article). 
Emotional affect 
“I think one things should be said. This is a time for great sadness, national sadness and certainly personal sadness for the people in space program.” (CBS News, 
1967) 
"All of the human spaceflight centers—KSC, MSFC, and JSC—suffered terribly from the loss of Challenger and Columbia. The personnel of all three centers 
recovered by rededicating themselves to understanding what caused the accidents and how accidents could be prevented in the future. Together, they found the 
problems and fixed them"  (NASA Historical legacy book, 2010) 
Accustomed to change 
"The other thing that's difficult in that environment is the politics. If you go through a 15-year project build, you're going to go through four, maybe, presidential 
cycles. Priorities change" (Interviewee, Senior engineer) 
"I think the NASA culture [change] is cyclical, the NASA culture is. So if we look at what the agency has done over time, so we'll see things where we're really being 
driven by schedule, and then we have the Apollo 1 fire, and so we lost three people, and we made some changes...after the Columbia accident, we kept saying we 
were going to fly within six months, and that meant any changes we needed to make had to be implemented within six months..." (Interviewee, Division Director) 
Restricted parameters 
Historical: “The prime purpose of all tests conducted prior to launch is to verify and demonstrate that the space vehicle ground support equipment, procedures and 
personnel are all ready for flight operations. Many of the tests involve a "first time" operation particularly in an overall sense. Therefore, inherent in the verification 
process is the likelihood that faults will be found in procedures and in equipment” (Apollo 204 review board report, 1967) 
Contemporary: “… JSC is about the business of getting things done, failure's not an option, we're going to get the mission accomplished no matter what, and we are 
going to make sure that there is no chance that whatever system we are working on is actually going to fail. We will take out all potential capacity for that system or 
vehicle to fail. We are going to remove all doubt. We are going to study it until we can be confident that we are not taking unnecessary risk…” (Interviewee, senior 
manager) 
Table 11: Extracts of first-order codes associated with second-order themes 
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In incorporating the NACA, its personnel and military related units into 
NASA, the new Agency was influenced by its relations with the military in its early 
development: “NASA also inherited projects, programs, people, and installations 
which had their origin in the military services” (Archive: NASA Historical Staff, 
1966:3). Though NASA, a civilian agency, was focused on the development of space 
sciences, the organization drew upon its deep military association in terms of the way 
it operated30: 
“The style of management developed in them [NASA’s 
early large-scale and high-tech projects Atlas, Mercury and 
SAGE] propagated cold-war ideals… Systems analysis, 
systems engineering, project management, and 
configuration control developed in the military-industrial-
academic complex on large aerospace projects, and they 
continue to thrive. In them the values and institutions of 
the cold war persist…” (Johnson, 2001: 686) 
 
For example, NASA’s approach to design and production and its reliance on 
contractors followed the operating model used by the Army and Air Force: 
“NASA’s contracting drew on both the Air Force’s heavy 
reliance on independent contractors for design and 
delivery and the Army’s traditional arsenal for in-house 
production and design capability. NASA engineers, at 
least through the Apollo years, maintained an in-house 
capability allowing them to keep the design and technical 
skills to effectively direct, lead, and manage the NASA 
contractors” (Dethloff, 1993)31 
 
Contemporary: In describing the modern organizational culture and manner of 
operating at JSC, interviewees expressed it using militaristic terms, suggesting the 
founding influence persisted and was still active at JSC:  
“It’s very much ‘you don’t know your place’, ‘you need to 
make sure you’re talking to me about it’. And that’s a lot 
of the culture here. It’s very militaristic. It’s very….My 
father was in the military so I was very comfortable 
                                                          
30 Much of the work conducted by the NACA related to solving the problems of other 
organizations/agencies, the most critical relationship being with the US.S Department of 
Defense (DOD). (NASA History Archive, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space 
Science, 1977; 1966) 
31 Dethloff, H.C. (1993). ‘Suddenly, Tomorrow Came…’ The NASA History Series. NASA: 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 93-86012 
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coming in here. First I was like, okay, who’s my next 
chain in command?  Oh, here’s your Lead. Who’s his 
chain? There’s your Chief. Okay” (Team Lead) 
 
 
b) Structural systems  
 
Stovepipes and silos 
Founding: When the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) 
transitioned to become NASA in 1958, its assets and personnel transferred to the new 
organization including “the historic tendency of ‘stovepipe’ management” (NASA 
Archive, 1977). This traditional feature of the military-civilian relationship of the 
NACA, transferred over to the Manned Space Center when it opened in Houston in 
1961. Since the early beginnings of NASA’s space programs there has been a 
distinction between technical and operational/administrative organizational activities 
at a management and functional level. This is exemplified in one archive transcript:  
“During that period, from July 1961 to 1962, I was, in a 
sense, co-director of the [Apollo] program with Milt 
Tregaser. Milt was the technical director, I was the 
operations director; essentially his job was to solve 
technical problems and I was to solve the management 
and organization problems…”  (Archive transcript, 
Deputy Director, 1966)  
 
The data indicates that the technical programmatic activities and organizational 
management were historically treated as two distinct competencies to be managed 
separately. This structural differentiation in competencies is reminiscent of structural 
ambidexterity and its principle of separation.  
 
Contemporary: In describing JSC’s modern context interviewees described it as being 
siloed and stovepiped, separated along various lines. Some interviewees referred to the 
distinction as being ‘the technical-side’ and ‘the business/non-technical side’, whilst 
others referred to it as “the institution versus the program” dynamic. The program 
connoted technical, engineering human space activities whilst the institution referred 
to the Center’s administration and facilities operations.  This dynamic was referred to 
as being critical to understanding the workings of JSC and its cultural complexity:    
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“I think it's an important dynamic at Johnson, and 
probably with every center is the difference between 
program and institution.  You should really look into this 
as a tool to understand why things are the way they 
are…” (Interviewee, Office manager) 
 
 
c) Underlying features perpetuating founding imprints 
 
Association with historical accomplishments: 
The study found that certain organizational characteristics established during 
JSC’s founding were sustained throughout its history because they were perceived to 
be associated with the accomplishment of significant achievements in the 
organization’s history.  
 In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy set NASA the goal of placing a man 
on the moon within a decade, a benchmark for leadership and technological 
excellence was established for what was the space race.  
“I believe that this nation should commit itself to 
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a 
man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth. 
No single space project in this period will be more 
impressive to mankind, or more important for the long-
range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult 
or expensive to accomplish” (President John F. Kennedy, 
1961)32 . 
 
By achieving this ambition in 1969, NASA and the Manned Space Craft 
Center (became JSC in 1973) achieved what was considered nationally and 
internationally as “the greatest adventure of all…men had actually reached the moon” 
(BBC video archives)33.  
The stovepiped structure and culture established in NASA/JSC’s early years 
was considered a contributory factor to its lunar accomplishments in space during the 
1960s and 1970s space programs (i.e. Gemini, Apollo, Saturn programs and man 
walking on the moon). These NASA successes were associated with the organizational 
                                                          
32 President John F. Kennedy (1961) Joint session of Congress speech, May 25.  
33 BBC video archive, The Sky at Night: Looking back to 20 July 1969. Sound and video 
footage from 1969. Documentary first broadcast 2006 
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structures and cultural features active at the time period in which they occurred (the 
1960s and 1970s). Hence, perpetuating these organizational features reinforced their 
value and positive contribution to achieving space missions. For example, in referring 
to NASA’s historical achievements and education of these, a former NASA 
administrator remarked:   
“What I found fascinating was the historical research and 
looking at the record of how NASA was initially 
organized. It wasn’t just assembling a lot of very smart 
people in a room and saying, “Give this your best shot 
now that you’re all together in the same place.” ... All 
these decades later, there are still defining cultural features 
about the Agency based on its “stove pipe” origins that 
existed well before the NASA “meatball” was ever 
introduced (Oral history transcript, Former 
administrator)34. 
 
The expert identity: The success stories of NASA’s past from the lunar landing to 
the Apollo 13 recovery; an event dubbed “NASA’s finest hour”35, imprinted and 
reinforced JSC with an expert identity and an internal reliance that they were the 
knowledge center for human spaceflight. A value belief that perpetuated through JSC’s 
history and the various changing space missions: 
“You’ve got an organization that very much values that 
internal reliance on doing everything, self-inventiveness, 
based on the premise that there’s nobody outside that’s 
doing this, and you get that embedded in the 
organization. And you find that’s been a very successful 
model, actually. And then you bring that all the way 
forward through Apollo and Shuttle and the international 
Space Station, and largely that model remains 
effective…” (Chief technologist, 2017)36 
 
 
                                                          
34 NASA oral history interview transcript (2014). Former NASA Administrator.  
35 Apollo 13 mission is looked up at JSC as the Center’s “the finest hour”. See ‘Apollo 13’ on 
www.NASA.gov/missions/Apollo13 
36 Terrier, D., Heracleous, L., and Gonzalez, S. (2017). p. 22 
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2. Post-founding sensitive periods: Crisis and 
organizational trauma  
Findings indicated that crisis events presented sensitive periods in the 
organization’s history during which JSC was susceptible to external and internal 
influences (Johnson, 2007), which subsequently resulted in important changes. These 
crises signify traumatic intermural events which had a significant emotional effect on 
organizational members (Simuth, 2017; Stuart, 1996), and served to reshape certain 
organizational features. These major crisis events were caused by internal factors 
rather than external conditions, and consequentially reshaped core structural and 
cultural characteristics in JSC. The following outlines the major crisis events that 
occurred at JSC, the origins and organizational trauma effects. 
 
Historical major JSC events of crises and trauma 
The Apollo 1 fire 
On January 27, 1967 during the early years of NASAs Apollo program a fire occurred 
in a manned command module (Apollo 204 spacecraft) during a ‘plugs-out’ test on the launch 
pad at Cape Canaveral, simulating flight conditions. The ‘plugs-out’ test was “a routine but 
necessary part of qualifying the hardware” (Pyle, 201437) and Mission Control who were 
responsible for monitoring the tests were based in Houston at JSC. The three astronauts on-
board the command vehicle all died as a result of the fire. The fire had been caused by a short 
circuit somewhere in the 30 miles of wire underneath the seat of astronaut Gus Grissom, and 
the pure oxygen within the command module ignited the fire much faster. The Apollo 1 fire 
was the first fatal tragedy to befall JSC and NASA’s space program. Under the direction of 
NASA Administrator James Webb, NASA appointed a review Board - the Apollo 204 Review 
Board - to conduct an internal investigation into the incident.  
 
Source of the crisis: Technical not managerial fault 
The Apollo 1 review board investigating the cause of fire deemed the incident to be 
the cause of technical faults with the module’s hardware:  “The Board's investigation revealed 
many deficiencies in design and engineering, manufacturing and quality control” (Apollo 204 
review board report, 1967). The Board’s investigation reviewed in detail the technical issues 
and found numerous technical deficiencies:  
“…they did in the investigation find numerous problems with the Apollo command module. It had a pure 
oxygen environment. There were wiring problems which probably produced the spark which set off the blaze. 
There were flammable materials in the cockpit. Nylon straps, things like that which would have burned very 
rapidly…” (CBS News, 1967)38.  
                                                          
37 Pyle R. (2014), p. 72 
38 Excerpt taken from archive video footage, CBS News special report (1967) 
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Post the fire, NASA implemented numerous changes in line with the Board’s 
recommendations, which included redesigning a quick- and outward opening hatch. It took 
the Apollo program almost 18 months to recover from the disaster and return to normal 
operations. Critically, the Apollo review Board found the fault to be technical and unrelated to 
management methods or operations: “That investigation [the 1967 hearings] yielded one 
important ‘non-finding’. Congress found no fault with management methods recently 
implemented by Samuel C. Phillips, the director of Project Apollo.” (Johnson, 2001: 685). 
 
Organizational trauma:  
The response of JSC personnel at the time towards the Apollo 1 fire incident was one 
of disbelief, guilt and sadness and was referred to as “one of the worst tragedies in the history 
of spaceflight” (NASA Apollo Program, 1967): “It was a tremendous tragedy…there had never been a 
fatality in the space program. Everyone knew it was risky but there’s theory and then there’s reality. The loss of 
these three astronauts was a major blow. It certainly was shocking to NASA and I think to the public at 
large… and it really sent shock waves I think through NASA and through the nation. This was something 
that people were riveted to their television sets to find out what had happened. What had gone wrong and what 
might it do to the race to the moon” (Space consultant, 2017)39 
Days following the Apollo 1 fire, one of the Apollo flight directors gave a speech to 
the rest of the Apollo program conveying the guilt and blame JSC employees at the time 
placed on themselves: “Spaceflight will never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and neglect. Somewhere, 
somehow, we screwed up…Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were too gung ho about the schedule 
and we locked out all of the problems we saw each day in our work. Every element of the program was in 
trouble and so were we… I don’t know what Thompson’s committee will find as the cause, but I know what I 
find. We are the cause! We were not ready! We did not do our job!” (Excerpt of speech by Apollo 1 flight 
director, 1967) 
 
 
STS Challenger Shuttle disaster 
On 28 January, 1986, nineteen years after the Apollo 1 fire, the Challenger space 
shuttle prepared for its 10th launch from Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Cape Canaveral, 
Florida. In the run up to the launch the weather temperature had been uncharacteristically 
cold in Florida which caused the launch date to be moved back a number of times. On the 
morning of January 28 the weather dropped below freezing, raising concern among some 
NASA personnel and contractors over the integrity of the O-ring seals on the solid rocket 
boosters in the unusually cold weather. At 11: 39AM (EST), 73 seconds into the launch flight 
the Challenger space shuttle exploded, disintegrating over the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of 
Florida. All seven crew members died including Christa McAuliffe, the first teacher selected to 
be a part of the “Teach in Space” project. President Reagan appointed the Rogers 
Commission to investigate the accident. It took 32-months before the Shuttle program flew 
again in 1988. 
 
Source of the crisis: Technical and managerial-cultural systems failings 
The presidential commission assembled to investigate the Challenger shuttle 
explosion identified technical and managerial causes of the accident. Technically, the 
Commission concluded that there was a design fault with the O-ring seals on the rocket 
                                                          
39 Excerpt recorded from news media video footage, CBS News (26 January, 2017) 
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boosters. The O-ring seals had degraded in the extreme cold weather which compromised the 
performance.  Managerially, the Rogers Commission Report identified numerous failings 
which stemmed from the organizational culture. Cultural issues focused primarily on two 
features - flaws in the decision making process and failures in the communication system 
across different divisions and hierarchal levels of the program (i.e. issues feeding information 
to the launch management team and the rejection of dissenting views).  
The Rogers Commission Report (1986) stated: “It is clear that crucial information about the 
O-ring damage in prior flights and about the Thiokol engineers' argument with the NASA telecon 
participants never reached Jesse Moore or Arnold Aldrich, the Levels I and II program officials40, or J.A. 
(Gene) Thomas, the Launch Director for 51-L …testimony reveals failures in communication that resulted in 
a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between 
engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal 
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.”. 
 
Organizational trauma:  
The data points to the tragic, demoralizing long-lasting effect the Challenger disaster 
had on JSC and wider NASA employees: “Most Americans are unaware of the profound and 
devastating impact the accident had on the close-knit NASA team. The loss of Challenger and her crew 
devastated NASA, particularly at Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
and the landing and recovery crew at Dryden Flight Research Center…To this day Aldrich asks himself 
regularly, “What could we have done to prevent what happened?” Holding a mission management team 
meeting the morning of launch might have brought up the Thiokol/MSFC teleconference the previous evening. 
“I wish I had made such a meeting happen,” he lamented. The flight control team felt some responsibility for 
the accident, remembered STS-51L Lead Flight Director Randy Stone. Controllers “truly believed they could 
handle absolutely any problem that this vehicle could throw at us.” The accident, however, “completely shattered 
the belief that the flight control team can always save the day. We have never fully recovered from that” 
(NASA Historical legacy, 2010). 
 
 
STS Columbia Shuttle disaster 
Seventeen years after the Challenger space disaster, NASA experienced another tragic 
event with the STS Columbia Space Shuttle. At 9 AM on February 1, 2003, 16 days after 
launching, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart on re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere 
killing all seven astronauts on board. Columbia was the second time NASA lost a shuttle and 
all its crew. All STS Space Shuttle flights were suspended for over two years during which 
time construction of the international space station was out on hold. NASA commissioned 
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to establish the causes of the disaster.  
Following the investigation into the accident commentators claimed “the events that led up to the 
loss of Columbia were eerily similar to those surrounding Challenger” (NASA Historical legacy, 2011).  
 
                                                          
40 “The Challenger launch was coordinated by the top technical managers and administrators 
in NASA’s four-tiered launch decision chain. Among them were Jesse Moore, Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, Washington (Level I); Arnold Aldrich, 
Program Manager, Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas (Level II)” (Cited in Diane 
Vaughan, 1996, p.1) 
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Source of the crisis: Technical and cultural systems fault 
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board determined that the accident was the 
result of technical and the organizational cultural failings. Approximately 82 seconds after the 
Shuttle’s launch a small section of insulating foam fell from the Shuttle’s external tank, causing 
damage to the reinforced carbon panels on the orbiter’s left wing. Foam insulation breaking 
off from the external fuel tank had been a persistent problem and this ‘debris shedding’ as it 
was labelled was a well-known to the program but management had deemed it acceptable. 
When it occurred on STS-107, it was initially assumed that a lightweight piece of foam could 
not damage the Shuttle’s resilient reinforced carbon panels.  However, the investigation found 
falling insulating foam has caused the second major shuttle failure. Organizationally, the CAIB 
identified problems in the program’s culture. The panel determined they were unwilling to 
embrace dissenting points of view, and that the issue was part of a larger culture problem at 
NASA.  
 
Organizational trauma:  
The Columbia Shuttle disaster had a similar shock effect on JSC and NASA to that of 
Challenger: “on February 1, 2003, all of our lives were changed in an instant” (Letter excerpt from Space 
Shuttle program manager, 2003). Informants who were present at JSC during the time of the crisis 
and experienced firsthand spoke of the traumatic impact it had on the morale of the 
organization and described it as an emotional loss: “the [Columbia] shuttle disaster rocked this place 
[JSC]. It was tough, really tough … we knew them, they were our friends. We saw them at church, we coached 
their kids at little league, they were part of the family” (Interviewee, Deputy Manager). 
Data points to the crisis event having a long-lasting effect on the minds and 
consciousness of JSC and NASA employees, one of regret and guilt: “As with the loss of 
Challenger, NASA employees continue to be haunted by questions of “what if.” “I’ll bet you a day hardly goes 
by that we don’t think about the crew of Columbia and if there was something we might have been able to do to 
prevent” the accident, admitted Dittemore [Space Shuttle Columbia Program Manager]. Wayne Hale, shuttle 
program manager for launch integration at KSC, called the decisions made by the mission management team 
his “biggest” regret. “We had the opportunity to really save the day, we really did, and we just didn’t do it, just 
were blind to it.” (NASA Historical legacy, 2010) 
 
 
 
3. The reprinting process: a paradoxical influence 
According to Bednarek et al (2017) “paradox theory specifically focuses on 
contradictory poles that are mutually exclusive yet interrelated, and persistent over 
time” (p. 79). Hence, paradox reflects features that are in contradiction yet 
interdependent and continue to exist over time, and it is this understanding of paradox 
this finding adopts in referring to the reprinting process as a paradoxical influence. 
Holding to the assumption that in a given instance a process can either enable change 
or restrain it, for the conditions needed to support the change would seek to 
overcome the conditions restraining and delimiting change and, therefore would not 
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contribute to or partake in being the restraining force. However, with the reprinting 
process the study finds that in a given instance it simultaneously does both – in that it 
provides a platform to support change but in doing so it instantaneously generates a 
restraining force delimiting the character of change for future occurrences. 
Furthermore, the reprinting process is a reoccurring process whose implications 
continue to manifest over time.  
The reprinting process occurs parallel to sustained imprinting but is concerned 
with organizational characteristics that emerge post the organization’s founding, and is 
triggered as a result of a past sensitive period, namely a major crisis trauma event. 
Identification of this process emerged from the research data and longitudinal analysis 
of JSC, major crises in its history and their subsequent effects. As with the imprinting 
concept (Johnson, 2007), crisis trauma as a sensitive period refers to a limited time 
period during which the organization is susceptible to influences, however in the case 
of reprinting, these influences are not exclusively the result of external environmental 
influences or founder/entrepreneurial traits but can a result of endogenous crisis 
events and influences.  
The study identifies that crises-trauma events are a significant feature of an 
organization’s history, and can have a palpable shaping influence on the character of 
its present-day strategic change initiatives and perceptions towards exploration, 
exploitation and organizational change. The data found that crisis events and their 
consequential traumas provide a platform for two types of change – knowledge 
exploration and organizational and cultural systems – however, the long-term effects 
of crisis and trauma differ in character depending on the nature of the change the 
events produce and in some cases, it leads to long-term rigidities that restrict the limits 
of change and openness to experimentation. Importantly, the study finds that 
reprinting resulting from crisis and trauma events has a dual tensional effect with 
subsequent organizational change. 
 
 
a) Historical crisis events and trauma as a platform for organizational 
change  
Firstly, each of the major historical crisis events were defined as tragedies and 
signified  traumatic painful experiences for JSC as an organization, provoking the 
Center to embrace positive change: “The tragedies galvanized the agency to learn from 
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these painful events” (NASA History, 2015). This finding concurs with principles 
advocated by prevailing change models that crisis events provide a platform to trigger 
for organizational change (Lewin, 1951; Schein, 1996). In retrospectively reflecting 
upon the major past crisis events in JSC’s history, participants expressed the view that 
the crisis events and the failures that instigated them as being necessary progressive 
periods in the organization’s history for internal learning and change:  
“There's a lot of case studies that they put you through at 
NASA, where they actually show all these successful 
programs and then they'll go, "Hey, these critical disasters 
were essential for the program to move forward." On 
Apollo they had the fire. After that, they made all these 
changes that really made the program better and let them 
get to the moon. In the shuttle program, they had one 
disaster that caused everybody to back up and re-evaluate, 
then it was a much better program afterwards. There's 
kind of a feeling that those failures are almost necessary. 
That you push on a certain mind-set and you need that 
break to force you to back up at that point and go 
"Whoa. What's going on?", and to re-evaluate. And that's 
positive. That's very good. Seeing that always challenge 
my team to do is, "Can we do that without killing 
anybody?" (Interviewee, senior engineer) 
 
In examining the learning and change that resulted from the JSC’s major 
historical crisis events, two types of change emerged as being directly related to the 
events: (1) technical knowledge, and (2) structural changes.  
As a result, NASA has emphasized that the culture should 
be “prove it is safe” as opposed to “prove it is unsafe” 
when a concern is raised. The process is better, and the 
culture is changing as a result of both of these accidents. 
(NASA Historical legacy, 2010)  
 
Platform for technical change 
For example, post the Apollo 1 fire, JSC implemented a number of technical 
and organizational changes to the program.  The Apollo 1 fire and the findings of 
subsequent review Boards (i.e. the Apollo 204 Review Board and NASA’s own 
detailed analysis of the Apollo program and its management) created a platform upon 
which the organization implemented a number of technical spacecraft hardware and 
procedural changes, with a core focus on improving crew safety. Technically, NASA 
defined the 100 percent pure oxygen test environment as hazardous and forever 
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changed what was considered a safe test environment for future test. Significant 
changes were also made to the materials used inside the spacecraft module by severely 
restricting and controlling the volume and location of flammable materials and a new 
hatch was designed to be quick opening.  
"I can assure you if we had not had that fire and rebuilt 
the command module ... we could not have done the 
Apollo program successfully, so we owe a lot to Gus, and 
Rog, and Ed. They made it possible for the rest of us to 
do the almost-impossible.” (Apollo Astronaut, CBS 
News, 2007)41 
 
In the case of the Challenger Shuttle disaster, NASA/JSC on the technical and 
engineering front spent the next 2½ years fixing the hardware and improving 
processes, and made over 200 changes to the shuttle during this downtime and 
worked on design changes to improve the vehicle and these technical learnings were 
utilized on future space missions. The engineers and astronauts at JSC focused on 
developing an escape system and protective launch and re-entry suit: 
“[we] included an escape module into the design of space 
vehicles. A feature that would be replicated in the next 
major space program - the ISS; and the Soyuz space 
capsule, which was sent up every six months for the 
purpose of changing out the emergency escape module 
that would be always attached to the International Space 
Station in the event of some destabilizing condition which 
made it no longer habitable. As a consequence the crew 
could then board the Soyuz and exit the Station with 
some very high assurance of returning to the surface of 
the Earth promptly” (ISS HQ report, 2013). 
 
Platform for structural change 
In 1967, following the Apollo 1 fire, Congress directed a structural change to 
the program and mandated the formation of an Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, “to 
advise the administrator on safety in NASA’s hardware programs. Congress also 
mandated a Space Program Advisory Council and a Research and Technology 
Advisory Council, reporting to the Administrator” (Bugos and Boyd, 2008: 146). 
Procedurally, the program redefined responsibilities for test procedures and 
                                                          
41 Excerpt from Morgan D. (2007). ‘How Deadly Apollo Fire Helped Save NASA’, CBS 
News. January 27.  
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established an independent Flight Safety Office that operated on two levels – at the 
NASA Headquarters level and also at the individual field centers, where the Office 
became responsible for reviewing “all aspects of design, manufacturing, test, and flight 
from a safety standpoint” (Apollo 204 Report, 1967).  
The Challenger Shuttle disaster, NASA/JSC led to the development and 
implementation of a number of long-term structure and process related changes. The 
organization established several new offices, panels and roles of responsibility all 
focused on establishing more formal stricter safety systems at both the NASA agency 
level:  
“Significant new procedures are being implemented to 
provide independent safety, reliability, maintainability, and 
quality assurance functions. A completely new 
organization, reporting directly to the NASA 
Administrator, now provides independent oversight of all 
critical flight safety matters…NASA has established an 
Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality 
Assurance (SRM&QA). A new position, Associate 
Administrator for SRM&QA, has been established, 
reporting directly to the NASA Administrator …The 
NASA Office of the Chief Engineer was abolished, and 
the appropriate functions and resources of that office 
were transferred to the Associate Administrator for 
SRM&QA…” (Excerpts from NASA Report to 
President: Action to implement the recommendation, 
1986) 
 
And more specifically at the JSC Center level: 
“In consideration of the number, complexity, and 
interrelationships between the many activities leading to 
the next flight, the Space Shuttle Program Manager at 
Johnson Space Center has initiated a series of formal 
Program Management Reviews for the Space Shuttle 
program…A Space Flight Safety Panel, chaired by 
astronaut Bryan O'Connor, has been established…” 
(Excerpts from NASA Report Implemented actions, 
1987).  
 
 
210 
 
b) Cultural change: progressively restrained parameters of innovation 
and efficiency 
The data found that with each crisis cycle in JSC’s history, the technical and 
structural learning and changes effected the culture of the organization. As an 
organization JSC connects its current safety culture to the major historical crisis 
events; “Our current Safety Culture ideals have been shaped by past tragedies such as 
Apollo 1” (JSC, Wilt, 2017)42. With each crisis JSC assumed a heightened safety 
culture, whereby with each crisis cycle safety systems and structures became stricter, 
more controlled and procedural.  Consequently, the parameters for innovation, 
experimentation and efficiency changed, and is perceived to have become 
progressively constrained: 
“And it used to be back in the old days like Apollo and 
stuff, you could do plenty of stuff. And even early shuttle 
days, yeah you could go make stuff, but now we over 
bureaucratize and over enforce rules, and, "No you can't 
do that. No you can't do that." There's got to be a reason 
why you can't do that” (Interviewee, senior engineer). 
 
The findings suggest that as part of the reprinting process, the organization’s 
original approach to innovation and efficiency was broader in scope in comparison to 
the organization’s modern framing. It suggests the historical crisis events and related 
trauma rewrote aspects of these founding characteristics, establishing new imprints 
and operating behaviors for JSC that were more rigid. This aspect of the reprinting 
process creates progressive rigidity into the system and culture of JSC, which was 
found to be a consequence of the organization’s deliberate attempt to prevent future 
occurrences of traumatic crisis events. For example, this is illustrated in the post-
Challenger report and its change intention: 
  “our objective has been not only to prevent any recurrence of 
the failure related to this accident, but to the extent possible to 
reduce other risks in future flights...It fully recognizes that 
the risk associated with space flight associated with space 
flight cannot be totally eliminated” (Commission report, 1986, 
emphasis added) 
 
                                                          
42 Wilt G. (2017). JSC Emerge, ‘Apollo 1 (AS-204) – Lessons and Legacies’ presentation, 
February 6, [sma.nasa.gov].  
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The findings indicate that the reprinting process is a redetermination of the 
organization’s risk paradigm where innovation and efficiency becomes progressively 
constricted and subservient to safety. The new risk paradigm being established as part 
of the reprinting process to prevent failure from occurring and remove as much risk as 
possible. For JSC these historical crisis events signified failure and in the 
contemporary context, it was to be avoided. In describing JSC’s current culture, 
informants commonly quoted the phrases “failure is not an option” and “fear of 
failure”, speaking of the organization being risk averse with limitations on what 
resembles accepted risk and innovation failure.  One interviewee articulated: 
“[post the STS Colombia accident] there was a little bit of 
creep into the system of, ‘just don't ever let that happen 
again’, which the sentiment is good, but they're trying to 
process it [risk and failure] out… You can't innovate in 
that environment. You cannot innovate and have a "We 
cannot fail" mentality. It's not possible” (Interviewee, 
Former JSC Senior engineer) 
 
 
Redetermining the dominant risk paradigm: occupational risk 
The term ‘dominant logic’ herein refers to an organization’s shared mindset 
and way of conceptualizing tools, processes, behaviors and modes of operating in 
order to achieve its mission (Kor and Mesko, 2013; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Based 
on analysis it emerged that the organization’s dominant logic, specifically its risk 
perspective influences the parameters and boundaries of what it deemed tolerable 
innovation and efficiency.  
A theme common across various sources of data was the view that human 
space flight is a highly dangerous endeavor and therefore risk is a central tenet of 
human space exploration and JSC’s mission. The principle of risk and risk acceptance 
was often articulated with participants expressing sentiments that “it [human space 
flight] isn't safe. What we do is dangerous. We have to be willing to tolerate or accept 
some level of risk” (interviewee, former astronaut and Directorate Director). 
However, this perception extends beyond the case organization and is a foundational 
feature of the broader space industry, thus indicating a world view shared by a 
network of organizations, a space ecosystem. The space industry was birthed out of 
aviation and the early flight contributors came from the air force pilots accustomed to 
high occupational risk and had witnessed the loss of men’s lives. In being an industry 
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wide feature, the dominant risk logic holds significance because it persists even when 
an organization changes its strategy, be it ambidextrous or otherwise, for it constitutes 
a defining feature that determines the operational capabilities of organizations in the 
field of human space flight. 
The data found that one particular risk dimension was prominent at JSC – 
occupational risk. Occupational risk refers to the potential risks that occur as a 
consequence of activities undertaken by individuals in fulfilment of their job tasks. At 
JSC, this had a direct association with astronauts who, by virtue of their role (i.e. they 
travel to/from space in a highly combustible space vehicle and may perform 
extravehicular activity), absorbed a high degree of risk given that any failures could 
result in their loss of life. However, sensitivity to the personal occupational risk of 
astronauts was not restricted to the astronaut community but extended across the 
broader JSC organization and its employees. This sensitivity to the risk to astronauts is 
embedded within the culture of JSC and is encapsulated by the Center’s motto often 
repeated by actors, “failure is not an option”, a phrase coined after the Apollo 1 fire. 
As an organization, JSC procedures and processes are designed to intentionally 
mitigate risks to astronauts and crew as much as possible. A feature which manifests 
itself in operational processes and the organization’s culture, characterized by the 
testing and retesting of technology, hardware, processes, and systems for safety 
assurance.  
During the early establishment of the human space program and the Manned 
Space Center (JSC) astronauts and the Center demonstrated a risk perception and 
expectation that accepted human life would be lost but it was part and parcel of the 
human space mission, and sought to manage the risk rather than mitigate or attempt 
to eliminate it. 
“…I think we all expect to lose a man sometime. We’re 
working just as hard as we can work against it, of course. 
But in anything where you have equipment like this, as 
high speed, and as new equipment like this, we’re not 
hiding our head in the sand. We’re well aware somebody 
will get their head knocked off one of these days on some 
mission or other. But just as in aviation, we’ve all had 
many of our friends killed in aviation. This doesn’t mean 
that aviation progress stops and that we all go back and 
say we shouldn’t fly anymore. This program is worth 
running, well there’ll be times when people will probably 
get hurt but the program will go on and we’re not going 
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to stop our efforts. Meanwhile, we wanna make it just as 
safe as we can possibly make it” (Astronaut, CBS video 
archive, 1966-1967) 
 
However, in the modern JSC organizational context the data indicated a 
different risk paradigm where the loss of human life is considered wholly unacceptable 
and structural and cultural measures seek to mitigate the loss of life at all costs.  
“the risk was more acceptable back then [Apollo 
program]. You had test pilots that lost their lives all the 
time, and I'm not saying anybody thought that was okay, 
but it was accepted. We have military people who lose 
their lives all the time, that's not okay, but it's accepted, so 
we've evolved into a culture where it's not okay to lose an 
astronaut (Interviewee, Division Head).  
 
 
4. Surface manifestation: dual process of sustained 
imprints and reprinting effect in tension with 
ambidexterity  
Surface manifestations refers to the contemporaneous detectable structural 
and cultural features of the organization that play an active role in shaping JSC’s 
transition to ambidexterity. The study detected that sustained imprints and the 
reprinting process were dual processes actively occurring at JSC influencing the 
organization’s transition towards the pursuit of exploration and exploitation. The 
strategic transition underway at JSC revealed that certain sustaining imprints with 
origins in the organization’s founding now presented impediments in the new strategic 
context JSC found itself.  
 
 
a) Competency trap: sustained imprints conflicting with ambidextrous pursuit  
The data found that sustained organizational characteristics originating from 
JSC’s founding represents a competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988). Their 
association to historical achievements gives them value and contributes to their 
persistence, trapping the organization into continuing with these features even though 
they are not conducive to the new strategic vision for the organization.  
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 In an effort to attain its new strategic vision for the dual pursuit for 
innovation with efficiency, JSC’s underwent a reorganization in 2015 that sought to 
change historic features such as stovepipes as they were unconducive to the new 
vision ‘to advance human exploration with a structure and governance that is more 
lean, agile, and adaptive to change:  
“This reorganization did not create new functions or 
abolish existing ones… a major goal of this 
reorganization was to enhance collaboration and reduce 
stove pipes and coordinate JSC exploration activities and 
resources.  So, your core duties and functions won’t 
change, but how you perform those duties and functions 
will likely evolve--  due to new partnerships and 
collaborations  and expected efficiencies of scale in areas 
such as processes and procedures created by new offices 
and grouping of functions.” (JSC internal 
communications, 2015) 
 
In the modern context of JSC, the stovepipes were seen as an inhibitor of 
innovation, collaboration and experimentation, indicating either a decay in the value of 
this feature, or the inclusion of other factors that now negate the historical benefit of 
this feature. Similarly, the militaristic style was described as a conformity mechanism 
“It’s literally, you know your chain of command. You do not step out of your chain of 
command…There's like a mental socialization that occurs, so if you want to move up 
then you have to stick to the straight and narrow and not ruffle too many feathers…” 
(Office Lead). However, participants associated the new strategic visions (JSC 2.0) for 
innovation and efficiency with traits like “being open to diversity of thinking and 
dissenting opinions”, and being “outward looking” – features that did not fit with the 
militaristic style historically found in the organization.  
 
b) Reprinting: Accustomed to change 
In the context of the new strategy and the changes underway at JSC, 
interviewees who had worked at the organization spoke of being accustomed to 
change – changing missions, changing administrations: “we’ve had so many changes 
here we’re used to change” (Division Chief). Participants related a familiarity with 
change connecting it to the various changes the organization has experienced in its 
past as a result of the crisis events, cancelled space programs (i.e. Space Shuttle and 
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Constellation). Informants explained that change was a significant part of JSC and its 
past experiences and had occurred in different forms, thereby being an activity the 
organization was accustomed with: 
“Boy, [change] it's huge here … I'll start with the huge 
[recent] changes, really it started beginning with the 
Columbia accident… So the change really started with the 
accident. Then came the next big change-- the return to 
flight. Getting shuttle back flying so we can finish the 
space station. That imposed a huge change on [JSC] areas, 
on my directorate…Then, I guess the next big, big change 
to come was President Obama was elected. When was 
that? '08 I guess? Yes, '08. So that was the beginning of 
yet another huge change. So, political. There was a 
political wave that now came sweeping across NASA, 
change from Bush to Obama, that was enormous-- it had 
an enormous impact in terms of change… So right 
around 2011, 2010, 2011 when the shuttle was finally into 
the road, STS 135 was the last mission. It's done, 
Constellation is over -- this was the next enormous 
change, was the double whammy; Constellation and 
shuttle both gone. We suddenly had thousands of people 
with nothing to do and no way of being funded, so huge 
lay-offs on the contractor side… So I'm just kind of 
outlining about a decade’s worth of enormous change 
that affected JSC” (Interviewee, Division Chief).  
 
In speaking of JSC’s new strategy and change effort, some informants expressed 
an element of change fatigue as noted in comments like “JSC 2.0, we’ll wait and see. 
This is just another change that will come and go” (Interviewee, Officer), thus 
reinforcing the point that change as a result of past experiences, including crisis 
events, had become familiar to JSC.  
 
c) Reprinting: redetermined risk logic conflicting with ambidextrous pursuit  
The dominant risk logic which had been redefined as a result of past crisis 
events was evident in the organization’s strict cultural orientation around safety: “our 
safety ethic that had been baked into our Agency DNA,” (Oral History, Former 
administrator (b)). 
Safety is paramount at JSC and it conditions the character of processes, 
systems and modes of behavior across the organization. The strong safety culture was 
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observed onsite in artefacts such as welcome mats with the message “safety has no 
quitting time” and signs emphasizing “safety first” and “safety begins here”. The data 
indicated that the culture of safety at JSC is a risk mitigating mechanism that has 
evolved over the course of the organization’s history, and in its contemporary form 
the safety culture was geared towards risk avoidance rather than risk management. 
Interviewees expressed that the organization tends to pursue risk avoidance strategies 
and practices and as a consequence was lacking in risk management capabilities. As 
such the organizational culture was regularly described as being highly risk averse, 
motivated primarily by the fear of the loss of life, an occupational risk.  
“… before we cut metal, before we invest on a build or a 
test, we're going to lay out the detail plan anticipating 
everything that can go wrong and convince ourselves that 
that plan is sound and complete. So, we spend a lot of 
money on that plan, and a lot of time” (Interviewee, 
Former JSC engineer).  
 
 Notably, some participants expressed that this dominant risk logic bounded 
and constrained innovation and experimentation at JSC. One senior manager whose 
role involved actively engaging with new ideas and technologies and bringing them 
into JSC to improve performance and increase innovation expressed the tension, 
noting the strategic intent to explore and exploit capabilities involved challenging the 
prevailing JSC risk logic which in view of historical events was suitable to preserve life, 
but in the current context was an inhibitor:  
“We try to connect new ideas, things that have not been 
tried out in space yet and aren't even close necessarily, but 
trying to move it closer so we could improve 
performance, make grand leaps in our technological 
capabilities. That's the intent of bringing nanotechnology 
to the Space Center… but it was always a bit of a battle 
against what JSC's culture is predominantly, which is 
failure is not an option, you've heard of  before. That can 
have good connotations and bad. You knew about the 
good ones, right? Because of the movie Apollo 13, right? 
"Hey, we're going to get these guys home no matter 
what," Failure is not an option. But sometimes, that also 
means that failure and the potential of failure -even in a 
technology, is not tolerated, so taking risks when you're 
protecting the crew make all the sense in the world. You 
do not take unnecessary risks when humans are at stake 
and huge taxpayers investments. But when you're trying 
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to develop a new technology, or to take the next step, that 
same aversion to risk and desire to go with what's already 
proven and already tried and true goes against you, when 
you want to start challenging the type of structure you 
might want to use or the type of power system or battery 
system. It's a challenging place for people who are 
technology researchers, lower TRL [test readiness level] 
stuff” (Interviewee, senior manager) 
 
The Center’s new strategy was viewed to be promoting collaboration and 
partnerships, on a Center-wide scale in an effort to garner learnings on innovation and 
efficiency: “Partnerships are of mutual benefit. For we [JSC] get the benefit of learning 
new ways of doing things –insights into what other businesses do” (Interviewee, 
senior manager). The Center’s new ambidextrous strategy and its inclusion of 
partnerships with commercial organizations signaled a disruption to the Center’s 
historically rooted self-identity of being the solo knowledge experts in the field. The 
shift towards an exploration and exploitation ambidextrous strategy through the use of 
partnership and commercialization is the new feature perceived to be augmenting 
JSC’s expert identity “now partnership and commercialization is changing this [JSC’s 
position as knowledge center] with knowledge being shared and gained from partners” 
(Interviewee, Senior manager). Another interviewee exemplified this change tension 
and its manifestation in how the Center engaged with commercial partners: 
“There's the change with commercialization in the ways 
we do vehicles, which on the engineering side has big 
cultural impacts because NASA doesn't cross-check every 
[one of commercial partners] safety decision. We have to 
step back. Let them have their accidents. Let them resolve 
them... NASA stepping back and not controlling all the 
science but instead enabling it is also a really dramatic 
change” (Interviewee, Division Chief) 
 
Hence, the shift towards working with external partners shifts the knowledge 
center away from JSC, however, it was felt that the organization was struggling to 
change and break away from its historically embedded ideas: 
“If you look at the implementation, we read the words 
and you say, “I want to be more agile. I’m going to be 
responsive to change”. We should say “responsive to 
change” means we’ve got to look outside to see what the 
change is, but that’s not happening in practice in many 
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cases – a lot of our effort is concentrated internally” 
(Chief technologist, 2017)43.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study set out to conduct an inductive case analysis of JSC examining how 
its history influences the way it approaches a strategic shift towards exploration and 
exploitation, ambidexterity. As such, this study is reflective of Kipping and Üsdiken’s 
(2014) ‘history in theory’ approach for it engages with history as an influencer of the 
organization’s contemporary function. Furthermore, its empirical founding serves to 
address the call for research that gives more explicit attention to history, and its 
influence on strategic practices (Kipping and Üsdiken, 2014; Suddaby and Foster, 
2017). The paper refers to history as the sociohistorical context that shapes an 
organization’s strategic processes, practices and perceptions (Vaara and Lamberg, 
2016). One concept that has received scholarly attention and is pertinent to 
understanding the shaping role of history is the theory of imprinting (Marquis and 
Tilcsik, 2013). In drawing upon this concept the study pays attention to particular 
sensitive periods in JSC’s history post its founding – namely endogenous crisis events 
characterized by trauma that occurred in the organization’s past. The research findings 
contribute to an underserved area in imprinting research by furthering our 
understanding of the imprinting dynamic by examining organizational history and the 
effect of historical crises on contemporary strategic change activity. In focusing on 
endogenously produced crises and trauma this paper shifts its focus from exogenous 
shocks and threats which has dominated research studies (e.g. Mainiero and Gibson, 
2003; Schmitt et al, 2010), and contributes to expanding our understanding of a little 
explore and undertheorized feature of organizations (Sarkar and Osiyevsky, 2017). 
Figure 10, which is expounded upon below, presents a conceptual model conveying 
the core concepts emerging from the study and the interrelations between dimensions.   
                                                          
43 Terrier, D., Heracleous, L., and Gonzalez, S. (2017), p. 21 
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Figure 10: Conceptual illustration of historically embedded dual processes sustained imprinting and reprinting 
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The study finds that an organization’s history is multidimensional and consists 
of distinct but interrelated features which manifested in two historically embedded 
processes which were simultaneously in operation – sustained imprinting and the 
reprinting process. Furthermore, the interaction of these two concurrent processes was 
found to condition JSC’s contemporary perceptions and approach towards its new 
exploration-exploitation strategy and implementation at an organizational and 
individual level. As figure 10 demonstrates, in the case of JSC, these two processes 
have their origin in the organization’s founding structural and cultural characteristics 
or imprints (Boeker, 1989; Johnson, 2007). However, the subsequent effect and 
outcome of these founding imprints upon the sustained imprinting process and the 
reprinting process differ, and even diverge over time.  
In relation to the process of sustained imprinting, the findings highlight 
structural systems, and behavioral operating characteristics exhibited by JSC and its 
actors, were grounded within and representative of the militaristic siloed disposition of 
the 1950’s-1960’s space era when the organization was founded. However, what is 
significant about these founding imprints is not that they just persist over time, but in 
looking deeper it represents what Simsek et al (2015) refer to as amplification whereby 
the imprints become increasingly ingrained and a stable feature within the 
organization. Scholars (Blombäck et al, 2013; Johnson, 2007) highlight that gaps 
remain in our understanding of the mechanisms underpinning the retention and 
persistence of imprints and this study contributes in helping to address this gap by 
highlighting that prominent historical achievements in an organization’s past serve as 
episodes in time that reinforce imprints. The findings show that JSC’s founding 
imprints were perpetuated owing to significant historical achievements accomplished 
by the organization and the expert identity these accomplishments bestowed.  Hence, 
historical achievements represent prominent episodes in an organization’s history, and 
by attaining these feats by means of historically established attributes and imprints, 
success becomes associated with these structures, systems and behaviors first 
established at founding.  The suggestion that sustained imprints can be underpinned 
by historical achievements correlates with existing evidence that success reinforces 
imprints (Barnett and Pontikes, 2008). Furthermore, historical achievements imbue 
these associated imprints with value and subsequent achievements serve to reinforce 
the success of the founding imprints and continues to underpin its ingrained 
persistence. This view of historical achievements and imbued value relates with Van 
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Driel and Dolfsma (2010) who suggest values imprinted on organizations has 
behavioral and cognitive implications on sustaining the imprints. Historical 
achievements and the value affiliated with them is seen to provoke an inertial force 
that reinforces these imprints and deems them effective for ongoing operations.  
Although Simsek et al (2015) refer to path dependency, performance feedback and 
institutionalization as examples of reinforcing mechanisms, this study proposes that 
historical achievements are an additional mechanism for though the influence of 
accomplishments contributes to mechanisms such as path dependency and the 
escalation of commitment, it equally operates independent of them. Hence, this view 
of historical achievement provides a nuanced understanding of the forces 
underpinning the sustained stability of certain imprints.  
 
As with the sustained imprinting process, the second historically embedded 
process represented in figure 10, the reprinting process, has its roots in imprinting 
theory in that it refers to the organizational attributes shaped by environmental 
conditions (Stinchcombe, 1965). However, the reprinting process was found to be a 
dynamic process that reoccurs over time, and therefore portrays the progressive 
transformation of imprints (Simesek et al, 2015).  
As figure 10 shows, the reprinting process begins with the organization’s 
founding imprints, however the occurrence of unanticipated crises triggers the 
reprinting process. Organizational crises in the context of this study refers to 
unanticipated, negative events triggered by internal factors (Roux-Dufont, 2009), 
which disrupts the organization’s status quo and development path at a specific time 
period (Sarkar and Osiyevskyy, 2017), and requires corrective action (Dutton, 1986). 
Crises influence an organization’s long-term strategic efforts (Seeger et al, 2005), yet 
limited attention has been given to examining how past crisis events influence an 
organization’s contemporary strategic activity including a strategic shift towards 
ambidexterity.  Organizational crisis is a frequently observed phenomenon which 
occurs at various times throughout an organization’s development, however studies 
have tended to examine and analyze crisis and trauma as a solo occurrence (e.g. Seeger 
et al, 2005).  A distinguishing feature of this study is that it examines a series of 
historical crisis trauma events experienced by JSC. In analyzing the organization’s 
historical crisis and trauma events cumulatively, the study helps builds an 
understanding of how crises relate, and accounts for the cumulative experience and 
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the compounded impact cycles of crises can have on an organization (Mias deKlerk, 
2007). The study shows how crisis and trauma events occur not as solo episodes with 
confined repercussions, as is generally presented in literature, but in a cyclical manner, 
where the repercussions of one event become the basis upon which change and 
imprinted behaviors arising from subsequent crisis events are built upon. Hence, the 
conditioning effect of historical crisis is layered over time and with each new layer 
come nuances in behavioral traits. The study therefore contributes to change and crisis 
management literature by providing a better understanding of how crisis events affect 
an organization, how these events are linked over time and the consequence of these 
connections.   
The study finds that post-founding crisis events represent salient sensitive 
periods, thus providing empirical evidence that an organization experiences multiple 
sensitive periods during its lifetime (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). These sensitive 
episodes experienced by JSC were triggered not by external environmental influences 
or founding individual(s) as purported in imprinting studies, but were endogenously 
provoked, cultivating organizational vulnerabilities that resulted in the crisis events 
(Roux-Dufont, 2009). Furthermore, these crises events were distinguished by trauma, 
thus providing more specification to the nature and boundaries of post-founding 
sensitive periods. The findings show that the series of unanticipated crisis events each 
produced a traumatic effect and a phase of heightened sensitivity to the imprinting 
process. The trauma experienced by JSC members equates to the shock phase in Fink 
et al’s (1971) crisis model, causing disruption to the organization’s collective thinking 
and emotional distress.  
Having identified crisis-trauma events as a trigger of the reprinting process, 
analysis indicates that this process consists of two distinct, opposite but interrelated 
activities – the act of change and rigidity. These two elements are reflective of Helfat 
(1998: 49) ‘adaption versus rigidity’ tension within history-dependent activities. Helfat 
(1998) presents these dimensions as alternatives, suggesting that a historically 
embedded activity or process produces either change or rigidity. Similarly, Sarkar and 
Osiyevskyy (2017) note that in relation to existential crises, organizations are either 
stimulated to change or become rigid in an effort to preserve established structures 
and practices. However, the paradox lens would suggest that it is possible for these 
two opposite elements (change and rigidity) to be interrelated and occur 
simultaneously (Lewis, 2011). In the case of the reprinting process the study finds that 
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both change and rigidity are discernable activities that actively occur, but they are also 
interrelated, for in pursuing change post the crisis-trauma event, JSC also established 
rigidities that redefined future strategic activity. Thus the reprinting process can be 
seen to be a paradoxical manifestation of a historically embedded process.  
To expound upon the change element further, the JSC case analysis indicates 
that each crisis-trauma event engendered visible change in the organization, which 
corresponds with existing studies and theorizations (e.g. Seegar et al 2005; Szymanski 
and Schindler, 2017), and the contention of change models which view crises as a 
trigger for change (Lewin, 1951; Schein, 1996). The ensuing changes diverged from 
JSC’s previous way of operating, prompting structural, operational and cultural 
changes and triggered the development of organizational patterns and structures 
(imprints) that differed to those created at its founding. With each cycle of crisis, JSC 
implemented technical, organizational and structural changes. Hence, the resulting 
imprints arising from one crisis event became the foundation upon which imprints are 
transformed or new ones established in subsequent crises, representing a layering of 
organizational patterns. The study does not find evidence of the decay or elimination 
(Simsek et al, 2015) of imprints as such, but rather existing structural systems, 
processes and modes of behaving are adapted and transformed, and new attributes 
(imprints) are created. In establishing these structures and reorganizing resources, 
consequently these changes become the new status quo which the organization strives 
to maintain until the next crisis-trauma event triggers another change cycle.  
However, as figure 10 illustrates, crisis events not only triggers disruptive 
change activity as part of the reprinting process, but as a consequence of the trauma 
effect (Simuth, 2017) derived from crises,  it simultaneously generates an implicit 
supplementary process that engenders rigidity in the organization’s cognitive and 
cultural framing of innovation and efficiency over time. In experiencing emotional and 
cognitive distress as a result of the fatal crisis events, JSC was predisposed to change, 
but the change was underpinned by an intrinsic deterrent to avoid a repeat of such 
events – a point illustrated by the JSC motto ‘failure is not an option’. Thus, within the 
reprinting process, as JSC undergoes change it simultaneously operates a defensive 
mechanism whereby it redefines and progressively restrains the parameters of what it 
deems acceptable for risky exploration and efficiency orientated activities in an effort 
to avoid the reoccurrence of a traumatic crisis event. This redefining process occurs 
with each crisis cycle and subsequent change initiatives arising from later crises build 
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upon these redefined parameters and progressively delimitS the scope of these 
activities. In other words, the crisis events lead to change in the short term but 
simultaneously create scope rigidities for future cycles of change, innovation and 
efficiency.  
The reprinting process can be seen to resemble Lewis’ (2000) concept of 
paradox and reinforcing cycles. Lewis asserts, “as actors seek to resolve paradoxical 
tensions, they may become trapped within reinforcing cycles that perpetuate and 
exacerbate the tension, for paradox is a double-edged sword. Tensions might serve as 
“a trigger for change”, spurring actors to rethink existing polarities and recognize 
more complicated interrelationships. Yet, tensions simultaneously inhibit change” 
(2000: 763). In the case of the reprinting process, we see that both dynamics occur 
simultaneously, for the crisis event provokes reprinting and induces the organization 
to change; and simultaneously, it implicitly leads to the organization establishing 
rigidities in how it classifies and perceives exploration and exploitation activities. Thus, 
reprinting signifies a negative adjustment in the organization’s operating paradigm, and 
reflects a paradoxical self-reinforcing cycle. Whereas imprinting theory relates to 
persistent patterns and features established at the organization’s founding (Marquis 
and Tilcsik, 2013), reprinting represents a second order ramification arising from 
sensitive historical crisis events occurring post its founding. The successive occurrence 
of such crisis-trauma events triggers the reprinting process which in turn transforms 
and/or creates imprints which become layered over time and have long-term 
consequences on the organization’s functioning behavior.  
 In addition, the reprinting process is reflective in part of van Driel and 
Dolfsma (2010) contention that imprinting is a dynamic recurring process that 
conditions and locks-in the organization. For van Driel and Dolfsma (2010) ‘lock-in’ 
refers to continuity of imprints and not rigidity.  However, with the reprinting process 
and its paradoxical elements, we see that this process represents both continuity and 
rigidity.  Thus reprinting extends van Driel and Dolfsma (2010) view and provides a 
deeper understanding of the complexities that can inherently exist with imprinting as a 
recurring process. Simsek et al’s (2015) framework implies that over time imprints are 
dynamic and can evolve over time as opposed to remaining static. The study of JSC 
contributes a nuanced empirically based understanding of the dynamic evolving 
quality of imprints. Furthermore, figure 10 illustrates that imprints assume both a 
225 
 
dynamic quality and a static one, as represented by the historically embedded processes 
‘sustained imprints’ and the ‘reprinting process.  
 
The coexistence of sustained imprints and reprinting, two historically 
embedded processes, indicates a dual process whose interaction is manifested in JSC’s 
contemporary enactment of the strategic change effort to implement ambidexterity 
(figure 10). In relation to the change process, Kriauciunas and Kale (2006) suggest the 
“solution firms identify or where they look for information to address the problem 
might be influenced by how or what they first define as the problem” (p. 665). In 
other words, how organizations approach change depends on how they frame the 
problem. Extending this argument further, the findings from this study suggest that 
when transitioning towards an explore-exploit strategy, how the organization frames 
these activities and attempts to fulfil them is dependent on historical events and the 
parameters by which it defines exploration-exploitation activities as a result of the 
reprinting process. 
In JSC’s contemporary environment its new strategic agenda of innovation (i.e. 
the search for new knowledge, openness towards distant knowledge, collaborative 
learning with non-aerospace and commercial entities and the reduction structural 
silos); and exploitation (i.e. streamlining cumbersome processes to further innovation 
efforts), sustained founding imprints (i.e. the continued utility of founding behavioral 
and structural imprints) came into conflict with the organization’s ambition for 
ambidexterity. The continued presence of these sustained imprints represented a 
competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988). And with regards to the reprinting process, 
the impetus for change generated by the process imbued JSC with a degree of 
familiarity to adaptation and change. However, the countervailing force of rigidity 
within reprinting, operationally and cognitively, progressively constrained the 
organization’s perception of exploration and exploitation and formed bounds around 
how JSC defined and approached the simultaneous implementation of exploration and 
exploration activities. Consequently, it presents a friction with JSC’s strategic ambition 
and implementation for ambidexterity. The manifestation of this friction became 
evident, for example, in that the search for new knowledge was a struggle and 
inconsistently pursued. This new context of exploration stretched JSC’s historically 
defined and accepted parameters of what constituted exploration. Similarly, efficiency 
and exploitation activities were historically conditioned on the basis it did not 
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compromise safety, minimized risk and had been tested and proven to work 
(consequences of JSC’s cycles of crisis-trauma events). Yet, in this new strategic 
context of ambidexterity, exploitation and the drive for efficiency presented a friction 
to this standard.  
The temporal perspective to organizational history maintains that actors 
operate in an ‘ongoing present’, meaning that through present materials, an 
organization’s past is continually enacted in its present and future (Schultz and 
Hernes, 2013). Although Schultz and Hernes (2013) apply this lens to identity 
reconstruction, the findings in this study find application to organizational change. 
The reprinting process is found to be an ongoing process which manifests in existent 
actions and decisions of actors engaged in the change process. The view of history 
having a continual active influence on contemporary change helps to deepen our 
understanding of the complexity of its influence, and takes it beyond the current 
perceptions of history as being an ‘either-or’ phenomenon. The study shows that in 
dissecting an organization’s history, certain elements of it have a paradoxical influence 
that extends to the present.  
 
Perspectives for future research  
The findings presented in this paper open up several avenues for further 
research. The study demonstrates the multidimensional nature and influence of 
organizational history by giving closer examination to organizational imprinting.  In 
identifying two distinct historically embedded processes – sustained imprinting and 
the reprinting process – the study contributes to our understanding of how an 
organization’s history and past crisis-trauma events influence its present strategic 
context. Future research can extend analysis of organizational history by developing 
our understanding of sensitive periods and examine whether entities and other 
organizations are equally susceptible to trauma events and the ensuing reprinting 
process as reflected in this study, or whether trauma events pay a particular role in 
redefining imprints.  
The study identifies that the occurrence of the reprinting process is 
conditioned by crises and has a paradoxical influence. Exploring whether other 
features of an organization’s past are characterized by paradox, how it conditions the 
organization’s function and what are the long-term effects, could further our 
understanding. Future research could also unpack the reprinting process further by 
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looking at whether the paradoxical process of change and rigidity results only from 
crises characterized by trauma or can it be extended to other sensitive periods?  
Furthermore, research could examine the reprinting process from a different 
analytical perspective, such as sensemaking. Such an approach could help reveal the 
related cognitive constructs traversing crisis events and the redetermination of 
activities such as exploration and exploitation. Future examination could also explore 
and expand upon the underlying factors contributing to the existence of the reprinting 
process, its reproduction and also whether the reprinting process occurs in reverse. 
The role of leadership and key actors in shaping the reprinting process could provide a 
multi-level understanding of the concept. In addition, discursive analysis (Paroutis et 
al, 2013) exploring how meaning is redefined during reprinting could provide depth to 
understanding this complex historical process, and the way in which is used by 
organizational members in the strategy process.  
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The research program within this thesis set out to investigate the 
concept of organizational ambidexterity and how an organization develops this 
capability by empirically examining the process by which an organization transitions to 
simultaneously manage exploration-exploitation, and the underlying mechanisms 
which either support or hinder the process. Through an extensive qualitative multi-
level case analysis of an organization undergoing strategic change targeted towards the 
dual and effective pursuit of exploration and exploitation, the research project 
contained within this thesis provides a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon 
rooted in empirical real-world practice. Drawing upon qualitative research methods 
(i.e. ethnographic and grounded theory approach), and multiple primary and 
secondary data sources, the study helps to address some of the theoretical and 
empirical gaps that exist in our comprehension of ambidexterity. In exploring an 
organization’s journey towards ambidexterity, this research project provides nuanced 
insights positioned in the intersection of organizational ambidexterity, organizational 
history, and the interplay of the formal and informal organization.  
 
Summary of three papers 
The core chapters within this thesis contain the three papers that convey the 
core findings emerging from this research project. All three papers are drawn together 
by the overarching concept of change which is inherent in an organization’s strategic 
shift towards becoming organizationally ambidextrous. The following briefly discusses 
the three papers contained within this thesis and summarizes the resulting 
contribution. Table 12 details key aspects of each of the three papers.  
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Paper one examines the concept of complementarity between the different 
approaches to ambidexterity. Scholars conceptually acknowledge and that the pathway 
to ambidexterity involves a combination of structural and contextual solutions, yet 
empirically ambidexterity studies have tended to examine ambidexterity either through 
the lens of structural differentiation or contextual integration, thus limiting our 
understanding of how an organization integrates different antecedent as it transitions 
towards achieving ambidexterity (Agostini et al, 2016; Asif, 2017). Employing a 
longitudinal in-depth case analysis of a large organizational division within the case 
organization, this study looks at how different structural and contextual approaches 
were employed during the division’s strategic pursuit for exploration (science) and 
exploitation (engineering). The findings identify a hybrid approach where different 
modes are integrated in a progressive layered manner, and is underpinned by an 
oscillating dynamism in the exploration-exploitation tension. The study contributes to 
our understanding of how the process to achieving ambidexterity ‘works in practice’, 
and the underpinning mechanisms involved within the process.  
Paper two examines the interplay between the formal and informal 
organization in practice during an organization’s strategic transition to ambidexterity. 
Through an ethnographic analysis of actors across multiple levels of the case 
organization, JSC, the study identifies an emergent practice – ‘the practice of 
circumventing’ – that arises out of the interaction between formal and informal 
organizational elements and, under certain condition, has the capacity to engender 
exploration and exploitation activities. The study finds that though this practice 
resembles a positive deviant behavior, it fulfils Teece’s (2007) categorization of the 
micro-processes of dynamic capabilities.  The study contributes to expanding our 
understanding of how the dynamic interaction between the formal and informal 
organization provides a flexible enacted practice mechanism for promoting 
exploration and exploitation, and its contribution towards dynamic capabilities.  
Paper three examines how organizational history and past crisis-trauma events 
influence and shape an organization’s contemporary strategic change to ambidexterity. 
Employing a longitudinal case analysis of JSC the study examines its 50 years long 
history, its founding imprints and historical crisis-trauma events. The study finds that 
organizational history, particularly past crisis-trauma events have a significant 
influence on the organization’s contemporary framing and perception of exploration 
and exploitation activities. Furthermore, it identifies two historically embedded 
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processes – sustained imprinting and the reprinting process – which actively influence 
the organization’s contemporary context by having a paradoxical effect in that it 
engenders the organization to change but simultaneously establishes rigidities 
impeding the organization’s adaptation towards ambidexterity.  The study contributes 
a multidimensional understanding of the role of organizational history and its 
influence on contemporary strategic activity, and provides insights on how history can 
forge paradoxical tensions in an organization’s present strategic context.  
 
 
Limitations and future research direction 
 This study and its findings stem from a multi-level analysis of a single case 
organization. Though this approach provides depth and rich insight into the reality of 
an organization’s strategic transition towards ambidexterity, its pathway and the 
mechanisms involved, the study has limitations.  
In conducting a single-case analysis of the pursuit of ambidextrous activity, 
this research project is open to the critique of ‘micro-isolationism’ (Seidl and 
Whittington, 2014: 1408), for the organization under study, JSC, is the focal interest 
and therefore bounds the setting in which the phenomenon is studied. However, in 
explicitly examining history, the influence and shaping force of external environmental 
factors, and the deliberate engagement of informants outside the focal organization in 
interviews, this project in part broadens its empirical scope and reduces its degree of 
separation from the larger, macro factors involved in the phenomenon. In addition, 
the ability for this research project to generalize from the data is limited given that 
organizations have idiosyncratic characteristics and therefore the data may capture 
nuances relevant to the organization under study. This study could be advanced 
through multi-case comparative analysis (Eisenhardt, 1991) and follow in the vein of 
inductive studies of multiple cases (e.g. Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Ozcan and 
Santos, 2015). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) notes that “while single-case studies 
can richly describe the existence of a phenomenon…multiple cases enable 
comparisons that clarify whether an emergent finding is simply idiosyncratic to a 
single case or consistently replicated by several cases” (p. 27). Furthermore, extending 
this research through the use of multi-case can serve to strengthen its ‘analytic power’ 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 27) and address construct validity and robustness 
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concerns by reinforcing emerging theory-building (Yin, 2014). It would also contribute 
to developing a broader theoretical framework of the ambidexterity phenomenon.  
Using a single-case methodology allows for the study of complex 
phenomenon such as organizational ambidexterity and allows rich insights to be 
captured. However, it is limited in terms of replication and therefore raises questions 
around whether or not the same findings would be gained if the study was conducted 
at another organization(s).  
 
In terms of avenues for future research, this study focused on understanding 
an organization’s management of the exploration-exploitation tension to become 
ambidextrous, and the mechanisms and structures involved in the process. Future 
research could extend emerging findings highlighting dynamism in the exploration-
exploitation relationship. Studies could explore whether this occurs under other 
contexts or situations beyond those identified in this study (i.e. converging priorities, 
lifecycle changes, and contradictions with interdependent organizational capabilities).  
This would help expand our understanding of the drivers for the dynamism and the 
organizational contexts in which it occurs. Although the central focus of this research 
program has been the exploration-exploitation tension, future studies could go further 
by examining other organizational tensions to see if the relationship between the 
dimensions is similar and demonstrates dynamism, and if so, why? Such a study would 
broaden our view of tensions in terms of areas of cross-over and areas of difference. 
Furthermore, in exploring how different approaches to ambidexterity are integrated in 
practice, we find empirical evidence for an evolving hybrid mode, where approaches 
are progressively combined over time in layers and build upon previous modes. Future 
research could explore this line further to see if there are other patterns of integration 
employed by organizations and if so, how does it operate?  
 In exploring some of the mechanisms and processes actively involved in 
enabling an organization’s pursuit for organizational ambidexterity this study identified 
features such as the interplay of the formal and informal organization, managerial 
dynamic capabilities and unconventional structures, as contributing 
underpinning/micro mechanisms. Future structures could give more focus to such 
constructs as this would further our understanding of how ambidexterity is generated 
beyond current conceptualizations and could provide new practice insights. This study 
also gave attention to organizational features and mechanisms which potentially 
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hindered the organization’s transition to ambidexterity. In analyzing this feature the 
study found that organizational history and past crisis-trauma events can have a 
paradoxical change-rigidity influence on an organization’s contemporary strategic 
activity of exploration and exploitation.  Future studies could expand on this history 
dimension future to see what other specific features or sensitive periods in an 
organization’s past influence its ambidexterity strategy, and the resulting consequence 
(i.e. is it enabling or impeding). In identifying two historically embedded processes – 
sustained imprinting and the reprinting process – this study gives insights into the 
dynamic influence of history and its related processes. The reprinting process provides 
another interesting avenue for future research. Future studies could unpack this 
concept further and see if there are other aspects undiscovered in this study, the role 
of leaders in this process and whether the paradoxical influence is an integral part of 
the process or only occurs under certain circumstance.
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 Paper One  Paper Two  Paper Three 
Research 
questions 
How antecedents to ambidexterity are 
harmoniously engaged within an 
organization, and why would such a 
condition occur; and what organizational 
features underpin this manifestation? 
 
How do emergent informal practices interact 
with formal organizational elements, and 
vice-versa, to engender ambidexterity, and 
does this interaction contribute towards the 
organization’s dynamic capabilities?  
How do historical events in an 
organization’s past influence its current 
approach to strategic change, and what role 
do historical crisis events play in an 
organization's development and transition 
towards ambidexterity? 
Main  
findings 
i ) An organization's pursuit of 
ambidexterity is a change process that 
engages with and layers different 
antecedents over time 
ii ) The exploration-exploitation tensions 
is dynamic and in flux, where both are 
actively present but the emphasis and 
organizational focus fluctuates over time 
due to lifecycle phases, converging 
priorities and contrasting but inter-reliant 
capabilities 
iii ) The transition to ambidexterity 
requires reshaping the organization's 
internal context and middle managers are 
a critical mechanism to achieve change by 
means of dynamic capabilities and 
dynamic managerial capabilities 
 
i ) The interplay of the formal and informal 
organization is manifested in enacted 
practices such as the practice of 
circumventing 
ii ) The interplay of formal and informal 
organizational elements can act as a dynamic 
capability, whereby the actor is capable of 
exercising sensing, seizing and reconfiguring 
processes to promote exploration and 
exploitation 
iii ) Formal authority and informal status 
moderate the outcomes of the practice of 
circumventing, and the degree to which long-
term reconfiguration occurs 
i ) An organization's history can have a 
paradoxical influence on its present-day 
strategic change, for it can attune the 
organization to change yet simultaneously 
restrict the parameters of  its change 
ii ) Organizational crises represents a 
sensitive period in an organization's 
development during which it is susceptible 
to developing new characteristics and 
behaviors 
iii ) The reprinting process is a secondary 
imprinting type process that occurs post 
the organization's founding as a result of 
crisis and trauma events  
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Theoretical 
significance 
i ) Contributes to our understanding of the 
nature of explore-exploit: In the context of 
explore and exploit activities being 
simultaneously present and active (i.e. non 
punctuated equilibrium context), the relationship 
between the dimensions is not constant but 
fluxes under situations of converging priorities,  
lifecycle dynamics and contrasting, yet 
interdependent capabilities 
ii ) In identifying the evolving hybrid approach 
where different antecedents are combined 
progressively over time in a layered pattern, the 
study contributes to expanding our 
understanding of how antecedents are engaged 
integratively in practice, and in so doing 
enhances understanding of the equifinality of 
ambidexterity  
iii) Furthers the middle management perspective 
by showing that their context-reshaping capacity 
extends beyond implementing strategy, and that 
under conditions of organizational cognitive 
dissonance middle managers become the 
significant creators and designers of change 
capabilities at the organizational and individual 
level. 
i ) Contributes to our understanding of 
the interaction of the formal and 
informal organization as an embodied 
practice – the practice of circumventing 
– and that these voluntary positive 
deviant behaviors exhibit the micro-
foundational process of dynamic 
capabilities (sense, seize and 
reconfigure), and under certain 
circumstances, have the ability to 
contribute and reshape an 
organization's internal context, and at 
multiple levels of the organization 
ii ) Advances understanding of the 
mechanisms involved in achieving 
ambidexterity by showing that the 
informal organization can promote this 
endeavor organically, in that such 
practices are endogenous and emerge 
through the voluntary actions of 
organizational actors 
i ) Contributes to our understanding of 
imprinting sensitive periods by identifying 
post-founding crisis-trauma events as 
sensitive periods which can have a 
paradoxical change-rigidity influence on an 
organization’s contemporary strategic 
activity through the process I term 
reprinting  
ii ) Highlights the multidimensional 
influence of organizational history for the 
effect of history on an organization’s 
present strategy should not be viewed as 
the activity of one process but the 
interaction of multiple historically 
embedded processes (i.e. sustained 
imprinting and the reprinting process) 
235 
 
Implications 
for practice 
i ) Highlights to managers that in certain 
situations the relationship between exploration 
and exploitation is not constant but in flux; 
therefore, organizations can expect to experience 
continual fluctuations in their emphasis of 
explore and exploit activities, as they pursue both 
activities simultaneously 
ii ) Aids managers and practitioners by expanding 
their understanding of the role and capabilities of 
middle managers as a context reshaping 
mechanism beyond the implementation of 
strategy (i.e. designers of change capabilities at 
the organizational and individual level) 
 
i ) Gives practitioners insight into how 
informal practices can interact with 
formal organizational elements and 
what the manifestation of this 
interaction looks like in practice 
ii ) Demonstrates to managers that 
under certain conditions, actors exhibit 
positive deviant behavior  which goes 
against organizational norms but 
produces beneficial outcomes 
supporting and promoting explorative 
and exploitative activities 
iii ) Highlights to practitioners that 
practices geared towards change and 
alignment can occur organically and 
voluntarily from the informal 
organization and informal practices 
utilized by actors at different levels of 
the organization, and not just through 
formally recognized processes and 
procedures directed by senior 
management 
i ) Demonstrates to practitioners that 
organizational  history can have an intricate 
influence on its present day context, way of 
behaving and approach to strategic change, 
for it has the capacity to simultaneously 
motivate change and provoke resistance  
ii ) Reveals the role and effect historical 
crises and trauma events can have on 
positioning an organization for change, 
and highlights to managers the significance 
of consciously being aware of the 
structures and cultural mechanisms 
developed by the organization as a 
defensive response to such events and the 
effect these have on the organization's 
current context and approach to 
explorative and exploitative activities 
 
Table 12: Summary of key research findings and contributions 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A  
Sample Questions from Interviews 
 
Examples of questions asked throughout data collection 
1. What does JSC 2.0 mean (i.e. being lean, agile and adaptive to change) to you 
and your organization? What do you think it is trying to achieve, and how do 
you interpret it? 
2. What do the terms innovation and efficiency mean? Do you think it has the 
same universal meaning across the organization? 
3. How would you describe the culture here at JSC, and what do you think needs 
to change to make JSC 2.0 happen? 
4. How do you understand the change occurring at JSC? What are some of the 
changes underway in your organization in response to JSC 2.0, please describe 
them? 
5. Please tell me about when you first joined JSC, what were your experiences 
and how have things changed? 
 
Examples of questions targeted to individuals involved in the largest division 
(ISS program) 
1. What is the core role of the RISE change initiative and how did it come about? 
What is the strategic mandate you are working towards? 
2. What was going on internally/externally that bought about a realization that 
change was needed? 
3. Is the culture in the program different to that of the Center, and if so how? 
4. Having witnessed the transition of the ISS from assembly to full utilization, 
describe the transition process, what were the critical factors and your key 
lessons learnt? 
5. The distinction between science and engineering, how is this understood in the 
program, and how does it manifest in the program? What challenges does this 
distinction present and how do you overcome them?  
 
Examples of questions tailored to specific individuals 
1. The interaction between the business and technical side of the organization, 
what issues if any, arise as a result of this distinction?  
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2. How does the organization define risks and manage risks? Are risks 
categorized and defined the same way across the Center and what are the 
distinctions?  
3. How do you know if the strategy has been successful? What is the measure of 
success? 
4. In terms of competencies and skills, what do you think is needed for 
innovation and efficiency to occur effectively and simultaneously at JSC/in 
your organization? 
5. How do you know if the strategy has been successful? What is the measure of 
success? 
 
 
Appendix B 
Selected case organization, JSC 
  
Established in 1961, the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) is the hub of all 
human spaceflight activity for NASA and is one of NASA’s largest research and 
development facilities. The Center has served as the mission control for all manned in-
orbit missions from the Gemini, Apollo and Skylab projects of the 1960s -1970s to 
the more recent Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs. 
Throughout its history JSC has played a direct role in a number of NASA’s innovation 
achievements including the moon landing of 1969 and the launch of the Hubble 
telescope in 1990. However, the organization has also experienced fatal disasters - the 
Apollo fire of 1961, the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, and Space Shuttle 
Columbia explosion in 2003. Historically, NASA held a monopolistic position in space 
activities with the government agency being the only customer in the U.S space 
industry. However, since 2010 the organization has experienced a high degree of 
change in its internal and external environment.   
In 2010 under the Obama Administration, JSC’s burgeoning Constellation 
program was abruptly cancelled and a new Space Policy was implemented which called 
for the agency to operate within a commercial arena. This triggered the emergence of 
US commercial space and private sector entrants with the likes of Orbital ATK, Blue 
Origin and SpaceX. The commercial space industry has evolved seeing a growth in 
private and commercial entrants who in 2015 accounted for 76% of global space 
activity, representing approximately three-quarters of all global economic space 
264 
 
activity (The Space Report, 2016)44. For JSC this shift in policy towards 
commercialization changed its operational dynamic and introduced new business 
relationships. The agency would no longer be the sole customer and owner of space 
hardware and the private sector was no longer limited to the role of contractor. In this 
evolving environment, JSC (and by extension the wider NASA agency) would operate 
as one of many customers and the private sector is now an integral partner with its 
own vested interests.  
Moreover, in March 2013 US Congress implemented a “sequestration” 
imposing across-the-board cuts in discretionary spending among Defense and federal 
agencies over the coming 10 years. This placed further budgetary constraints on JSC 
and the wider NASA agency who had seen a consistent progressive decrease in its 
budget allocation (see appendix F). This shifting landscape signaled an unprecedented 
degree of change for JSC and in an effort to redirect and align the organization with 
its new environment, JSC Center Director, Dr. Ellen Ochoa, announced a new 
strategy in the spring of 2013 intended to pursue innovation alongside efficiency, 
sustainability and affordability:  
“We know that we need to operate under the constraints of scarce 
resources and ongoing uncertainty. My concept of JSC 2.0 asks a 
fundamental question: If we were starting JSC today, how would 
we build a space center to reach our vision of leading a global 
enterprise in human space exploration that is sustainable, 
affordable and benefits humankind? […] How would we be 
organized to most efficiently and effectively carry out our work? 
What tools and processes would we use? How can we be more 
nimble and adaptable to change, and stay that way in the future? I 
hope everyone at JSC will engage in “re-inventing” JSC so that 
both our current programs and projects, as well as ones we hope 
to carry out in the future, will be successful” (Dr. Ellen Ochoa, 
2013: 2)45  
 
                                                          
44 The size of the global space industry combines satellite services and ground equipment, 
government space budgets, and global navigation satellite services (GNSS) equipment. In 2016 
this was estimated to be $324 billion. Government space budgets represent the second largest 
contributor to the industry with an estimated share of 24% of the global space economy, with 
the US government spending $44.57 billion on its space efforts in 2015. Source: Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), Annual Compendium of Commercial Space Transportation: 2016, 
January 2016; FAA AST: Washington DC 
[https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2016_Compendiu
m.pdf] 
45 NASA JSC Roundup: Fantastic Voyages, Spring 2013 (magazine) 
265 
 
What’s more, Dr. Ellen Ocha’s new strategy also spoke of exploration and the 
intention of a “reinvigorated JSC mission statement, emphasizing our role in 
pioneering humankind’s presence in space” (JSC features, 2016)46.  
 
 
Appendix C 
Instances of U.S. legislative attempts to 
terminate the ISS Program 
 
  
 House of Reps introduced bill to terminate the Space Station Freedom program.H.R.5393 
- To terminate the Space Station Freedom program – 102nd Congress, June 1992 (1991-
1992)  
 Senate introduced bill for Deficit Reduction through Space Station Freedom Termination 
Act of 1992 (see, “S.2930 - Deficit Reduction through Space Station Freedom 
Termination Act of 1992: 102nd Congress (1991-1992), July 1992 
 Bill introduced to terminate the ISS program held in 1993 (see, ‘H.R.1856 - Space Station 
Freedom Termination Act of 1993: 103rd Congress (1993-1994)’.  
 U.S. Senate Bill to terminate ISS program, January 1993 (see, ‘S.462 - Deficit Reduction 
Through Space Station Freedom Termination Act of 1993: 103rd Congress (1993-1994)  
 Termination Bill introduced May, 1993 (see, ‘H.R.2050 - To terminate the Space Station 
Freedom and Advanced Solid Rocket Motor programs, and to redirect the savings 
therefrom to deficit reduction, and to National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
space and civil aviation programs. 103rd Congress (1993-1994)  
 Bill to terminate the program introduced in May 1994 (see, ‘H.R.4451 - To terminate the 
International Space Station Alpha program, and to redirect the savings therefrom to 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration space and civil aviation programs: 103rd 
Congress (1993-1994) 
 House of Reps. ISS termination Bill introduced in 1995 (see, ‘H.R.407 - To terminate the 
International Space Station Alpha program. 104th Congress (1995-1996)’  
 Senate ISS termination act, January 1995. (see, ‘S.157 - Reduction of Federal Spending 
Through Space Station Termination Act of 1995: 104th Congress (1995-1996)  
 Bill to terminate the program introduced in 1997 at the start of ISS construction (see, 
‘H.R. 1831 - To terminate the United States participation in the International Space 
Station program. 105TH Congress (1997-1998)’  
 Amendment sought to eliminate the authorization in the bill for funding of the 
international space station. “H.Amdt.1102 to H.R.3322 – 104th Congress (1995-1996). 
Failed by recorded vote: 127 – 286 [H.R.3322 - Omnibus Civilian Science Authorization 
Act of 1996 – 104th Congress (1995-1996).  
 Amendment sought to cancel funding for the International Space Station. “H.Amdt.775 
to H.R.4194 — 105th Congress (1997-1998). Failed by recorded vote:  109-323” 
                                                          
46 JSC Features. Coffee chats jolt creativity for JSC 2.016 initiatives [electronic 
communications] 
https://jscfeatures.jsc.nasa.gov/pages.ashx/471/Coffee%20chats%20jolt%20creativity%20fo
r%20JSC%202016%20initiatives  
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[H.R.4194 - Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 – 105th Congress (1997-1998)] 
 Amendment sought to terminate the International Space Station program. “H.Amdt.107 
to H.R.1654 – 106th Congress (1999-2000). Failed by recorded vote: 92 – 337 [H.R.1654 - 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2000 – 106TH 
Congress (1999-2000)] 
 Amendment sought to eliminate funding for the international space station program. 
“H.Amdt.423 to H.R.2684 – 106th Congress (1999-2000). Failed by recorded vote: 121 – 
298 [H.R.2684 - Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, 
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000 – 106th Congress (1999-2000) 
 
Source: US Congress. Available from: 
https://www.congress.gov/search?q={%22source%22:%22legislation%22,%22search%22:%
22International+space+station%22}&searchResultViewType=expanded&pageSort=relevancy
&page=2 ) [Accessed 24-01-2017] 
 
 
Appendix D 
Vignettes: Empirical examples of episodes of 
the practice of circumventing 
 
Vignette 1: Example of organizational actor circumventing steps within a formal 
process:  
Following the radical changes that occurred in its environment in 2010, JSC was 
mandated to establish strategic partnerships and collaboration initiatives with external 
organizations to develop new technologies and commercial avenues to apply them. 
This new policy meant the development of a number of new procedures to 
standardize the process of developing new partnerships with commercial 
organizations. One of the key new processes developed was JSC internal contractual 
approval and sign-off process which authorized the partnership. The approval and 
sign-off process was designed with a number of review stages (including legal reviews), 
after which it would receive official sign-off from the executive director. Due to the 
bureaucratic nature of JSC administrative systems the approval process was known, 
both internally to JSC and externally by potential partner organizations, to be a long 
slow process. Nevertheless, one of JSC Division Deputy Manager’s had successfully 
developed a partnership opportunity with a large local organization for innovation 
collaboration and had received the necessary approvals informally. All that was left 
was completion of the formal sign-off process confirming approval of the contract. A 
contract completion date had been agreed by both JSC and the new partner and both 
parties awaited its finalization. The Division Deputy Manager regularly checked on the 
progress of contract in the sign-off process, however, as the agreed completion date 
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grew closer it became apparent to the Division Deputy Manager that the partnership 
contract would not be sign-off in time. Realizing that this delay could jeopardize the 
future of the partnership the Division Deputy Manager decided to intervene. Having 
established that the contract had been reviewed and Okayed by the necessary internal 
reviewers, a critical step in the review process, the Division Deputy Manager skipped 
the remaining administrative steps in the process and submitted the contract directly 
to the Executive Director for sign-off. However, this action to skip the remaining 
administrative steps was perceived negatively by senior management and resulted in 
the contract being pushed back to the administration office and was advised that the 
skipping steps in the process should not be performed as it would only result in 
further delays. The Division Deputy Manager reflected that “I don't mind if JSC does 
its processes or whatever it needs to internally, but when it reflects badly on JSC and 
our brand to the external partner we're trying to collaborate with then it bothers me” 
(Division, Deputy Manager), thus showing that the practice of circumventing was not 
enacted for personal gain but to promote efficiency and innovative collaboration. 
 
 
Vignette 2: Example of senior management circumventing layers of hierarchy 
One of the core operational directorates at JSC redesigned and implemented a new 
training program for all of its technical operators in order to reduce the training period 
and upskill staff quicker and more efficiently. The senior management team detected 
that delays and operational issues occurring during the implementation of the new 
training program was due to middle management resistance. Some of the middle 
managers felt that the new training time period was not long enough to develop the 
necessary operational skills and knowledge, and was also an unfair departure from the 
way things had been done in the past. The management team believed that the new 
training plan was a strategic way of realizing efficiency and maintaining high morale in 
staff, particularly in younger employees. To realize the new training plan the 
management team intentionally circumvented the entire middle management level and 
set about performing a series of informal interactive activities to communicate with 
and engage directly the lower level employees who would be affected by the new 
training plan to drum up their support. In doing so the management team’s utilization 
of the practice of circumventing promoted efficiency and resulted in the successful 
implementation of the new training program which, in the long-term, resulted in 
successfully changing the formal training structure permanently. 
 
 
Vignette 3: Example of middle management circumventing hierarchy layers 
The largest program in operation at JSC underwent a major change initiative designed 
to transform its culture, operating processes and systems so that the program could 
execute science exploration and routine engineering activities effectively and 
simultaneously. This change initiative had been initiated and designed by a group of 
middle managers who had, through voluntary means, identified structural inhibitors in 
the organization’s pre-existing systems and culture preventing the program from 
fulfilling its strategy for effective and concurrent operations of science exploration and 
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engineering excellence. The middle managers took their assertions to senior 
management who commissioned the middle managers to design, develop and 
implement a change strategy to resolve the obstacles and embed the simultaneous 
management of science innovation and engineering excellence into the fabric of the 
program. The change consisted solely of middle managers who were pulled from their 
routine jobs and redeployed to focus solely on developing the new change strategy. 
From its outset the change team operated as a separate transient unit with a different 
reporting line outside the program’s hierarchical chain of command. Supported by the 
program executive, the change team would report directly to the executive, thereby 
intentionally circumventing a number of upper management hierarchical layers 
including their own line managers. The middle managers identified that by 
circumventing layers of upper management they could reduce structural hindrances 
creating dissonance between upper and lower levels of the program which were 
impeding the program’s ambidextrous strategy being translated into its operations. 
This reporting structure also allowed the executive to monitor the strategy’s 
development closely and also gave visibility to workings on the ground thereby 
removing one of the structural inhibitors previously identified by the middle 
managers. From their beginning, the change team were given full design freedom and 
authority by the program executive to explore and make solutions as they saw fit and 
all boundary constraints were removed from the group other than retaining the 
program’s structure and maintaining safety. As a consequence of the change team’s 
unconventional design and reporting structure a successful strategy was developed 
promoting science exploration activities alongside engineering excellence. With the 
leader of the change team later being integrated into program management during 
implementation of the change initiative helped to instill permanent change into the 
program’s hard systems such as processes, enabling systems and performance 
management mechanisms as well as intangible features including the program’s 
cultural norms.  
  
Vignette 4: Junior employees circumventing levels of hierarchy 
Within the informal organization at JSC some divisions practice “skip-level meetings”. 
This practice is intended to overcome recognized structural inhibitors (i.e. middle 
managers) so that employees at lower levels of the organization can have direct access 
to senior management to share ideas, explore ways to be innovative, ask questions and 
provide constructive feedback on current organizational affairs in an unstructured 
prescribed manner. The practice is a repeated activity that occurs in some but not all 
divisions across JSC as it is a voluntary practice – attendance is voluntary although 
management make a point to make themselves available to attend. The practice is 
exercised within the informal organization through informal means however 
depending on a division’s particular sub-culture and systems of working it can take 
different forms. It is a practice that is supported by some divisions but is not 
mandated by the formal organization. This bottom-up interaction was perceived to be 
better received and promote in positive outcomes promoting the pursuit of 
innovation and efficiency driven activities in comparison to other informal non-
supported “skip-level” attempts because although these junior employees lack formal 
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authority they benefit from a higher degree of informal status because not only do 
they know who their management are, but have direct access to them and know that 
this action is supported by their management who possess a high degree of formal 
authority.  Although some middle and senior managers were perceived to find this 
form of the practice of circumventing unnerving, because it had support from the 
management team of that particular division, there was no perceived resistance to the 
“skip-level” meetings. An outcome of these meetings was the identification and 
implementation of incremental changes by junior members intended to instill small 
process orientated changes geared towards promoting efficiency; and also the 
development of small informal innovation-centered groups who gathered in their own 
time to pursue small innovative projects of common interest. 
 
 
 
Appendix E 
Overview: JSC founding history 
 
In 1958 at the height of the Cold War, and in reaction to the launch of the 
Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite by the Soviet’s the previous year, President 
Dwight Eisenhower signed a public order creating the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), by incorporating its predecessor, the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)47 (1915-1958) into a federal agency 
dedicated to space exploration; and so ensued the space race with the U.S.S.R and the 
U.S.A. competing for technological dominance in space.  
Within days of NASA’s founding came the creation of the Space Task Group 
(STG), a working group of engineers based at Langley Research Center, Virginia, who 
were responsible for US manned spaceflight projects. In 1961, following President 
John F. Kennedy’s speech setting the goal to put a man on the moon before the end 
of the 1960s, NASA Administrator James E. Webb scaled up the STG unit 
transforming it into the Manned Spacecraft Center and in 1962 moved the Center to 
larger facilities Houston, Texas: 
                                                          
47 See following resources for an exposition of the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) (1915-1958): Bugos, G.E., and Boyd, J.W. (2008). Accelerating 
entrepreneurial space: The case for an NACA-style organization. Space Policy, 24: 140 – 147; 
NACA Annotated Bibliography.  
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“Houston, your City of Houston, with its Manned 
Spacecraft Center, will become the heart of a large 
scientific and engineering community.” (President John F. 
Kennedy, 1962)48.  
 
In 1973, the Manned Spacecraft Center was renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson 
Space Center (JSC), and this organization is the focus of this research project. JSC is 
famed for Mission Control Center (MCC), a unit which since its inception has 
managed the running of flight activities for all human space mission operations 
throughout the Agency’s history - the Gemini project, Apollo program, Skylab, 
Apollo-Soyuz, Space Shuttle flights – including the first moon walk in 1969. Today, 
JSC is responsible for managing flight operations to and from the International Space 
Station (ISS) and oversees the development of the new Orion space vehicle and 
contributes towards the Commercial Crew program.  
Since the end of the Shuttle program in 2011 NASA no longer has the 
capability to transport astronauts to space and has since become dependent on Russia 
and the use of its Soyuz vehicle to carry U.S astronauts to the International Space 
Station, paying $71 million per seat. In 2010, the Obama Administration announced a 
new NASA program, the Commercial Crew Program (CCP). The program sees NASA 
invest in a number of U.S commercial companies to facilitate the design and 
development of a new breed of transportation capabilities to take U.S astronauts to 
and from low-earth-orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS). The CCP 
program roused a shift in NASA’s focus away from in-house technological 
development towards commercially developed spaceflight, and signaled an adjustment 
for NASA and JSC in the area of human spaceflight. Critically it meant that the 
development of forthcoming space transportation vehicle hardware and technologies 
transporting US astronauts to space would no longer be the sole domain of NASA but 
resided also with private space companies. Going forward, NASA and JSC is reliant 
on space crafts designed, manufactured and operated by private companies to 
transport cargo and humans to LEO and the ISS. Through the development of Space 
Act Agreements (SAA), NASA has awarded more than $8.2 billion to accelerate the 
commercial program and enable commercial entities to collaborate in the development 
of its technological capabilities.  
                                                          
48 President John F. Kennedy Moon Speech - Rice Stadium, September 12, 1962. Speech 
transcript. https://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/ricetalk.htm  
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Appendix F  
 
 
 
Source: Data sourced from U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
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